The army of the Filipinas Islands, in view of the class of men of
whom it now consists, offers very little (if any) moral confidence
for their resisting the force of the revolutions which may be formed
in the very bosom of the islands. It is officered, in great part,
by Spaniards of the country, and by some Americans and mestizos; and
the disposition, tendencies, and education of the latter class are
(with very rare exceptions) absolutely different from those of the
other and European officers; consequently, there exists between the two
classes, from the outset, a certain insuperable disunion of feeling,
between not only individuals but the two classes. The officer who
is a native of the country has all the lax characteristics which the
climate induces. He lives in exclusive intercourse with his neighbors,
and separated from the Europeans. He likes the military career solely
for the conveniences connected with his office; he is incapable of
a noble emulation, and limits himself in the service to the outside
and very inexact fulfilment of the necessary obligations of his
position; and when the cause of the legitimate government exacts on
his part sacrifices incompatible with his own interests or those of
his neighbors, he disowns and absolutely abandons his duties. For
these reasons the officers born in that country have never come to
merit the confidence of their chiefs; and if from the rank of cadets
they have been promoted to that of captain, it has been more from the
peremptory necessity of completing the military corps and protecting
the service than on account of their fitness, military spirit, or
appreciation of the confidence and honor which the king bestows on
them. Such sentiments they can never possess until they undergo a
rigid training moral and political, in the colleges of España. This
mental divergence, and the natural contrariety of their temperaments,
so mischievous in the ordinary service of military bodies, are much
more lamentable in the crisis of a revolution. The officers of the
country, being nearer to the Indian soldiers in their customs and
language, make common cause with the latter, and seduce and lead
them into their own faction, with a marvelous readiness; this I have
repeatedly seen in the mutinies of military bodies which have occurred
in the Americas, and especially in that of the troops in the kingdom
of Guadalajara in the year '21, and in that at Manila in the year '23.
The army of Filipinas also contains a considerable number of Indian
sergeants and corporals, and this is another of the causes from
which have already arisen, and always will arise, seditions in the
corps. Whoever has observed the natural disposition of the Filipino
Indian will recognize two things: First, that he always imitates
and obeys only that which is directly commanded, explained, and
taught to him; and, second, that while he is kept in his simple
condition of laborer, artisan, or soldier he is entirely void of
ambition. The Indian soldier serves very contentedly during the eight
years of his term, and returns to his own land without aspiring to
anything; but when he is placed in command, of any degree whatever,
he is filled with pride, and vehemently desires to be at the head
[serlo todo], without changing, for all that, his station as an
Indian. [The writer states that even these non-commissioned officers
were formerly always Spaniards; [141]] the appointment of Indians to
these posts has been only in these last years, in which a system of
commerce which entirely separated those islands from their center of
government has rendered impossible the despatch of reënforcements,
so necessary to those islands. From that very time may be noted much
laxity in the military service and discipline; and I have witnessed the
insurrections and disorders which never were known in former days. In
the popular uprisings in the suburbs of Manila, at the end of 1820,
[142] the detachments commanded by Indian corporals who were sent
out to pacify the villages took such part in the lawlessness that
they even attacked houses, and it was by their gunshots that many
foreigners were butchered. In the military insurrection of June 3,
1823, parties of troops commanded by only one officer (a Philippine
Spaniard), without any previous plan or any combination, and simply
by appearing before the barracks of their regiment and offering
to make captains of the Indian sergeants, immediately persuaded
them to revolt; and, directing the soldiers at their own pleasure,
they committed the lamentable and horrible acts of that day, which
ought to be kept well in mind. [This should be a warning against
allowing the Indians any place of command, especially as they have
more influence with the common soldiers than do the superior officers;
and all military posts of command should be filled with competent and
trained Spaniards. The writer urges the following measures of reform:
(1) that a sufficient number of Spanish officers to fill all the posts
of sergeant and corporal, and a surplus number to fill vacancies
as they occur, shall be sent to Filipinas annually; (2) the class
of cadets should be suppressed, who "have always been (with a few
exceptions) very unsatisfactory officers; for, belonging to very poor
and obscure families, and receiving no kind of education, in a country
which so depraves and corrupts a youth, they demoralize the soldiers,
and cause the military career to be held there in slight esteem;" (3)
in future, no other officers except the heads of corps should be sent
there from the Peninsula, so as to make room for promoting the lower
officers, and to avoid demoralizing the young Spaniards; (4) that
the Indian and mestizo sergeants or corporals who, after fulfilling
their twelve years of all service, have to be replaced by Spaniards,
shall be given places in the custom-house or revenue service, or in the
monopoly shops, so as to recompense them for losing their posts.] In
this manner the Indian soldier--who is docile, and always imitates
the desires and opinions of his immediate superiors--will receive more
disinterested treatment than he has hitherto had; he will make common
cause with his leaders, in critical cases of popular revolutions;
and the army will remain loyal and incorrupt in its opinions, always
ready for its duty, and united in action and interests.