OF THE DIVINE LAW[7]
The word law, taken in the abstract means that by which an individual,
or all things, or as many things as belong to a particular species, act
in one and the same fixed and definite manner, which manner depends
either on natural necessity or on human decree. A law which depends on
natural necessity is one which necessarily follows from the nature, or
from the definition of the thing in question; a law which depends on
human decree, and which is more correctly called an ordinance, is one
which men have laid down for themselves and others in order to live more
safely or conveniently, or from some similar reason.
For example, the law that all bodies impinging on lesser bodies, lose as
much of their own motion as they communicate to the latter is a
universal law of all bodies, and depends on natural necessity. So, too,
the law that a man in remembering one thing, straightway remembers
another either like it, or which he had perceived simultaneously with
it, is a law which necessarily follows from the nature of man. But the
law that men must yield, or be compelled to yield, somewhat of their
natural right, and that they bind themselves to live in a certain way,
depends on human decree. Now, though I freely admit that all things are
predetermined by universal natural laws to exist and operate in a given,
fixed, and definite manner, I still assert that the laws I have just
mentioned depend on human decree.
(1.) Because man, in so far as he is a part of Nature, constitutes a
part of the power of Nature. Whatever, therefore, follows necessarily
from the necessity of human nature (that is, from Nature herself, in so
far as we conceive of her as acting through man) follows, even though it
be necessarily, from human power. Hence the sanction of such laws may
very well be said to depend on man's decree, for it principally depends
on the power of the human mind; so that the human mind in respect to its
perception of things as true and false, can readily be conceived as
without such laws, but not without necessary law as we have just defined
it.
(2.) I have stated that these laws depend on human decree because it is
well to define and explain things by their proximate causes. The general
consideration of fate and the concatenation of causes would aid us very
little in forming and arranging our ideas concerning particular
questions. Let us add that as to the actual cooerdination and
concatenation of things, that is how things are ordained and linked
together, we are obviously ignorant; therefore, it is more profitable
for right living, nay, it is necessary for us to consider things as
contingent. So much about law in the abstract.
Now the word law seems to be only applied to natural phenomena by
analogy, and is commonly taken to signify a command which men can either
obey or neglect, inasmuch as it restrains human nature within certain
originally exceeded limits, and therefore lays down no rule beyond human
strength. Thus it is expedient to define law more particularly as a plan
of life laid down by man for himself or others with a certain object.
However, as the true object of legislation is only perceived by a few,
and most men are almost incapable of grasping it, though they live under
its conditions, legislators, with a view to exacting general obedience,
have wisely put forward another object, very different from that which
necessarily follows from the nature of law: they promise to the
observers of the law that which the masses chiefly desire, and threaten
its violators with that which they chiefly fear: thus endeavoring to
restrain the masses, as far as may be, like a horse with a curb; whence
it follows that the word law is chiefly applied to the modes of life
enjoined on men by the sway of others; hence those who obey the law are
said to live under it and to be under compulsion. In truth, a man who
renders every one their due because he fears the gallows, acts under the
sway and compulsion of others, and cannot be called just. But a man who
does the same from a knowledge of the true reason for laws and their
necessity, acts from a firm purpose and of his own accord, and is
therefore properly called just. This, I take it, is Paul's meaning when
he says, that those who live under the law cannot be justified through
the law, for justice, as commonly defined, is the constant and perpetual
will to render every man his due. Thus Solomon says (Prov. xxi. 15),
"It is a joy to the just to do judgment," but the wicked fear.
Law, then, being a plan of living which men have for a certain object
laid down for themselves or others, may, as it seems, be divided into
human law and Divine law.
By human law I mean a plan of living which serves only to render life
and the state secure.
By Divine law I mean that which only regards the highest good, in other
words, the true knowledge of God and love.
I call this law Divine because of the nature of the highest good, which
I will here shortly explain as clearly as I can.
Inasmuch as the intellect is the best part of our being, it is evident
that we should make every effort to perfect it as far as possible if we
desire to search for what is really profitable to us. For in
intellectual perfection the highest good should consist. Now, since all
our knowledge, and the certainty which removes every doubt, depend
solely on the knowledge of God;--firstly, because without God nothing
can exist or be conceived; secondly, because so long as we have no clear
and distinct idea of God we may remain in universal doubt--it follows
that our highest good and perfection also depend solely on the knowledge
of God. Further, since without God nothing can exist or be conceived, it
is evident that all natural phenomena involve and express the conception
of God as far as their essence and perfection extend, so that we have
greater and more perfect knowledge of God in proportion to our
knowledge of natural phenomena: conversely (since the knowledge of an
effect through its cause is the same thing as the knowledge of a
particular property of a cause) the greater our knowledge of natural
phenomena, the more perfect is our knowledge of the essence of God
(which is the cause of all things). So, then, our highest good not only
depends on the knowledge of God, but wholly consists therein; and it
further follows that man is perfect or the reverse in proportion to the
nature and perfection of the object of his special desire; hence the
most perfect and the chief sharer in the highest blessedness is he who
prizes above all else, and takes especial delight in the intellectual
knowledge of God, the most perfect Being.
Hither, then, our highest good and our highest blessedness aim--namely,
to the knowledge and love of God; therefore the means demanded by this
aim of all human actions, that is, by God in so far as the idea of him
is in us, may be called the commands of God, because they proceed, as it
were, from God Himself, inasmuch as He exists in our minds, and the plan
of life which has regard to this aim may be fitly called the law of God.
The nature of the means, and the plan of life which this aim demands,
how the foundations of the best states follow its lines, and how men's
life is conducted, are questions pertaining to general ethics. Here I
only proceed to treat of the Divine law in a particular application.
As the love of God is man's highest happiness and blessedness, and the
ultimate end and aim of all human actions, it follows that he alone
lives by the Divine law who loves God not from fear of punishment, or
from love of any other object, such as sensual pleasure, fame, or the
like; but solely because he has knowledge of God, or is convinced that
the knowledge and love of God is the highest good. The sum and chief
precept, then, of the Divine law is to love God as the highest good,
namely, as we have said, not from fear of any pains and penalties or
from the love of any other object in which we desire to take pleasure.
The idea of God lays down the rule that God is our highest good--in
other words, that the knowledge and love of God is the ultimate aim to
which all our actions should be directed. The worldling cannot
understand these things, they appear foolishness to him, because he has
too meager a knowledge of God, and also because in this highest good he
can discover nothing which he can handle or eat, or which affects the
fleshly appetites wherein he chiefly delights, for it consists solely in
thought and the pure reason. They, on the other hand, who know that they
possess no greater gift than intellect and sound reason, will doubtless
accept what I have said without question.
We have now explained that wherein the Divine law chiefly consists, and
what are human laws, namely, all those which have a different aim unless
they have been ratified by revelation, for in this respect also things
are referred to God (as we have shown above) and in this sense the law
of Moses, although it was not universal, but entirely adapted to the
disposition and particular preservation of a single people, may yet be
called a law of God or Divine law, inasmuch as we believe that it was
ratified by prophetic insight. If we consider the nature of natural
Divine law as we have just explained it, we shall see
I. That it is universal or common to all men, for we have deduced it
from universal human nature.
II. That it does not depend on the truth of any historical narrative
whatsoever, for inasmuch as this natural Divine law is comprehended
solely by the consideration of human nature, it is plain that we can
conceive it as existing as well in Adam as in any other man, as well in
a man living among his fellows as in a man who lives by himself.
The truth of a historical narrative, however assured, cannot give us the
knowledge nor consequently the love of God, for love of God springs from
knowledge of Him, and knowledge of Him should be derived from general
ideas, in themselves certain and known, so that the truth of a
historical narrative is very far from being a necessary requisite for
our attaining our highest good.
Still, though the truth of histories cannot give us the knowledge and
love of God, I do not deny that reading them is very useful with a view
to life in the world, for the more we have observed and known of men's
customs and circumstances, which are best revealed by their actions, the
more warily we shall be able to order our lives among them, and so far
as reason dictates to adapt our actions to their dispositions.
III. We see that this natural Divine law does not demand the performance
of ceremonies--that is, actions in themselves indifferent, which are
called good from the fact of their institution, or actions symbolizing
something profitable for salvation, or (if one prefers this definition)
actions of which the meaning surpasses human understanding. The natural
light of reason does not demand anything which it is itself unable to
supply, but only such as it can very clearly show to be good, or a means
to our blessedness. Such things as are good simply because they have
been commanded or instituted, or as being symbols of something good, are
mere shadows which cannot be reckoned among actions that are the
offspring, as it were, or fruit of a sound mind and of intellect. There
is no need for me to go into this now in more detail.
IV. Lastly, we see that the highest reward of the Divine law is the law
itself, namely, to know God and to love Him of our free choice, and with
an undivided and fruitful spirit; while its penalty is the absence of
these things, and being in bondage to the flesh--that is, having an
inconstant and wavering spirit.
These points being noted, I must now inquire
I. Whether by the natural light of reason we can conceive of God as a
lawgiver or potentate ordaining laws for men?
II. What is the teaching of Holy Writ concerning this natural light of
reason and natural law?
III. With what objects were ceremonies formerly instituted?
IV. Lastly, what is the good gained by knowing the sacred histories and
believing them?
Of the first two I will treat in this chapter, of the remaining two in
the following one.
Our conclusion about the first is easily deduced from the nature of
God's will, which is only distinguished from His understanding in
relation to our intellect--that is, the will and the understanding of
God are in reality one and the same, and are only distinguished in
relation to our thoughts which we form concerning God's understanding.
For instance, if we are only looking to the fact that the nature of a
triangle is from eternity contained in the Divine nature as an eternal
verity, we say that God possesses the idea of a triangle, or that He
understands the nature of a triangle; but if afterwards we look to the
fact that the nature of a triangle is thus contained in the Divine
nature, solely by the necessity of the Divine nature, and not by the
necessity of the nature and essence of a triangle--in fact, that the
necessity of a triangle's essence and nature, in so far as they are
conceived of as eternal verities, depends solely on the necessity of the
Divine nature and intellect, we then style God's will or decree, that
which before we styled His intellect. Wherefore we make one and the same
affirmation concerning God when we say that He has from eternity decreed
that three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, as when
we say that He has understood it.
Hence the affirmations and the negations of God always involve necessity
or truth; so that, for example, if God said to Adam that He did not wish
him to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, it would have
involved a contradiction that Adam should have been able to eat of it,
and would therefore have been impossible that he should have so eaten,
for the Divine command would have involved an eternal necessity and
truth. But since Scripture nevertheless narrates that God did give this
command to Adam, and yet that none the less Adam ate of the tree, we
must perforce say that God revealed to Adam the evil which would surely
follow if he should eat of the tree, but did not disclose that such evil
would of necessity come to pass. Thus it was that Adam took the
revelation to be not an eternal and necessary truth, but a law--that is,
an ordinance followed by gain or loss, not depending necessarily on the
nature of the act performed, but solely on the will and absolute power
of some potentate, so that the revelation in question was solely in
relation to Adam, and solely through his lack of knowledge a law, and
God was, as it were, a lawgiver and potentate. From the same cause,
namely, from lack of knowledge, the Decalogue in relation to the Hebrews
was a law, for since they knew not the existence of God as an eternal
truth, they must have taken as a law that which was revealed to them in
the Decalogue, namely, that God exists, and that God only should be
worshiped. But if God had spoken to them without the intervention of any
bodily means, immediately they would have perceived it not as a law but
as an eternal truth.
What we have said about the Israelites and Adam applies also to all the
prophets who wrote laws in God's name--they did not adequately conceive
God's decrees as eternal truths. For instance, we must say of Moses that
from revelation, from the basis of what was revealed to him, he
perceived the method by which the Israelitish nation could best be
united in a particular territory, and could form a body politic or
state, and further that he perceived the method by which that nation
could best be constrained to obedience; but he did not perceive, nor
was it revealed to him, that this method was absolutely the best, nor
that the obedience of the people in a certain strip of territory would
necessarily imply the end he had in view. Wherefore he perceived these
things not as eternal truths, but as precepts and ordinances, and he
ordained them as laws of God, and thus it came to be that he conceived
God as a ruler, a legislator, a king, as merciful, just, etc., whereas
such qualities are simply attributes of human nature, and utterly alien
from the nature of the Deity. Thus much we may affirm of the prophets
who wrote laws in the name of God; but we must not affirm it of Christ,
for Christ, although He too seems to have written laws in the name of
God, must be taken to have had a clear and adequate perception, for
Christ was not so much a prophet as the mouthpiece of God. For God made
revelations to mankind through Christ as He had before done through
angels--that is, a created voice, visions, etc. It would be as
unreasonable to say that God had accommodated His revelations to the
opinions of Christ as that He had before accommodated them to the
opinions of angels (that is, of a created voice or visions) as matters
to be revealed to the prophets, a wholly absurd hypothesis. Moreover,
Christ was sent to teach not only the Jews but the whole human race, and
therefore it was not enough that His mind should be accommodated to the
opinions of the Jews alone, but also to the opinion and fundamental
teaching common to the whole human race--in other words, to ideas
universal and true. Inasmuch as God revealed Himself to Christ, or to
Christ's mind immediately, and not as to the prophets through words and
symbols, we must needs suppose that Christ perceived truly what was
revealed, in other words, He understood it, for a matter is understood
when it is perceived simply by the mind without words or symbols.
Christ, then, perceived (truly and adequately) what was revealed, and if
He ever proclaimed such revelations as laws, He did so because of the
ignorance and obstinacy of the people, acting in this respect the part
of God; inasmuch as He accommodated Himself to the comprehension of the
people, and though He spoke somewhat more clearly than the other
prophets, yet He taught what was revealed obscurely, and generally
through parables, especially when He was speaking to those to whom it
was not yet given to understand the kingdom of heaven. (See Matt. xiii.
10, etc.) To those to whom it was given to understand the mysteries of
heaven, He doubtless taught His doctrines as eternal truths and did not
lay them down as laws, thus freeing the minds of His hearers from the
bondage of that law which He further confirmed and established. Paul
apparently points to this more than once (_e.g._, Rom. vii. 6, and iii.
28), though he never himself seems to wish to speak openly, but, to
quote his own words (Rom. iii. 5, and vi. 19), "merely humanly." This he
expressly states when he calls God just, and it was doubtless in
concession to human weakness that he attributes mercy, grace, anger, and
similar qualities to God, adapting his language to the popular mind, or,
as he puts it (1 Cor. iii. 1, 2), to carnal men. In Rom. ix. 18, he
teaches undisguisedly that God's anger and mercy depend not on the
actions of men, but on God's own nature or will; further, that no one
is justified by the works of the law, but only by faith, which he seems
to identify with the full assent of the soul; lastly, that no one is
blessed unless he have in him the mind of Christ (Rom. viii. 9), whereby
he perceives the laws of God as eternal truths. We conclude, therefore,
that God is described as a lawgiver or prince, and styled just,
merciful, etc., merely in concession to popular understanding, and the
imperfection of popular knowledge; that in reality God acts and directs
all things simply by the necessity of His nature and perfection, and
that His decrees and volitions are eternal truths, and always involve
necessity. So much for the first point which I wished to explain and
demonstrate.
Passing on to the second point, let us search the sacred pages for their
teaching concerning the light of nature and this Divine law. The first
doctrine we find in the history of the first man, where it is narrated
that God commanded Adam not to eat of the fruit of the tree of the
knowledge of good and evil; this seems to mean that God commanded Adam
to do and to seek after righteousness because it was good, not because
the contrary was evil: that is, to seek the good for its own sake, not
from fear of evil. We have seen that he who acts rightly from the true
knowledge and love of right, acts with freedom and constancy, whereas he
who acts from fear of evil, is under the constraint of evil, and acts in
bondage under external control. So that this commandment of God to Adam
comprehends the whole Divine natural law, and absolutely agrees with the
dictates of the light of nature; nay, it would be easy to explain on
this basis the whole history or allegory of the first man. But I prefer
to pass over the subject in silence, because, in the first place, I
cannot be absolutely certain that my explanation would be in accordance
with the intention of the sacred writer; and, secondly, because many do
not admit that this history is an allegory, maintaining it to be a
simple narrative of facts. It will be better, therefore, to adduce other
passages of Scripture, especially such as were written by him, who
speaks with all the strength of his natural understanding, in which he
surpassed all his contemporaries, and whose sayings are accepted by the
people as of equal right with those of the prophets. I mean Solomon,
whose prudence and wisdom are commended in Scripture rather than his
piety and gift of prophecy. He, in his proverbs, calls the human
intellect the well-spring of true life, and declares that misfortune is
made up of folly. "Understanding is a well-spring of life to him that
hath it; but the instruction of fools is folly" (Prov. xvi. 22). Life
being taken to mean the true life (as is evident from Deut. xxx. 19),
the fruit of the understanding consists only in the true life, and its
absence constitutes punishment. All this absolutely agrees with what was
set out in our fourth point concerning natural law. Moreover, our
position that it is the well-spring of life, and that the intellect
alone lays down laws for the wise, is plainly taught by the sage, for he
says (Prov. xiii. 14): "The law of the wise is a fountain of life"--that
is, as we gather from the preceding text, the understanding. In chap.
iii. 13, he expressly teaches that the understanding renders man blessed
and happy, and gives him true peace of mind. "Happy is the man that
findeth wisdom, and the man that getteth understanding," for "Wisdom
gives length of days, and riches and honour; her ways are ways of
pleasantness, and all her paths peace" (xiii. 16, 17). According to
Solomon, therefore, it is only the wise who live in peace and
equanimity, not like the wicked whose minds drift hither and thither,
and (as Isaiah says, chap. lvii. 20) "are like the troubled sea, for
them there is no peace."
Lastly, we should especially note the passage in chap. ii. of Solomon's
proverbs which most clearly confirms our contention: "If thou criest
after knowledge, and liftest up thy voice for understanding ... then
shalt thou understand the fear of the Lord, and find the knowledge of
God; for the Lord giveth wisdom; out of His mouth cometh knowledge and
understanding." These words clearly enunciate (1), that wisdom or
intellect alone teaches us to fear God wisely--that is, to worship Him
truly; (2), that wisdom and knowledge flow from God's mouth, and that
God bestows on us this gift; this we have already shown in proving that
our understanding and our knowledge depend on, spring from, and are
perfected by the idea or knowledge of God, and nothing else. Solomon
goes on to say in so many words that this knowledge contains and
involves the true principles of ethics and politics: "When wisdom
entereth into thy heart, and knowledge is pleasant to thy soul,
discretion shall preserve thee, understanding shall keep thee, then
shalt thou understand righteousness, and judgment, and equity, yea every
good path." All of which is in obvious agreement with natural knowledge:
for after we have come to the understanding of things, and have tasted
the excellence of knowledge, she teaches us ethics and true virtue.
Thus the happiness and the peace of him who cultivates his natural
understanding lies, according to Solomon also, not so much under the
dominion of fortune (or God's external aid) as in inward personal virtue
(or God's internal aid), for the latter can to a great extent be
preserved by vigilance, right action, and thought.
Lastly, we must by no means pass over the passage in Paul's Epistle to
the Romans (i. 20), in which he says: "For the invisible things of God
from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the
things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead; so that they
are without excuse, because, when they knew God, they glorified Him not
as God, neither were they thankful." These words clearly show that every
one can by the light of nature clearly understand the goodness and the
eternal divinity of God, and can thence know and deduce what they should
seek for and what avoid; wherefore the Apostle says that they are
without excuse and cannot plead ignorance, as they certainly might if it
were a question of supernatural light and the incarnation, passion,
resurrection of Christ. "Wherefore," he goes on to say (_ib._ 24), "God
gave them up to uncleanness through the lusts of their own hearts;" and
so on, through the rest of the chapter, he describes the vices of
ignorance, and sets them forth as the punishment of ignorance. This
obviously agrees with the verse of Solomon, already quoted, "The
instruction of fools is folly," so that it is easy to understand why
Paul says that the wicked are without excuse. As every man sows so shall
he reap: out of evil, evils necessarily spring, unless they be wisely
counteracted.
Thus we see that Scripture literally approves of the light of natural
reason and the natural Divine law, and I have fulfilled the promises
made at the beginning of this chapter.
FOOTNOTES:
[7] From the _Tr. Th.-P._, ch. iv, same title.