CHAPTER VI

OF THE CEREMONIAL LAW[8]

In the foregoing chapter we have shown that the Divine law, which

renders men truly blessed, and teaches them the true life, is universal

to all men; nay, we have so intimately deduced it from human nature that

it must be esteemed innate, and, as it were, ingrained in the human

mind.

But with regard to the ceremonial observances which were ordained in the

Old Testament for the Hebrews only, and were so adapted to their state

that they could for the most part only be observed by the society as a

whole and not by each individual, it is evident that they formed no part

of the Divine law, and had nothing to do with blessedness and virtue,

but had reference only to the election of the Hebrews, that is (as I

have shown in Chapter IV), to their temporal bodily happiness and the

tranquillity of their kingdom, and that therefore they were only valid

while that kingdom lasted. If in the Old Testament they are spoken of as

the law of God, it is only because they were founded on revelation, or a

basis of revelation. Still as reason, however sound, has little weight

with ordinary theologians, I will adduce the authority of Scripture for

what I here assert, and will further show, for the sake of greater

clearness, why and how these ceremonials served to establish and

preserve the Jewish kingdom. Isaiah teaches most plainly that the Divine

law in its strict sense signifies that universal law which consists in a

true manner of life, and does not signify ceremonial observances. In

chapter i., verse 10, the prophet calls on his countrymen to hearken to

the Divine law as he delivers it, and first excluding all kinds of

sacrifices and all feasts, he at length sums up the law in these few

words: "Cease to do evil, learn to do well: seek judgment, relieve the

oppressed." Not less striking testimony is given in Psalm xl. 7-9, where

the Psalmist addresses God: "Sacrifice and offering Thou didst not

desire; mine ears hast Thou opened; burnt offering and sin-offering hast

Thou not required; I delight to do Thy will, O my God; yea, Thy law is

within my heart." Here the Psalmist reckons as the law of God only that

which is inscribed in his heart, and excludes ceremonies therefrom, for

the latter are good and inscribed on the heart only from the fact of

their institution, and not because of their intrinsic value.

Other passages of Scripture testify to the same truth, but these two

will suffice. We may also learn from the Bible that ceremonies are no

aid to blessedness, but only have reference to the temporal prosperity

of the kingdom; for the rewards promised for their observance are merely

temporal advantages and delights, blessedness being reserved for the

universal Divine law. In all the five books commonly attributed to Moses

nothing is promised, as I have said, beyond temporal benefits, such as

honors, fame, victories, riches, enjoyments, and health. Though many

moral precepts besides ceremonies are contained in these five books,

they appear not as moral doctrines universal to all men, but as commands

especially adapted to the understanding and character of the Hebrew

people, and as having reference only to the welfare of the kingdom. For

instance, Moses does not teach the Jews as a prophet not to kill or to

steal, but gives these commandments solely as a lawgiver and judge; he

does not reason out the doctrine, but affixes for its non-observance a

penalty which may and very properly does vary in different nations. So,

too, the command not to commit adultery is given merely with reference

to the welfare of the state; for if the moral doctrine had been

intended, with reference not only to the welfare of the state, but also

to the tranquillity and blessedness of the individual, Moses would have

condemned not merely the outward act, but also the mental acquiescence,

as is done by Christ, Who taught only universal moral precepts, and for

this cause promises a spiritual instead of a temporal reward. Christ, as

I have said, was sent into the world, not to preserve the state nor to

lay down laws, but solely to teach the universal moral law, so we can

easily understand that He wished in no wise to do away with the law of

Moses, inasmuch as He introduced no new laws of His own--His sole care

was to teach moral doctrines, and distinguish them from the laws of the

state; for the Pharisees, in their ignorance, thought that the

observance of the state law and the Mosaic law was the sum total of

morality; whereas such laws merely had reference to the public welfare,

and aimed not so much at instructing the Jews as at keeping them under

constraint. But let us return to our subject, and cite other passages

of Scripture which set forth temporal benefits as rewards for observing

the ceremonial law, and blessedness as reward for the universal law.

None of the prophets puts the point more clearly than Isaiah. After

condemning hypocrisy, he commends liberty and charity towards oneself

and one's neighbors, and promises as a reward: "Then shall thy light

break forth as the morning, and thy health shall spring forth speedily,

thy righteousness shall go before thee, and the glory of the Lord shall

be thy reward" (chap. lviii. 8). Shortly afterwards he commends the

Sabbath, and for a due observance of it promises: "Then shalt thou

delight thyself in the Lord, and I will cause thee to ride upon the high

places of the earth, and feed thee with the heritage of Jacob thy

father: for the mouth of the Lord has spoken it." Thus the prophet, for

liberty bestowed and charitable works, promises a healthy mind in a

healthy body, and the glory of the Lord even after death; whereas, for

ceremonial exactitude, he only promises security of rule, prosperity,

and temporal happiness.

... It remains to show why and how the ceremonial observances tended to

preserve and confirm the Hebrew kingdom; and this I can very briefly do

on grounds universally accepted.

The formation of society serves not only for defensive purposes, but is

also very useful, and, indeed, absolutely necessary, as rendering

possible the division of labor. If men did not render mutual assistance

to each other, no one would have either the skill or the time to provide

for his own sustenance and preservation: for all men are not equally

apt for all work, and no one would be capable of preparing all that he

individually stood in need of. Strength and time, I repeat, would fail,

if every one had in person to plow, to sow, to reap, to grind corn, to

cook, to weave, to stitch and perform the other numerous functions

required to keep life going; to say nothing of the arts and sciences

which are also entirely necessary to the perfection and blessedness of

human nature. We see that peoples living in uncivilized barbarism lead a

wretched and almost animal life, and even they would not be able to

acquire their few rude necessaries without assisting one another to a

certain extent.

Now if men were so constituted by nature that they desired nothing but

what is designated by true reason, society would obviously have no need

of laws: it would be sufficient to inculcate true moral doctrines; and

men would freely, without hesitation, act in accordance with their true

interests. But human nature is framed in a different fashion: every one,

indeed, seeks his own interest, but does not do so in accordance with

the dictates of sound reason, for most men's ideas of desirability and

usefulness are guided by their fleshly instincts and emotions, which

take no thought beyond the present and the immediate object. Therefore,

no society can exist without government, and force, and laws to restrain

and repress men's desires and immoderate impulses. Still human nature

will not submit to absolute repression. Violent governments, as Seneca

says, never last long; the moderate governments endure.

So long as men act simply from fear they act contrary to their

inclinations, taking no thought for the advantages or necessity of their

actions, but simply endeavoring to escape punishment or loss of life.

They must needs rejoice in any evil which befalls their ruler, even if

it should involve themselves; and must long for and bring about such

evil by every means in their power. Again, men are especially intolerant

of serving and being ruled by their equals. Lastly, it is exceedingly

difficult to revoke liberties once granted.

From these considerations it follows, firstly, that authority should

either be vested in the hands of the whole state in common, so that

every one should be bound to serve, and yet not be in subjection to his

equals; or else, if power be in the hands of a few, or one man, that one

man should be something above average humanity, or should strive to get

himself accepted as such. Secondly, laws should in every government be

so arranged that people should be kept in bounds by the hope of some

greatly desired good, rather than by fear, for then every one will do

his duty willingly.

Lastly, as obedience consists in acting at the bidding of external

authority, it would have no place in a state where the government is

vested in the whole people, and where laws are made by common consent.

In such a society the people would remain free, whether the laws were

added to or diminished, inasmuch as it would not be done on external

authority, but their own free consent. The reverse happens when the

sovereign power is vested in one man, for all act at his bidding; and,

therefore, unless they had been trained from the first to depend on the

words of their ruler, the latter would find it difficult, in case of

need, to abrogate liberties once conceded, and impose new laws.

From these universal considerations, let us pass on to the kingdom of

the Jews. The Jews when they first came out of Egypt were not bound by

any national laws, and were therefore free to ratify any laws they

liked, or to make new ones, and were at liberty to set up a government

and occupy a territory wherever they chose. However, they were entirely

unfit to frame a wise code of laws and to keep the sovereign power

vested in the community; they were all uncultivated and sunk in a

wretched slavery, therefore the sovereignty was bound to remain vested

in the hands of one man who would rule the rest and keep them under

constraint, make laws and interpret them. This sovereignty was easily

retained by Moses, because he surpassed the rest in virtue and persuaded

the people of the fact, proving it by many testimonies (see Exod. chap.

xiv., last verse, and chap. xix., verse 9). He then, by the Divine

virtue he possessed, made laws and ordained them for the people, taking

the greatest care that they should be obeyed willingly and not through

fear, being specially induced to adopt this course by the obstinate

nature of the Jews, who would not have submitted to be ruled solely by

constraint; and also by the imminence of war, for it is always better to

inspire soldiers with a thirst for glory than to terrify them with

threats; each man will then strive to distinguish himself by valor and

courage, instead of merely trying to escape punishment. Moses,

therefore, by his virtue and the Divine command, introduced a religion

so that the people might do their duty from devotion rather than fear.

Further, he bound them over by benefits, and prophesied many advantages

in the future; nor were his laws very severe, as any one may see for

himself, especially if he remarks the number of circumstances necessary

in order to procure the conviction of an accused person.

Lastly, in order that the people which could not govern itself should be

entirely dependent on its ruler, he left nothing to the free choice of

individuals (who had hitherto been slaves); the people could do nothing

but remember the law, and follow the ordinances laid down at the good

pleasure of their ruler; they were not allowed to plow, to sow, to reap,

nor even to eat; to clothe themselves, to shave, to rejoice, or, in

fact, to do anything whatever as they liked, but were bound to follow

the directions given in the law; and not only this, but they were

obliged to have marks on their doorposts, on their hands, and between

their eyes to admonish them to perpetual obedience.

This, then, was the object of the ceremonial law, that men should do

nothing of their own free will, but should always act under external

authority, and should continually confess by their actions and thoughts

that they were not their own masters, but were entirely under the

control of others.

From all these considerations it is clearer than day that ceremonies

have nothing to do with a state of blessedness, and that those mentioned

in the Old Testament, _i.e._, the whole Mosaic Law, had reference merely

to the government of the Jews, and merely temporal advantages.

As for the Christian rites, such as baptism, the Lord's Supper,

festivals, public prayers, and any other observances which are, and

always have been, common to all Christendom, if they were instituted by

Christ or His Apostles (which is open to doubt), they were instituted as

external signs of the universal church, and not as having anything to do

with blessedness, or possessing any sanctity in themselves. Therefore,

though such ceremonies were not ordained for the sake of upholding a

government, they were ordained for the preservation of a society, and

accordingly he who lives alone is not bound by them: nay, those who live

in a country where the Christian religion is forbidden, are bound to

abstain from such rites, and can none the less live in a state of

blessedness. We have an example of this in Japan, where the Christian

religion is forbidden, and the Dutch who live there are enjoined by

their East India Company not to practice any outward rites of religion.

I need not cite other examples, though it would be easy to prove my

point from the fundamental principles of the New Testament, and to

adduce many confirmatory instances; but I pass on the more willingly, as

I am anxious to proceed to my next proposition. I will now, therefore,

pass on to what I proposed to treat of in the second part of this

chapter, namely, what persons are bound to believe in the narratives

contained in Scripture, and how far they are so bound. Examining this

question by the aid of natural reason, I will proceed as follows:

If any one wishes to persuade his fellows for or against anything which

is not self-evident, he must deduce his contention from their

admissions, and convince them either by experience or by ratiocination;

either by appealing to facts of natural experience, or to self-evident

intellectual axioms. Now unless the experience be of such a kind as to

be clearly and distinctly understood, though it may convince a man, it

will not have the same effect on his mind and disperse the clouds of his

doubt so completely as when the doctrine taught is deduced entirely from

intellectual axioms--that is, by the mere power of the understanding and

logical order, and this is especially the case in spiritual matters

which have nothing to do with the senses.

But the deduction of conclusions from general truths _a priori_, usually

requires a long chain of arguments, and, moreover, very great caution,

acuteness, and self-restraint--qualities which are not often met with;

therefore people prefer to be taught by experience rather than deduce

their conclusion from a few axioms, and set them out in logical order.

Whence it follows, that if any one wishes to teach a doctrine to a whole

nation (not to speak of the whole human race), and to be understood by

all men in every particular, he will seek to support his teaching with

experience, and will endeavor to suit his reasonings and the definitions

of his doctrines as far as possible to the understanding of the common

people, who form the majority of mankind, and he will not set them forth

in logical sequence nor adduce the definitions which serve to establish

them. Otherwise he writes only for the learned--that is, he will be

understood by only a small proportion of the human race.

All Scripture was written primarily for an entire people, and

secondarily for the whole human race; therefore its contents must

necessarily be adapted as far as possible to the understanding of the

masses, and proved only by examples drawn from experience. We will

explain ourselves more clearly. The chief speculative doctrines taught

in Scripture are the existence of God, or a Being Who made all things,

and Who directs and sustains the world with consummate wisdom;

furthermore, that God takes the greatest thought for men, or such of

them as live piously and honorably, while He punishes, with various

penalties, those who do evil, separating them from the good. All this is

proved in Scripture entirely through experience--that is, through the

narratives there related. No definitions of doctrine are given, but all

the sayings and reasonings are adapted to the understanding of the

masses. Although experience can give no clear knowledge of these things,

nor explain the nature of God, nor how He directs and sustains all

things, it can nevertheless teach and enlighten men sufficiently to

impress obedience and devotion on their minds.

It is not, I think, sufficiently clear what persons are bound to believe

in the Scripture narratives, and in what degree they are so bound, for

it evidently follows from what has been said that the knowledge of and

belief in them is particularly necessary to the masses whose intellect

is not capable of perceiving things clearly and distinctly. Further, he

who denies them because he does not believe that God exists or takes

thought for men and the world, may be accounted impious; but a man who

is ignorant of them, and nevertheless shows by natural reason that God

exists, as we have said, and has a true plan of life, is altogether

blessed--yes, more blessed than the common herd of believers, because

besides true opinions he possesses also a true and distinct conception.

Lastly, he who is ignorant of the Scriptures and knows nothing by the

light of reason, though he may not be impious or rebellious, is yet less

than human and almost brutal, having none of God's gifts.

We must here remark that when we say that the knowledge of the sacred

narrative is particularly necessary to the masses, we do not mean the

knowledge of absolutely all the narratives in the Bible, but only of the

principal ones, those which, taken by themselves, plainly display the

doctrine we have just stated, and have most effect over men's minds.

If all the narratives in Scripture were necessary for the proof of this

doctrine, and if no conclusion could be drawn without the general

consideration of every one of the histories contained in the sacred

writings, truly the conclusion and demonstration of such doctrine would

overtask the understanding and strength not only of the masses, but of

humanity; who is there who could give attention to all the narratives at

once, and to all the circumstances, and all the scraps of doctrine to be

elicited from such a host of diverse histories? I cannot believe that

the men who have left us the Bible as we have it were so abounding in

talent that they attempted setting about such a method of demonstration,

still less can I suppose that we cannot understand Scriptural doctrine

till we have given heed to the quarrels of Isaac, the advice of

Achitophel to Absalom, the civil war between Jews and Israelites, and

other similar chronicles; nor can I think that it was more difficult to

teach such doctrine by means of history to the Jews of early times, the

contemporaries of Moses, than it was to the contemporaries of Esdras.

But more will be said on this point hereafter, we may now only note that

the masses are only bound to know those histories which can most

powerfully dispose their mind to obedience and devotion. However, the

masses are not sufficiently skilled to draw conclusions from what they

read, they take more delight in the actual stories, and in the strange

and unlooked-for issues of events than in the doctrines implied;

therefore, besides reading these narratives, they are always in need of

pastors or church ministers to explain them to their feeble

intelligence.

But not to wander from our point, let us conclude with what has been our

principal object--namely, that the truth of narratives, be they what

they may, has nothing to do with the Divine law, and serves for nothing

except in respect of doctrine, the sole element which makes one history

better than another. The narratives in the Old and New Testaments

surpass profane history, and differ among themselves in merit simply by

reason of the salutary doctrines which they inculcate. Therefore, if a

man were to read the Scripture narratives believing the whole of them,

but were to give no heed to the doctrines they contain, and make no

amendment in his life, he might employ himself just as profitably in

reading the Koran or the poetic drama, or ordinary chronicles, with the

attention usually given to such writings; on the other hand, if a man is

absolutely ignorant of the Scriptures, and none the less has right

opinions and a true plan of life, he is absolutely blessed and truly

possesses in himself the spirit of Christ.

The Jews are of a directly contrary way of thinking, for they hold that

true opinions and a true plan of life are of no service in attaining

blessedness, if their possessors have arrived at them by the light of

reason only, and not like the documents prophetically revealed to Moses.

Maimonides ventures openly to make this assertion: "Every man who takes

to heart the seven precepts and diligently follows them, is counted with

the pious among the nations, and an heir of the world to come; that is

to say, if he takes to heart and follows them because God ordained them

in the law, and revealed them to us by Moses, because they were of

aforetime precepts to the sons of Noah: but he who follows them as lead

thereto by reason, is not counted as a dweller among the pious, nor

among the wise of the nations." Such are the words of Maimonides, to

which R. Joseph, the son of Shem Job, adds in his book, which he calls

_Kebod Elohim, or God's Glory_, that although Aristotle (whom he

considers to have written the best ethics and to be above every one

else) has not omitted anything that concerns true ethics, and which he

has adopted in his own book, carefully following the lines laid down,

yet this was not able to suffice for his salvation, inasmuch as he

embraced his doctrines in accordance with the dictates of reason and not

as Divine documents prophetically revealed.[9]

However, that these are mere figments and are not supported by

Scriptural authority will, I think, be sufficiently evident to the

attentive reader, so that an examination of the theory will be

sufficient for its refutation. It is not my purpose here to refute the

assertions of those who assert that the natural light of reason can

teach nothing of any value concerning the true way of salvation. People

who lay no claims to reason for themselves are not able to prove by

reason this their assertion; and if they hawk about something superior

to reason, it is a mere figment, and far below reason, as their general

method of life sufficiently shows. But there is no need to dwell upon

such persons. I will merely add that we can only judge of a man by his

works. If a man abounds in the fruits of the Spirit, charity, joy,

peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faith, gentleness, chastity,

against which, as Paul says (Gal. v. 22), there is no law, such an one,

whether he be taught by reason only or by the Scripture only, has been

in very truth taught by God, and is altogether blessed. Thus have I said

all that I undertook to say concerning Divine law.

FOOTNOTES:

[8] From the _Tr. Th.-P._, ch. v, same title.

[9] The Jews were not, of course, alone in holding this point of view.

Dante consigned the ancient philosophers--including Aristotle--and even

Vergil to Limbo, agreeing thus in doctrine with Maimonides and R.

Joseph, the son of Shem Job.--ED.

The Philosophy of Spinoza · 第 6 / 20 章