After describing the futility of Germany's Moroccan policy, Prince
Lichnowsky goes on:
When I arrived in London, in November, 1912, public opinion had
calmed about the Morocco question. Mr. Haldane's mission had
certainly failed, since we had demanded a promise of neutrality
instead of satisfying ourselves with a compact which would
secure us against a British attack or an attack with British
support. Sir Edward Grey, however, had not given up the idea of
reaching an agreement with us and, as a beginning, made an
attempt in this direction in the economic and colonial spheres.
With Herr von Kühlmann as expert intermediary, an exchange of
views took place concerning the renewal of the Portuguese
Colonial Agreement and the Bagdad Railway, the object of which
was to divide the aforesaid colonies, as well as Asia Minor,
into spheres of interest. The British statesman desired, since
the old disputes with France and Russia were settled, to reach a
corresponding agreement with us. His aim was not to isolate us,
but to get us to take part in the already established concert.
Having succeeded in throwing a bridge across the Franco-British
and Russo-British divisions, he wished also, as far as possible,
to remove the causes of friction between England and Germany,
and, by a network of agreements--to which might well eventually
have been added an agreement on the unfortunate naval
question--to secure the peace of the world.
This was Sir Edward Grey's program. In his own words "Without
prejudice to the existing friendly understandings with France
and Russia, which pursued no aggressive aims, and involved in
themselves for England no binding obligations, to reach a
friendly rapprochement and understanding with Germany." In
short, to bring the two groups nearer together.
In this connection two schools of opinion--the optimists, who
believed in the possibility of an understanding; the pessimists,
who considered that war was sooner or later unavoidable. To the
former belonged Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Haldane, and
most of the members of the Liberal Cabinet, as well as the
leading Liberal organs, like The Westminster, The Chronicle, and
The (Manchester) Guardian. To the pessimists belonged,
primarily, Conservative politicians like Mr. Balfour, who on
repeated occasions allowed me to know his opinion, and leading
soldiers like Lord Roberts, who preached the necessity for the
introduction of compulsory service; also the Northcliffe press,
and the important English journalist, Mr. Garvin. During my time
in office, however, this party refrained from all attacks, and
maintained, both personally and politically, a friendly
attitude. But our naval policy and our conduct in 1905, 1908,
and 1911 had created among them the belief that some day it
would come to war. The first school, exactly as among us in
Germany, are now accused of foolishness and short-sightedness,
while the second are regarded as true prophets.
Prince Lichnowsky goes on to describe the situation during the Balkan
war. There were two policies, he says, open to Germany--to act as an
impartial mediator and seek a stable settlement in accordance with the
wishes of the Balkan peoples, or to conduct a strict Triple Alliance
policy. He himself recommended the former, but the Wilhelmstrasse
determined on the latter. Austria wished to keep Serbia from the
Adriatic; Italy wished to prevent the Greeks from reaching Avlona;
Russia supported the Serbs, France supported the Greeks. Germany had no
motive whatever for supporting her allies, and thus bringing about a bad
settlement, except the desire to consolidate what, in Prince
Lichnowsky's opinion, was a palpably worthless alliance--worthless
because it was obvious that Italy would break from the alliance in the
event of war, while Austria was absolutely dependent on Germany in peace
and war without an alliance.
The best way to increase Austria's dependence was to cultivate friendly
relations between Germany and Russia. The Kaiser, for dynastic reasons,
was in favor of the division of Albania between Greece and Serbia, but
"when I, in a letter to him, urged this solution, I received from the
Chancellor a severe reprimand to the effect that I was supporting
Austria's enemies, and should refrain from direct correspondence with
the Emperor."
Thus Germany decided to take her stand on the side of the Turkish and
Magyar oppressors for the sake of the Triple Alliance--a fatal blunder,
which Prince Lichnowsky describes as "all the more striking since a
sudden Franco-Russian assault--the only hypothesis which could justify
the Triple Alliance policy--could, in fact, be ruled out of our
calculations."