German Ambassador to Great Britain in 1914 Proves That His Country
Forced the War
Prince Lichnowsky, who was the German Ambassador to Great Britain when
the war began, is the author of an extremely interesting and important
historical document which became public in March, 1918. It is in the
form of a private memorandum written by the Prince, in which he frankly
and definitely admits that the guilt for starting the world conflict
rests upon his own country. The document, through some unrevealed
agency, reached the Stockholm newspaper Politiken, the influential
mouthpiece of the Swedish Socialists, and was printed in installments.
The publication created a profound sensation throughout Europe. It
evoked passionate rebukes of the Prince in the Reichstag and drew forth
an important utterance from the former German Foreign Minister, who
failed to refute its supremely important revelations. It was reported
early in April that the German Government had taken steps to institute
proceedings against the Prince on the charges of revealing State secrets
and of treason to the State.
The memorandum was written by Prince Lichnowsky about eighteen months
ago for the purpose of explaining and justifying his position to his
personal friends, and only half a dozen typewritten copies were made.
One of these copies, through a betrayal, reached the Wilhelmstrasse, and
caused a great scandal, and another was communicated to some members of
the Minority Socialist Party. But how it happened that a copy got across
the German frontier remains a mystery. Internal evidence, however,
leaves no doubt in regard to the authenticity of the document. It is
entitled "My London Mission, 1912-1914," and is dated "Kuchelna, (Prince
Lichnowsky's country seat,) August, 1916."
Prince Lichnowsky begins with a recital of the circumstances which led
to his being appointed to London after many years of retirement from
diplomacy, and a description of the European position as he then found
it. The moment, he believes,
was undoubtedly favorable for a new attempt to get on a better
footing with England. Our enigmatical Moroccan policy had
repeatedly shaken confidence in our peaceful disposition and
aroused the suspicion that we were not quite sure what we
wanted, or that our intention was to keep Europe in suspense,
and, when occasion served, to humiliate the French. An Austrian
colleague, who was long in Paris, said to me, "If the French
begin to forget révanche, you regularly remind them of it by
treading heavily on their toes."
After rejecting M. Delcassé's attempt to come to an agreement
with us in regard to Morocco, and declaring that we had no
political interests there, an attitude which was in full
accordance with the traditions of the Bismarckian policy, we
suddenly recognized in Abdul Aziz a Kruger No. 2. To him, also,
like the Boers, we promised the powerful support of the German
Empire--at the same cost and with the same result. For both
affairs ended, as they had to end, unless we were already then
resolved to undertake a world war--namely, in withdrawal.
Our attitude promoted the Russo-Japanese and the Russo-British
rapprochements. In face of the German peril all other conflicts
fell into the background. The possibility of a new Franco-German
war had become evident.