CHAPTER XX_Panama and the Canal in Picture and Prose

DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS OF THE CANAL

Having built the Panama Canal at a heavy cost of treasure and no light

cost of life, having subdued to our will the greatest forces of nature

and put a curb upon the malevolent powers of tropical miasma and

infection, we are about to give the completed result to the whole world.

It stands as a free gift, for never can any tolls that will be imposed

make of it a commercial success. It was the failure to recognize this

inevitable fact that made it impossible for the French to complete the

task. It will be a national asset, not because of the income gathered at

its two entrances, but because of the cheapening of freight rates

between our two coasts and the consequent reduction of prices to our

citizens. But this advantage will accrue to peoples who have not paid a

dollar of taxation toward the construction of the Canal. There is

absolutely no advantage which the Canal may present to the people of New

England that will not be shared equally by the people of the Canadian

provinces of Quebec and Ontario if they desire to avail themselves of

the opportunity. Our gulf ports of Mobile, New Orleans and Galveston

expect, and reasonably so, that the volume of their traffic will be

greatly increased by the opening of the Canal. But if Rio de Janeiro,

Buenos Ayres and Montevideo have products they desire to ship to the

Orient or to the western coast of their own continent of South America

the Canal is open to them as freely as to our ships.

Having given to the world so great a benefaction, it will be the part of

the international statesmen of the United States, the diplomatists, to

see to it that the gift is not distorted, nor, through any act of ours,

divided unequally among those sharing in it. Upon the diplomacy of the

United States the opening of the Canal will impose many new burdens and

responsibilities.

[Illustration: A CHURCH IN CHORRERA]

Scarcely any general European war involved more intricate and delicate

questions of the reciprocal rights of nations than did the acquisition

of the Suez Canal by Great Britain. Volumes have been written on the

subject of the diplomacy of Suez. The Constantinople conference called

for the discussion of that topic, and the specific delimitation of the

authority of Great Britain and the rights of other maritime nations was

one of the most notable gatherings in the history of diplomacy. The

Panama waterway will bring new problems and intensify old ones for the

consideration of our statesmen. The Monroe Doctrine is likely to come in

for a very, thorough testing and perhaps a new formulation. The precise

scope of that doctrine has of late years become somewhat ill defined.

Foreign nations say that the tendency of the United States is to extend

its powers and ignore its responsibilities under this theory. In Latin

America, where that doctrine should be hailed as a bulwark of

protection, it is looked upon askance. That feeling is largely due to

the attitude of this country toward the Republic of Colombia at the time

of the secession of Panama.

[Illustration: A NATIVE KITCHEN]

A problem of the highest importance to the credit of the United States

in Latin America, which should be settled in accordance with principles

of national honor and international equity, is the determination of what

reparation we owe the Republic of Colombia for our part in the

revolution which made Panama an independent state and gave us the Canal

Zone.

[Illustration: NATIVE HOUSE IN PENOMENE]

In an earlier chapter I have tried to tell, without bias, the story of

that revolution and to leave to the readers’ own judgment the question

whether our part in it was that merely of an innocent bystander, a

neutral looker-on, or whether we did not, by methods of indirection at

least, make it impossible for Colombia to employ her own troops for the

suppression of rebellion in her own territory. As President, and later

as private citizen, Mr. Roosevelt was always exceedingly insistent that

he had adhered to the strictest letter of the neutrality law--always

that is except in that one impetuous speech in San Francisco, in which

he blurted out the boast, “I took Panama and left Congress to debate

about it afterward”.

[Illustration: GIANT CACTI OFTEN USED FOR HEDGING

Planted close together, these cacti form a barrier impassible by

animals]

[Illustration: A STREET IN CHORRERA]

Mr. Roosevelt’s protestations of innocence had, however, little effect

upon his own friends and party associates, for early in the Taft

administration the conviction became general among men in high station

that reparation of some sort was due to Colombia for what was--to

express it guardedly--our connivance at a conspiracy that cost that

republic its richest province--cost it further a lump payment of

$10,000,000 and an annual sum of $250,000 to eternity. The records of

diplomacy are enmeshed in many concealing veils, but enough is known of

the progress of the negotiations to reflect credit upon the diplomacy of

Colombia. That country has neither threatened nor blustered--and the

undeniable fact that the comparative power of Colombia and the United

States would make threats and bluster ridiculous would not ordinarily

deter a Latin-American President from shrieking shrill defiance at least

for the benefit of his compatriots. Colombia has been persistent but not

petulant. It has stated its case to two administrations and has wrung

from both the confession that the United States in that revolution acted

the part of an international bandit. Out of the recesses of the

Department of State has leaked the information that the United States

has made to Colombia a tentative offer of $10,000,000, but that it had

been refused. But the offer itself was a complete confession on the part

of the United States of its guilt in the transaction complained of.

Naturally, Colombia declined the proffered conscience money. Panama

received from the United States not merely $10,000,000, but will get

$250,000 a year for an indefinite period. All this Colombia lost and her

valuable province as well because the captain of a United States

man-of-war would not let the Colombian colonels on that day of

revolution use force to compel a railroad manager to carry their troops

across the Isthmus. The grievance of the Colombians is a very real and

seemingly just one.

We hear much of the national honor in reference to canal tolls but less

of it in relation to this controversy with Colombia. Yet that

controversy ought to be settled and settled justly. It is inconceivable,

of course, that it should be determined by restoring the status as it

existed before that day of opera-bouffe revolution. Our investment in

the Canal Zone, our duty to the world which awaits the opening of the

Canal, and our loyalty to our partner, Panama, alike make that

impossible. The Republic of Panama is an accomplished fact not to be

obliterated even in the interest of precise justice. As the Persian poet

put it:

“The moving finger writes, and having writ

Moves on; nor all your piety nor wit,

Shall lure it back to cancel half a line,

Nor all your tears wash out one word of it”.

President Roosevelt wrote the word Panama on the list of nations and

moved on vastly pleased with the record.

[Illustration: _Photo by Brown Bros._

THE TOWN OF EMPIRE, SOON TO BE ABANDONED]

The situation at the same time is one not to be lightly dealt with. The

United States is none too popular at any point south of its own borders.

It is at the one time hated and feared. The very Panamanians whom we

invested with independence have no liking for us and the hatred of the

Colombians for the nation that despoiled them is so general and extreme

that their rulers are entitled to the utmost credit for having observed

all the courtesies of diplomacy in their efforts to secure some measure

of reparation. The question presents itself, is it wise to leave such a

hot-bed of hatred, of resentment perhaps justifiable, in the very midst

of Latin America, just when we are hoping by our new Canal to extend and

cement our commercial relations with them? Among the Latin Americans

there is a very general feeling that our devotion to the Monroe Doctrine

is indicative only of our purpose to protect our neighbors against any

selfish aggressions except our own. It is of the very highest importance

that this feeling be dissipated, and there is perhaps no more immediate

way of beginning that task than by reaching such an agreement with

Colombia as shall indicate to other South American governments our

purpose of doing exact justice among our neighbors, be they great and

powerful or small and weak.

[Illustration: PANAMA RAILROAD BRIDGE ACROSS THE CHAGRES]

With all the South American countries the commerce of the Canal will

tend to bring us into closer relations and to multiply the possibility

of international dissension. Moreover, the growing interests of United

States business men in those countries form national outposts on which

we must ever keep a friendly eye. It is ridiculous to urge upon

individuals the task of stimulating and extending our foreign trade if

the government is to be wholly indifferent to their efforts. It is known

that the great beef packers of Chicago have considerable plants in the

Argentine; that a famous iron manufacturer of Pittsburgh has in Chile

what is believed to be the largest iron mine in the world; that the

Standard Oil Company has its agencies throughout the continent; and the

Du Pont Powder Company besides maintaining two nitrate plants in Chile

does a prodigious business in explosives with the various states--and

not mainly for military purposes only. The United States Steel Company

has a vanadium mine in Peru where 3000 Americans are working. The

equipment of street railways and electric-lighting plants in South

American cities is almost wholly of American manufacture. Even without

the systematic encouragement of their home government, American business

men have begun to make inroads upon German and English commercial power

in South America, and the opening of the Canal will increase their

activities. Today our Pacific coast is practically shut off from any

interchange of commodities with Brazil and the Argentine; with the Canal

open a direct waterway will undoubtedly stimulate a considerable trade.

The more trade is stimulated, the more general travel becomes between

nations, the less becomes the danger of war. There is no inconsistency

in the statement that the Canal will become a powerful factor in the

world’s peace, even though it does necessitate the maintenance of a

bigger navy and the erection of powerful forts for its defense in the

improbable event of war.

[Illustration: A STREET IN CHORRERA]

This is but one phase of the influence the Canal will exercise upon

countries other than the United States. What it will do for the

Latin-American countries immediately adjacent to Panama in the direction

of leading them to establish improved sanitation systems, or to perfect

those they now maintain, is beyond present estimate. Many such

governments have had their representatives on the Zone to study the

methods there in force, and while the present writer was there Col.

Gorgas was besought to visit Guayaquil to give its rulers expert advice

on the correction of the unsanitary state of that city. Members of the

staff of Col. Gorgas are in demand as experts in all parts of the world.

I know of one who in the last days of the Canal construction was sent by

the German government to establish in some of the German South African

provinces the methods that brought health to the Isthmus after the days

of the futile French struggle with fever and malaria.

It is because of this influence upon foreign peoples, already apparent,

that far-sighted people find intolerable the proposition to let the

Canal Zone grow up into jungle and return to its original state of

savagery. It can and should be made an object lesson to the world. From

every ship that makes the ten-hour passage of the Canal some passengers

will go ashore for rest from the long voyage and to see what the Zone

may have to show them. Are we content to have them see only the hovels

of Colon and the languid streets of Panama--exhibits that give no idea

of the force, the imagination, the idealism that gave being to the

Canal? Today the Zone is a little bit of typical United States life set

down in the tropics. So it might remain if due encouragement were given

to industrious settlers. There is not so much land in the world that

this need be wasted, nor have there been so many examples of the

successful creation and continuance of such a community as the Zone has

been as to justify its obliteration before the world has grasped its

greatest significance.

[Illustration: A PEARL ISLAND VILLAGE]

There are not lacking those philosophers who hold that the first

political effect of the Canal will be to force us to abandon that

attitude of national isolation and aloofness prescribed in Washington’s

deprecation of “entangling alliances abroad”. They hold that this latest

and greatest addition to our reasons for solicitude about the control of

the Pacific will compel us to seek the coöperation of other powers--or

_another_ power--to make that control complete. Perhaps the proposition

is most frankly stated in this paragraph from Mr. Frank Fox’s “Problems

of the Pacific”.

[Illustration: DIAGRAM OF COMPARATIVE EXCAVATIONS BY THE FRENCH AND

AMERICANS IN CULEBRA CUT]

“The friendly coöperation between the United States and Great Britain

would give to the Anglo-Saxon race the mastery of the world’s greatest

ocean, laying forever the fear of the Yellow Peril, securing for the

world that its greatest readjustment of the balance of power shall be

effected in peace, while rivalry between these two kindred nations may

cause the gravest evils and possibly irreparable disasters”.

[Illustration: _Photo by W. R. Burtis_

VIEW OF PEDRO MIGUEL LOCKS NEARING COMPLETION]

This is no place to discuss this thesis, but even the most casual

consideration shows how great a mutual interest the United States and

Great Britain have in the Panama Canal and its safeguarding from any

disturbing conditions in the Pacific. Until conditions change and the

United States regains its place among the maritime nations of the world

the bulk of the trade passing through the Canal will be in British

ships. For New Zealand and all of the eastern part of British Australia

the Panama route offers the most expeditious connection with Liverpool.

Canada, too, is vitally interested in the Canal. By the employment of

the system of Georgian Bay and St. Lawrence Canals, which the Dominion

government has created, with a foresight far greater than our own, the

wheat, even of the Winnipeg region, may be sent by water to Montreal

and thence in sea-going ships to the further shore of the Pacific. Even

though owned by the United States, the Canal will be a powerful tie to

bind closer together the widely separated parts of the British Empire.

[Illustration: NATIVE WOMAN, COCLE]

That being true it will further cement the spirit of friendliness

between the United States and Great Britain. It will accomplish this

without formal treaties or proclaimed alliance. The alliance will be

tacit, resulting from the very logic of the situation. Great Britain

cannot afford to be otherwise than friendly with the owner of the

Canal--the little passing tiff over the question of tolls on coastwise

shipping notwithstanding. It is idle to ask that the control of the

Pacific be assured by an Anglo-American compact. More intelligent is it

to assume that any effort to break down that control, which now

virtually exists, would be met by action on the part of the two

English-speaking nations quite as effective as though a treaty existed.

This, too, despite the present Anglo-Japanese treaty which so disquiets

our California citizens, but quite needlessly, in fact, because of that

convention for it promises no support to Japan in the event of the

latter being the aggressor.

[Illustration: RIVER VILLAGE IN CHIRIQUI]

[Illustration: THE PEARL ISLAND VILLAGE OF SABOGA]

Any formal convention, however, any international agreement for the

control of the Pacific which should leave Germany out, would be an

incentive to trouble rather than a bright harbinger of peace. For no

nation is making more active and intelligent preparations to reap to the

fullest the advantages of the Canal than are the Germans. Their nation’s

great interests in Brazil, Argentine, and Chile, her colonizing

activities in Asia, her Chinese port of Kiau-Chou, forcibly wrested from

China, all impel her to take a lively interest in the Canal and the

Pacific. The Kaiser would not look with any placid indifference upon

such an Anglo-American agreement as has been urged, and as its ends can

be, and probably will be attained without formal pronouncement, any open

diplomatic negotiations for such a convention would probably be unwise.

Enough to say that while speculation concerning such an agreement is

quite general among publicists today, no discussion of it has yet

engaged the attention of any statesmen.

After considering the problem of what the Canal will be worth, let us

reverse the ordinary process and figure out what it will cost. Exact

statement is still impossible, for as this book is being printed the

Canal is months away from being usable and probably two years short of

completion if we reckon terminals and fortifications as part of the

completed work.

In an earlier chapter I have set forth some of the estimates of its cost

from the figure of $131,000,000 set by the volatile De Lesseps to the

$375,000,000 of the better informed and more judicious Goethals. In

June, 1913, however, we had at hand the official report of all

expenditures to March, 1913, duly classified as follows:

=CLASSIFIED EXPENDITURES--ISTHMIAN CANAL COMMISSION=

A statement of classified expenditures of the Isthmian Canal Commission

to March 31, 1913, follows:

+------------------------+--------------+----------+--------------+

|Periods | of Civil | of | of |

+------------------------+--------------+----------+--------------+

|Total to June 30, 1909 | $3,427,090.29| | $9,673,539.28|

|Total--Fiscal Year, 1910| 709,351.37| | 1,803,040.95|

|Total--Fiscal Year, 1911| 755,079.44| | 1,717,792.62|

|Total--Fiscal Year, 1912| 820,398.57| 24,729.16| 1,620,391.12|

|July, 1912 | 63,913.12| 1,448.53| 123,803.64|

|August, 1912 | 62,182.51| 1,468.26| 123,154.48|

|September, 1912 | 59,201.01| 1,207.82| 120,385.70|

|October, 1912 | 64,383.37| 2,033.75| 137,574.61|

|November, 1912 | 62,200.12| 1,892.14| 119,031.66|

|December, 1912 | 58,987.96| 1,462.18| 115,819.26|

|January, 1913 | 57,699.58| 1,469.59| 114,562.04|

|February, 1913 | 56,586.06| 1,649.00| 127,324.80|

|March, 1913 | 58,761.03| 1,899.22| 105,891.08|

| +--------------+----------+--------------+

| Grand total | $6,255,834.43|$39,259.65|$15,902,311.24|

+------------------------+--------------+----------+--------------+

+------------------------+---------------+---------------+

| | Department of| |

|Periods | Construction | General Items |

| |and Engineering| |

+------------------------+---------------+---------------+

|Total to June 30, 1909 | $69,622,561.42|$78,022,606.10 |

|Total--Fiscal Year, 1910| 26,300,167.05| 2,863,088.83 |

|Total--Fiscal Year, 1911| 27,477,776.19| 3,097,959.72 |

|Total--Fiscal Year, 1912| 28,897,738.10| 2,819,926.53 |

|July, 1912 | 2,649,246.61| 200,970.55 |

|August, 1912 | 2,539,680.83| =[A]98,054.61=|

|September, 1912 | 2,285,979.89| 77,003.53 |

|October, 1912 | 2,473,280.76| 83,523.30 |

|November, 1912 | 2,420,085.77| 75,779.01 |

|December, 1912 | 2,871,977.03| 120,946.61 |

|January, 1913 | 2,825,872.06| 6,463.72 |

|February, 1913 | 3,784,370.51| 123,034.12 |

|March, 1913 | 2,712,218.10| =7,706.70=|

| +---------------+---------------+

| Grand total |$176,860,954.32|$87,385,540.71 |

+------------------------+---------------+---------------+

+------------------------+--------------+---------------+

| | | |

|Periods |Fortifications| Total |

| | | |

+------------------------+--------------+---------------+

|Total to June 30, 1909 | |$160,745,797.09|

|Total--Fiscal Year, 1910| | 31,675,648.20|

|Total--Fiscal Year, 1911| | 33,048,607.97|

|Total--Fiscal Year, 1912| 1,212,881.66 | 35,396,065.14|

|July, 1912 | 104,126.92 | 3,143,509.37|

|August, 1912 | 111,402.55 | 2,739,834.02|

|September, 1912 | 127,168.25 | 2,670,946.20|

|October, 1912 | 129,736.37 | 2,890,532.16|

|November, 1912 | 300,016.33 | 2,979,005.03|

|December, 1912 | 118,152.57 | 3,287,345.61|

|January, 1913 | 119,272.77 | 3,125,339.76|

|February, 1913 | 314,994.96 | 4,407,959.45|

|March, 1913 | 131,940.75 | 3,003,003.48|

| +--------------+---------------+

| Grand total |$2,669,693.13 |$289,113,593.48|

+------------------------+--------------+---------------+

[A] Denotes credit.

It will be observed that since the beginning of the fiscal year 1913,

expenditures have averaged a trifle over $3,000,000 a month. This rate

of expenditure may be expected to decrease somewhat during the eighteen

months likely to elapse before the Canal, terminals and forts are

completed. Probably if we allow $250,000 a month for this decrease we

will be near the mark making the future expenditures average $2,750,000

monthly until January, 1915, making in all $57,750,000. Adding this to

the Commission expenditures up to March 31, 1913, and adding further the

$50,000,000 paid to the French stockholders and the Republic of Panama

we reach the sum of $396,863,593--a reasonable estimate of the final

cost of the great world enterprise; the measure in dollars and cents of

the greatest gift ever made by a single nation to the world.

It is worth noting that all this colossal expenditure of money has been

made without any evidence of graft, and practically without charge of

that all-pervading canker in American public work. During a long stay on

the Isthmus, associating constantly with men in every grade of the

Commission’s service, I never heard a definite charge of illegal profits

being taken by anyone concerned in the work. In certain publications

dealing with the undertaking in its earlier days one will find

assertions of underhanded collusion with contractors and of official

raids upon the more select importations of the Commissary without due

payment therefore. But even these charges were vague, resting only on

hearsay, and had to do with an administration which vanished six or more

years ago. Today that chronic libeler “the man in the street” has

nothing to say about graft in connection with Canal contracts, and

“common notoriety”, which usually upholds all sorts of scandalous

imputations, and is cited to maintain various vague allegations, is

decidedly on the side of official integrity at Panama.

This is not to say that the work has been conducted with an eye single

to economy. It has not. That is to say it has not been conducted in

accordance with the common idea of economy. All over the land

contractors, apprehensive of the effect of the Panama example of

government efficiency in public work, are telling how much more cheaply

they could have dug the Panama Canal. Probably they could if they could

have dug it at all. But the sort of economy they are talking about was

definitely abandoned when Col. Gorgas convinced the Commission that it

was reckless extravagance to save $50,000 or so on wire screens and lose

forty or fifty lives in a yellow-fever epidemic. The contractor’s idea

of economy was emphatically set aside when Col. Goethals determined that

it was cheaper to pay engineers one-third more than the current rate at

home, and make such arrangements for their comfort on the Zone that they

would stay on the job, rather than to pay ordinary prices and have them

leave in haste after a month or two of dissatisfied and half-hearted

work.

[Illustration: _Copyright by Underwood & Underwood._

THE TUG BOHIO WITH BARGES IN MIDDLE GATUN LOCK]

From which it appears that a new definition of “economy” is needed in

the application of the word to the Canal work.

Whatever may be the influence of the Canal on the position of the United

States as a world power, its influence on the industrial life at home is

likely to be all pervasive and revolutionary. The government is the

largest employer of labor in the land. It ought to be the best employer.

On the Zone it has been the best employer, and has secured the best

results. When government work is to be done hereafter it will not be let

out to private contractors without hesitation and discussion. A

consideration of the results obtained by the State of New York in its

latest expenditure, by the methods of private contract, of the Erie

Canal appropriation of $101,000,000, will go far to show the superiority

of the Panama system. In a recent interview the Secretary of the Navy,

Josephus Daniels, declared it to be the policy of the Department to

build battleships in navy yards so far as possible--a policy which the

shipbuilding interests have steadily resisted in the past. It is not too

much to infer that the success of the army in digging a canal encouraged

the Secretary to show what the navy could do in building its own ships.

[Illustration: _Copyright by Underwood & Underwood._

LOOKING DOWN CANAL FROM MIRAFLORES LOCK TO THE PACIFIC]

If the system and conditions of employment that have existed in Panama

could be applied to public service in all other parts of the United

States, the condition of all labor, all industry, all professional

service would be correspondingly improved. For with the most extensive

employer setting the pace all others would have to keep step with it.

When the long account comes to be balanced we may find that the United

States will owe quite as much to the Panama enterprise on the moral as

on the material side. Of course it is going to increase our trade both

foreign and domestic--that, as the French say, goes without saying. It

will cheapen the cost of building cottages in New York suburbs, because

lumber will be brought from the forests of Oregon and Washington for

half the freight cost now exacted. It will stimulate every manufacturing

interest on the Pacific coast for coal from West Virginia will be laid

down there at dollars per ton less than now. The men who catch and can

salmon in the rushing waters of the Columbia, the men who raise and pack

the luscious oranges of southern California will have a new and cheaper

way of carrying their products to the eager markets of the great cities

along the Atlantic coast. At the same time the output of our eastern

steel mills and New England cotton and woolen factories will find a more

expeditious and cheaper route to the builders and workers of the Pacific

coast.

[Illustration: _Copyright by Underwood & Underwood._

CULEBRA CUT PARTIALLY FILLED WITH WATER]

Incidentally the labors of the Interstate Commerce Commission are likely

to be multiplied almost incalculably. For it must be accepted as a fact

that free competition is no longer a complete regulator of freight rates

whether by rail or by water. Any one can charter a ship and send it

through the Canal with the same rights and privileges that a long

established line will enjoy. But not every independent ship can find

dockage facilities at both ends of its voyage, although it is true that

the enterprising cities of the Pacific coast are warding off monopoly by

building municipal docks. Moreover, the owner of the independent ship

will have his troubles in getting the railroads at either end to handle

his cargoes and distribute them at such charges as will leave him any

profit. Indeed the independent ship will be but little of a factor in

fixing rates. That will be done by the regular lines. Normally there

should be keen competition between the railroads and the steamships with

a very marked drop in rates. But it will not be well to base too great

hopes on this possibility. Transportation rates, even where there is

nominally free competition, are not often based wholly on the cost of

the service. What the traffic will bear is more often the chief factor

in rate making. Because ships can carry freight from New York to San

Francisco for three dollars a traffic-ton less than the railroads does

not imply that they will do so. Nor does it ensure that railroad rates

will drop spasmodically in a vain effort to keep all the business away

from the ships. Rather is it probable that certain classes of freight

like lumber, coal and ore will be left wholly to the ships, and some

form of agreement as to the essentials of the general rate card will be

arrived at. It is this agreement, which in some form or other is sure to

come, that will engage the attention of the Interstate Commerce

Commission, arouse its ceaseless vigilance and probably necessitate a

material extension of its authority.

In other than material ways the nation will largely profit. I think that

the fact of the Canal’s having been built by army engineers will go far

toward correcting a certain hostility toward the army which is common in

American thought. The Canal proves that the organization of the army,

the education of its officers, is worth something in peace as well as in

war. Of course this has been shown before in countless public works

scattered over the land, but never hitherto in a fashion to command such

attention and to compel such plaudits. There were five Colonels, besides

“The Colonel,” on the Commission which put the big job through, and I do

not believe that the most shrinking civilian who visited the Isthmus on

either business or pleasure found any ground to complain of militarism,

or was overawed by any display of “fuss and feathers.”

[Illustration: _Copyright by Underwood & Underwood._

FLOATING ISLANDS IN GATUN LOCK ENTRANCE

These islands, formed of aquatic plants with entwined roots and a little

soil, must be towed away by tugs and sent over the spillway lest they

block navigation.]

The Canal Zone was, of course, a rural community harboring about 65,000

people scattered along a railroad 47 miles long. Yet in the story of

its government there is much that is instructive to the rulers of our

American cities. Every head of the Department of Sanitation in an

American city would profit by a study of Col. Gorgas’s methods in

dealing with the problems of dirt, sewage, and infection. Indeed many of

the ideas he developed are already being adapted to the needs of North

American municipalities. It is becoming quite evident that the

scientific method of controlling insect pests by destroying their

breeding places is the only efficient one. The larvacide man in the

waste places, or the covered garbage can, and screened stable are not as

melodramatic as newspaper shrieks of “Swat the Fly”, but they accomplish