Longer tolerance of the piratical raids by the Moros is another cause
which in time must compromise our secure possession of the islands,
through the plundering of their maritime villages and the captivity of
their inhabitants, and the stoppage of the commerce and the coasting
trade. Much more is this true because some ports of the islands,
which are in the possession of those pirates, are already frequented
by foreign vessels, which provide the pirates with military supplies
and firearms; and it is to be feared that later the foreigners will
furnish them with plans, vessels, leaders, and other aids, like those
which they have furnished to the disaffected peoples in the Americas,
to wage steady war on the Spanish government. [The Spanish colony has
carried on defensive warfare with the Moros ever since the conquest,
but has gained no permanent advantage therein, while the enemy have
increased in numbers and strength, inflicting ravages on the southern
provinces that are "continually greater and more scandalous." The
Spaniards have spent enormous sums in forts, vessels, and other
defenses; but with little effect, on account of the immense extent of
the coasts of Filipinas and the great number of uninhabited places
where the pirates can hide themselves from pursuit.] Their vessels,
called pancos, are of extraordinary swiftness. The Moros make these
of planks lashed together with rattans, without nails or any [other]
ligature. Their masts are three bamboos, their rigging a few pieces
of rattan or the bark of trees, their sails are certain petates,
or mats, which they call saguran; and their provisions are reduced
to the flour made from a tree, called yoro [i.e., sago] and dried
shellfish. Nearly all their pancos have two banks of oars, and two men
for each oar. And with this slight though warlike equipment, with their
harpoons, javelins, campilans, and arrows (in handling which weapons
they are very dextrous), and with their swarming crews--composed of
their slaves, who row under the lash; and of a multitude of pirates,
who thus make their living, and traffic in their booty--they attack,
among many, with the odds on their side, surround, and jump aboard,
any Christian vessel which cannot defend itself on account of a small
crew or the inaccurate firing of its cannon. [If they are caught
in some bay by the Spanish who pursue them, they abandon their
pancos, hide in the mountains, where they find enough to live on,
and, as soon as the Spaniards depart, the pirates easily construct
new boats and resume their raids. The pirate marine with the forts,
troops, and cannon supported by the Spaniards make a heavy burden of
expense on the treasury and on the people; and the amount thus spent
in half a dozen years is enough to equip a strong naval expedition
which could humble the insolence of the pirates. In view of this,
and of the importance of Joló--which is the headquarters of the
Moro pirates and of their government, and the general market for
the Christian slaves and property which they carry away--Bernaldez
advocates the immediate conquest of that island, and its repopulation
from the more thickly settled parts of the northern islands. This can
easily be done. Thousands of families whose members have been enslaved,
especially in Bohol, are ready to join such an expedition, if leaders
and provisions are supplied to them; and there are a multitude of
skilled inter-island pilots--mestizos who are efficient and rich--who
would act as leaders for the sake of their own profit and reward in
such an enterprise. For ships they could use the government armed
vessels, and the multitude of boats which ply among the islands;
and sufficient rewards could be furnished to the soldiers in the
distribution of the conquered lands and of the plunder which they
would obtain. By this plan, the Moro piracies could be suppressed,
and the islands thus gain peace from those fierce enemies.]