The colonies are governed and maintained more by opinion, justice and
example than by force of arms. When opinion in them becomes corrupted
up to the point of forming great conspiracies, the offensive action
of the army produces no other effect than to hasten the ruin of the
legitimate government. [In the Filipinas Islands, the persuasions
and example of the ministers of religion, and the measures taken by
the civil authorities, have been usually sufficient to put down an
uprising; but it is not well to rely too much on military force in
such cases, since such action causes rankling resentment and unites
the discontented in the common effort to throw off the yoke. It is
impossible, in such a climate, to employ only Spaniards in the army,
since they cannot endure it, and the expense of such an army would also
be too great a burden on the royal treasury.] The army of Filipinas,
then, ought not to have a greater force than is sufficient to defend
and maintain, in any event, a post or locality that is impregnable,
which can serve as a protection and defense to the government, its
interests and employees, and the families of Spanish blood. A center
of strength, ordered and disciplined, of this sort (the locality of
which I will mention later), will be inaccessible not only to three
millions of inhabitants who now people the islands, but to thirty
millions who might inhabit them; and this idea alone in the mind
of the Filipino Indian is the most efficacious for disconcerting,
in its origin or progress, any plan for conspiring or taking by
surprise. [In such a point of vantage, the government can use measures
of policy,] which in revolutions are more effective than arms for
reëstablishing order, without leaving in the minds of the people,
as war does, deep feelings of resentment at being repressed; and the
partial revolutions in the provinces will be always broken--as thus
far have been those of Ilocos, Cebú, Bataan, and others--by the zeal
and sagacity of the European religious and coöperation of the civil
employees of the king. In such a crisis, the principle is, to disunite
sagaciously the opinions and feelings of the people; and repression by
force only unites them. [If the military forces, the forts, and the
navy be augmented, the only results will be to demoralize the army,
make unnecessary display of the government's power, teach the Indians
the art of war (which as few of them as possible ought to know), and
impose unendurable burdens on the treasury. Plans of this sort ought
to be postponed until the country can bear such burdens. The present
permanent veteran force of the islands seems to Bernaldez sufficient
for the above purpose;] it consists of four battalions of infantry,
each containing approximately one thousand men; of a cavalry corps,
recently increased to three squadrons; and a brigade of artillery,
with a force of four hundred forty-four men, including a light-armed
company. The following may also be regarded as permanent troops: a
company, called the Pampanga, annexed to the service of the engineer
corps; and three brigades called the "pirate marines" [marina
corsaria], who have been in service twenty years. [The system of
rewards is costly and useless. The soldier receives enough pay to live
comfortably, in a country where living is so cheap; "it is equivalent
for an Indian, and even for a Spaniard, to three times the same amount
in Europa." The rewards given to the soldiers ought to be reduced in
such measure as the circumstances of the colony demand, "taking for
a basis the fact that with four hard dollars a month any inferior
employee can maintain himself and all his family comfortably in the
provinces, and that all beyond that is extravagance." The Pampanga
company has no organization; it ought to be placed on a military
basis, with European officers, and ranked as a company of pioneers,
when it would be very useful in the service. The militia troops of the
islands have been neglected, although they are (especially the pirate
marines) so important in checking the Moro pirates. The commanders
are "men of no force, arbitrarily chosen by the governor there, from
the class of merchants and private citizens of Manila, who possess
only honorary titles, without any military instruction or love for
the military career." The militia forces do not cost the government
much, but they are of very little use. Bernaldez thinks that the
pirate marines ought to be regarded as a part of the regular army,
with the same pay, and with European officers. The cavalry corps of
Luzon is untrained, and would be of little use in an invasion of the
country; it ought to be replaced by light and irregular cavalry, and
supplemented by a small body of veterans. Two squadrons in the corps
of dragoons of Luzon would be sufficient to preserve order in Manila,
and the third ought to be abolished as unnecessary.]