CHAPTER XIX_Panama and the Canal in Picture and Prose

FORTIFICATIONS; TOLLS; COMMERCE AND QUARANTINE

With the completion of the Canal appeared many problems other than the

engineering ones which had for so many years engrossed public attention.

Some of these problems--like the question whether the Canal should be

fortified or its neutrality guaranteed by international agreement--had

reached a conclusion during the last year of the constructive work. But

the question of Canal tolls, the future management of the Canal Zone and

the broad speculation as to the general effect upon the trade of the

world were still subjects of discussion.

That there should have been any serious opposition to the fortification

of the Canal seems amazing, but the promptitude with which it died out

seems to indicate that, while noisy, it had no very solid foundation in

public sentiment. Indeed it was urged mainly by well-meaning theorists

who condemn upon principle any addition to the already heavy burden

which the need for the national defense has laid upon the shoulders of

the people. That in theory they were right is undeniable. Perhaps the

greatest anomaly of the twentieth century is the proportions of our

preparations for war contrasted with our oratorical protestations of a

desire for peace. But the inconsistencies of the United States are

trivial in comparison with those of other nations, and while the whole

world is armed--nominally for defense, but in a way to encourage

aggressions--it is wise that the United States put bolts on its front

gate. And that in effect is what forts and coast defenses are. They are

not aggressive, and cannot be a menace to any one--either to a foreign

land, as a great navy might conceivably be, or to our people, as a great

standing army might prove. The guns at Toro Point and Naos Island will

never speak, save in ceremonial salute, unless some foreign foe menaces

the Canal which the United States gives freely to the peaceful trade of

the world. But if the menace should be presented, it will be well not

for our nation alone, but for all the peoples of the earth, that we are

prepared to defend the integrity of the strait of which man has dreamed

for more than 400 years, and in the creation of which thousands of

useful lives have been sacrificed.

[Illustration: EXPLAINING IT TO THE BOSS]

Mistaken but well-meaning opponents of fortification have insisted that

it was a violation of our pact with Great Britain, and a breach of

international comity. This, however, is an error. True, in the

Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, both the United States and Great Britain

expressly agreed not to fortify or assume any dominion over any part of

Central America through which a canal might be dug. But that treaty was

expressly abrogated by the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. In its first draft

this latter treaty contained the anti-fortification clause and was

rejected by the United States Senate for that very reason. In its second

draft the treaty omitted the reference to fortifications and was

ratified. Lord Lansdowne, one of the negotiators for the British

government, explicitly said that he thoroughly understood the United

States wished to reserve the right to fortify the Canal.

[Illustration: _Photo by American Press Ass’n_

SPANISH MONASTERY AT PANAMA]

It was so clear that no question of treaty obligations was involved that

the opponents of fortification early dropped that line of argument. The

discussion of the treaty in the Senate silenced them. They fell back

upon the question of expediency. “Why”, they asked, “go to the expense

of building and manning fortifications and maintaining a heavy garrison

on the Zone? Why not, through international agreement, make it neutral

and protect it from seizure or blockade in time of war? Look at Suez”!

[Illustration: _Photo by H. Pittier_

_Courtesy National Geographic Magazine_

CHOCO INDIAN OF SANBU VALLEY]

This was more plausible. At first glance the questions seem answerable

in only one way. But consideration weakens their force. There is a Latin

copy-book maxim, “_Inter armas silent leges_”--“In time of war the law

is silent”. It is cynically correct. International agreements to

maintain the integrity or neutrality of a territory last only until one

of the parties to the agreement thinks it profitable to break it. It

then becomes the business of all the other parties to enforce the pact,

and it is usually shown that what is everybody’s business is nobody’s

business. Consider a partial record:

[Illustration: THE RISING GENERATION]

The independence of Korea was guaranteed by four Great Powers in 1902.

Inside of two years the Japanese Admiral Uriu violated the independence

of the Korean port of Chemulpo by sinking two Russian cruisers in it,

and shortly thereafter Japan practically annexed the country. None of

the Powers that had “guaranteed” its independence protested.

Austria-Hungary in 1908 annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the fact

that seven Powers, including Austria-Hungary herself, had fixed the

sovereignty of those provinces in Turkey. The signatory powers grumbled

a little, but that was all. Mr. W. E. Hall, recognized as the greatest

living authority on international law, observes cynically, and

truthfully, that “treaties are only permanently obeyed when they

represent the continued wishes of the contracting parties”.

Prussia once guaranteed the independence of Poland, and in two years

took the leading part in blotting it off the roll of nations.

[Illustration: ANCON HILL, WHERE AMERICANS LIVE IN COMFORT]

Illustrations of the failure of nations to observe the rights of

neutrals are common. Turkey and Korea afford recent illustrations of

nations that have entrusted their national integrity to international

agreements. Nothing remains of Korea’s nationality but a name, and the

Allies are rapidly carving Turkey to bits while the Great Powers that

guaranteed her integrity look on in amazed and impotent alarm. The

United States itself has not been wholly without share in such

high-handed proceedings. In the event of a general war Panama Canal

would be kept neutral just so long as our military and naval power could

defend its neutrality and no longer.

Moreover, we do not want it neutral in a quarrel in which we are

involved. The Canal is dug by our money and in our territory and is part

of our line of defense. We do not propose to permit its passage by an

enemy. That would be strict neutrality indeed, but it would make the

Canal a weakness instead of a defense. Without it our Pacific Coast is

practically safe from European aggression; our Atlantic coast protected

by thousands of miles of ocean from any foe whose naval strength is in

the Pacific. To throw open the Canal to our foes as well as to our

friends would be like supplying the key to the bank vaults to the

cracksmen as well as to the cashier.

[Illustration: _Photo by American Press Ass’n_

GATUN LAKE, SHOWING SMALL FLOATING ISLANDS]

The parallel with the Suez Canal strenuously urged by the advocates of

neutrality does not hold. The waterway between the Mediterranean and the

Red Sea was not dug as a government enterprise. It was a distinctly

commercial enterprise, with its shares listed upon the exchanges and

bought and sold in the open market. By the purchase of a majority of

those shares the ownership of the Canal passed into the hands of the

British government, but all the nations had joined in the international

agreement to protect their individual rights before the British

ownership was effected. Moreover, Great Britain is by no means content

with the safeguards provided by the Constantinople convention, but has

planted her great fortresses at Malta and at Aden, near the ends of the

Canal, and maintains in the Mediterranean a naval force equal to that of

any other two nations. The Caribbean is to be the American

Mediterranean, and the visible and effective power of the United States

in those waters must be equal, probably vastly superior, to that of

England in Europe’s great inland sea.

[Illustration: A SPECTACULAR BLAST]

Nor does the existence of a powerful navy, even the material

multiplication of our present naval force, obviate to any considerable

degree the necessity for powerful forts at either end of the Canal. Our

fleet cannot be anchored during the continuance of a war to any one

fixed point. The navy is essentially an offensive force, its part in the

defense of our country being best performed by keeping the enemy busy

defending his own. Farragut said that the best defense against the

attack of any enemy is the rapid fire of your own guns. Extend this

principle and it appears that the best way to defend our own coasts is

to menace those of the enemy. This principle was not applied in our

recent war with Spain, but we had not the navy then, and diplomatic

considerations further intervened to prevent our employing against

Spain’s sea coast cities such vessels as we had. Should we rely wholly

on the navy to defend our Canal entrances a mere demonstration against

those points would tie up a considerable portion of our floating force,

while an enemy’s main fleet might ravage our thickly populated sea

coasts.

[Illustration: THE FIRST VIEW OF COLON]

Discussion of this question, however, is largely academic, for the

fortification of the Canal has been determined upon, and construction of

the forts is well advanced. There is, however, some disquietude over a

fear, expressed by the late Admiral Evans, that the topography at the

Atlantic terminus of the Canal is such that fortifications, however

great their strength, would not be sufficient to prevent the enemy

holding a position so near the Canal’s mouth as to be able to

concentrate its fire on each ship as it emerged and thus destroy

seriatim any fleet seeking to make the passage of the Canal. The

criticism was a serious one. Even to the civilian mind the inequalities

of a battle in which six or eight battleships can concentrate their

broadside fire on a single ship navigating a narrow and tortuous channel

and able to reply with her bow guns only are sufficiently obvious.

Indeed the criticism was held of sufficient force to be referred to the

General Board of the Navy, which, after due consideration, made a report

of which the following quotations form the substance:

“The General Board believes that the proposed fortifications at the

termini of the Isthmian Canal would be invaluable in assisting the

transfer of a United States fleet from one ocean to the other through

the Canal, in the face of an opposing fleet. The function of the

fortifications in this particular is precisely the same at the Canal

termini as it is at any fortified place from which a fleet may have to

issue in the face of an enemy’s fleet.

[Illustration: A PORCH AT CULEBRA]

“Guns mounted on shore are on an unsinkable and steady platform, and

they can be provided with unlimited protection and accurate

range-finding devices. Guns mounted on board ship are on a sinkable,

unsteady platform, their protection is limited, and range-finding

devices on board ship have a very limited range of accuracy. The shore

gun of equal power has thus a great advantage over the ship gun which is

universally recognized, and this advantage is increased if the former be

mounted on disappearing carriages, as are the seacoast guns of the

United States. The mere statement of these elementary facts is a

sufficient proof of the value of seacoast guns to assist a fleet in

passing out from behind them to engage a waiting hostile fleet outside,

provided the shore guns are mounted in advance of, or abreast, the point

where the ship channel joins the open sea. Even if somewhat retired from

that point they would be useful, but to a less extent.

[Illustration: _Photo by American Press Ass’n_

AVENIDA CENTRALE, PANAMA, NEAR THE STATION]

[Illustration: Copyright, 1913, F. E. Wright.

SWIMMING POOL AT PANAMA

Some say that before the days of the city water supply this pool held

water for protection against fire. Nowadays it is chiefly used for the

aquatic revels of the boys.]

“At the Pacific terminus of the Canal there are outlying islands that

afford sites for fortifications, the usefulness of which in assisting

the egress of a fleet in the face of opposition is universally

admitted, as far as the General Board knows; but there has been

unfavorable criticism of the possibility of fortifications at the

Atlantic end to serve this purpose. The General Board regards these

criticisms as unfounded and believes, on the contrary, that the

conditions at the Atlantic terminus of the Canal are unusually favorable

for the emplacement of guns that would be of assistance to a fleet

issuing in the face of hostile ships.

[Illustration: IN A CHIRIQUI TOWN]

“On both sides of Limon Bay, in which the Canal terminates at the

Atlantic end, there are excellent sites for forts, well advanced on

outlying points. The line joining these sites is 3000 yards in front of

the point where the Canal prism reaches a low-water depth sufficient for

battleships, and Limon Bay from this point outward is wide enough for a

formation of eight ships abreast. The outer end of the most advanced

breakwater proposed is only 600 yards in front of the line joining the

sites for the forts; and as long as ships remain behind the breakwater,

it will afford them a considerable amount of protection from the enemy’s

fire, while they will themselves be able to fire over it. In order to

make his fire effective against the issuing ships the enemy must come

within the effective fire of the fortifications. Under these

circumstances it is impossible to deny the usefulness of fortifications

in assisting the issue of a fleet against opposition. The conditions in

this respect at the Atlantic end of the Canal are incomparably better

than those existing at Sandy Hook, whose forts nobody would dream of

dismantling”.

[Illustration: A MOUNTAIN RIVER IN CHIRIQUI]

Concerning the type of fortifications now building there is little to be

said. The War Department is not as eager for publicity as are certain

other departments of our federal administration. In November, 1912,

Secretary of War Stimson made a formal statement of the general plan of

defense. No change has been made in this plan, and it may be quoted as

representing the general scheme as fixed upon by the War Department and

authorized by Congress:

“The defenses to the Isthmus are divided into two general heads:

“1. A seacoast armament with submarine mines at the termini of the

Canal, for protection against a sea attack and to secure a safe exit for

our fleet in the face of a hostile fleet.

“2. The construction of field works and a mobile force of troops to

protect the locks and assure important utilities against an attack by

land”.

“The seacoast fortifications will include 16-inch, 14-inch and 6-inch

rifles and 12-inch mortars. This armament will be of more powerful and

effective types than that installed in any other locality in the world.

At the Atlantic end of the Canal the armament will be located on both

sides of Limon Bay. At the Pacific end the greater part of the armament

will be located on several small islands, Flamenco, Perico and Naos,

which lie abreast of the terminus. Submarine mines will complete the

seacoast armament and will prevent actual entry into the Canal and

harbors by hostile vessels.

[Illustration: BITING THROUGH A SLIDE: FIVE CUBIC YARDS PER BITE]

“In addition to these fortifications, and the necessary coast artillery

and garrison to man them, the defensive plans provide for the erection

of field works, and for the maintenance at all times on the Panama Canal

Zone of a mobile force consisting of three regiments of infantry, at a

war strength of nearly 2000 men for each regiment, a squadron of

cavalry, and a battalion of field artillery. These latter fortifications

and the mobile garrison are intended to repel any attacks that might be

made by landing parties from an enemy’s fleet against the locks and

other important elements or accessories to the Canal. As an attack of

this character might be coincident with or even precede an actual

declaration of war, it is necessary that a force of the strength above

outlined should be maintained on the Canal Zone at all times. This

mobile garrison will furnish the necessary police force to protect the

Zone and preserve order within its limits in time of peace. Congress has

made the initial appropriations for the construction of these

fortifications, and they are now under construction. A portion of the

mobile garrison is also on the Isthmus, and the remainder will be sent

there as soon as provision is made for its being housed”.

It is to be noted that these plans contemplate only the garrisoning of

the Isthmus in time of peace. The department has steadfastly refused,

even in response to congressional inquiry, to make public its plans for

action in war time. The only hint offered on the subject is the estimate

of Col. Goethals that 25,000 men would be needed there in such a

contingency and his urgency that such a garrison be maintained on the

Zone at all times.

[Illustration: COMMISSARY BUILDING AND FRONT STREET, COLON]

The most vulnerable point of the Canal is of course the locks. The

destruction or interruption of the electrical machinery which operates

the great gates would put the entire Canal out of commission. If in war

time it should be vitally necessary to shift our Atlantic fleet to the

Pacific, or vice versa, the enemy could effectively check that operation

by a bomb dropped on the lock machinery at Gatun, Pedro Miguel or

Miraflores. It is, however, the universal opinion of the military

experts that this danger is guarded against to the utmost extent

demanded by extraordinary prudence. Against the miraculous, such as the

presence of an aeroplane with an operator so skilled as to drop bombs

upon a target of less than 40 feet square, no defense could fully

prevail. The lock gates themselves are necessarily exposed and an injury

to them would as effectually put the lock out of commission as would the

wrecking of the controlling machinery.

Col. Goethals has repeatedly declared his belief that the construction

of the locks is sufficiently massive to withstand any ordinary assaults

with explosives. No one man could carry and place secretly enough

dynamite to wreck or even seriously impair the immediate usefulness of

the locks. Even in time of peace they will be continually guarded and

patroled, while in time of war they will naturally be protected from

enemies on every side and even in the air above. The locks are not out

of range of a fleet in Limon Bay and a very few 13-inch naval shells

would put them out of commission. But for that very reason we are

building forts at Toro Point and its neighborhood to keep hostile fleets

out of Limon Bay, and the United States navy, which has usually given a

good account of itself in time of war, will be further charged with this

duty and will no doubt duly discharge it.

That the locks make the Canal more vulnerable than a sea-level canal

would have been is doubtless true. The fact only adds to the argument in

behalf of defending it by powerful forts and an adequate navy.

[Illustration: PEDRO MIGUEL LOCKS

The deep arched recesses are provided that the gates may fold flush with

the walls]

General Weaver, U. S. A., raised the only serious question as to the

sufficiency of the defenses on the Pacific side in his testimony before

the House Committee on Appropriations:

“My views are entirely in harmony with those expressed by Col. Goethals.

I think that the defenses are wholly adequate. The only question I have

noted raised as to the adequacy of the defense has been as to whether

guns would not be mounted by an enemy on Taboga Island, and as to

whether an enemy’s ships could not stand behind Taboga Island, and as to

whether these land guns and naval guns could not from there control the

water area in front of the Pacific terminus? The new type of mortars

that the Ordnance Department is making for the fortifications at Panama

will have a range of 20,000 yards. They will cover the water well over

beyond Taboga Island, and have under fire all of Taboga Island and the

water for a considerable distance beyond the outermost shore lines of

Taboga Island. It is about 12,000 yards from the fortifications at the

Canal terminus to Taboga Island. The mortars will reach 8000 yards

beyond Taboga. The 16-inch gun on Perico will have a range of 20,000

yards. The 14-inch guns on Flamenco and Naos Islands will have ranges of

18,400 yards. The 6-inch guns on Naos Island and on the mainland have a

range of 6000 yards, and are well placed to oppose any attempt at

landing on the lands on which the fortifications are located.

“_Mr. Sherley._--‘So far you have spoken only of the Pacific side. Now,

what have you to say about the defense on the Atlantic side’?

“_Gen. Weaver._--‘On the Atlantic side the defense is, in my opinion,

equally adequate. At Fort Randolph, on Margarita Island, there are

eight mortars of the new type, two 14-inch guns and two 6-inch guns.

That armament will protect the Margarita Island side of the entrance and

it also controls the waters to the south. On the Toro Point side at Fort

Sherman we have eight mortars, two 14-inch guns, and two 6-inch guns.

There are in addition two 6-inch guns provided at Manzanillo Point, city

of Colon. In my opinion this armament is entirely adequate for the

defense of the Atlantic side’”.

It is apparent, therefore, that the unfortified Island of Taboga is the

one questionable point in our Pacific line of defense. It is wholly

probable that steps will be taken to erect such defenses as will make

the seizure of this island impracticable to any enemy.

[Illustration: DETAIL CONSTRUCTION OF A LOCK

The great tube, later covered by concrete, carries the water for filling

the chamber]

Plans for the landward defenses of the coast forts had not been

determined upon at the time of publication of this book. Necessary no

doubt from a strictly military point of view, they seem to the civilian

mind rather superfluous in view of the character of the countryside

along the borders of the Zone. The general who would undertake to lead

an army through the jungle would encounter a natural foe such as armed

forces have never had to overcome, and his invading column would hardly

emerge upon the Zone in fit condition to give battle to any considerable

army of occupation.

However, should an enemy once effect a landing at any point within

striking distance of Panama or Colon, say on the Chorrera coast, or at

Nombre de Dios or Porto Bello, some defensive works would be needed to

prevent their taking the coast forts in the rear. Such works are being

planned and an extensive permanent camp is to be built at Miraflores, at

which point the Canal can be readily crossed--there are to be no

permanent bridges--and smaller posts at Margarita Island, Toro Point

and Culebra Island. To man the actual seacoast forts there will be 12

companies of coast artillery of 109 men each; while distributed in the

army camps will be, according to present estimates, three regiments of

infantry, a squadron of cavalry and a battalion of field artillery,

making in all rather more than 8000 men.

[Illustration: _Photo by H. Pittier_

_Courtesy National Geographic Magazine_

A GROUP OF GUYAMI GIRLS]

The probable influence of the Panama Canal on commerce, on trade routes,

on the commercial supremacy of this or that country, on the development

of hitherto dormant lands is a question that opens an endless variety of

speculations. Discussion of it requires so broad a knowledge of

international affairs as to be almost cosmic, a foresight so gifted as

to be prophetic. A century from now the fullest results of the Canal’s

completion will not have been fully attained. This creation of a new

waterway where a rocky barrier stood from the infinite past in the

pathway of commerce will make great cities where hamlets now sit in

somnolence, and perhaps reduce to insignificance some of the present

considerable ports of the world.

Certain very common misbeliefs may be corrected with merely a word or

two of explanation. Nothing is more common than to look upon all South

America as a territory to be vastly benefited by the Canal, and brought

by it nearer to our United States markets. A moment’s thought will show

the error of this belief. When we speak of South America we think first

of all of the rich eastern coast, of the cities of Rio de Janeiro,

Montevideo and Buenos Ayres. But it is not to this section that the

greatest advantage will come from the Canal. Vessels from our Pacific

coast can indeed carry the timber of Puget Sound, the fish of Alaska and

the Columbia River, the fruits of California thither more cheaply than

now, but that is but a slight fraction of their trade. Nor are Brazil

and the Argentine participators in Oriental trade to any great extent,

though the Canal may make them so. The western coast of South America is

chiefly affected by the Canal, and that to a degree rigidly limited by

the distance of the point considered from the Straits of Magellan, and

the size of the Canal tolls imposed.

[Illustration: A ZONE SIGN OF CIVILIZATION]

Nor will the Suez Canal be an abandoned waterway after our own cut at

Panama is completed. It will, indeed, be not surprising to see the Suez

Canal tonnage increase, for trade breeds trade, and the Panama Canal

will be a stimulant as well as a competitor. To all of British India and

Southern China the distance from Liverpool via Suez is less than via

Panama, and to Melbourne, Sidney and other Australian ports the saving

in distance via Panama is less than 2000 miles. The Suez Canal, it is

to be remembered, is owned by Great Britain and a very slight concession

in rates will be all that is needed to keep British merchant vessels to

their long accustomed routes. We have had a harder task in digging our

Canal than the French had at Suez, but we need cherish no delusive idea

that we are going to put the earlier waterway out of business.

[Illustration: PART OF THE COMPLETED CANAL]

The really great material advantage which the United States is to derive

from this monumental national undertaking will come from the all-water

connection between our own Atlantic and Pacific coasts. A ship going

from New York to San Francisco via the Straits of Magellan traverses

14,000 miles of sea--some of it the very most turbulent of all King

Neptune’s tossing domain. By Panama the same ship will have but 5000

miles to cover. The amazing thing is that ships are going around the

Horn, or at least through the Straits, but the high rates on

transcontinental railroads make even that protracted voyage profitable.

What the Canal will do to transcontinental rates is a matter that is

giving some railroad managers deep concern. It was in fact a

consideration which led to prolonged and obstinate opposition to the

building of any canal at all. Water carriage between the two coasts has

long been a bogey to the railroad managers. When coastwise steamships on

the Atlantic and Pacific with the Panama Railroad for a connecting link

offered some competition, the five transcontinental railways pooled

together and, securing control of the Pacific Mail Steamship line

operating between San Francisco and Panama, used it to cripple all

competition. For a time there was danger that the methods then employed

might be adopted to destroy the usefulness of the Panama Canal, and it

was to guard against this that Congress adopted the law denying the use

of the Canal to vessels owned by railroad companies.

[Illustration: HIS MORNING TUB]

At the time of its passage this law created much discussion. The reason

for it was widely misunderstood. Its first effect was the canceling of

several orders for ships placed by railroad companies with shipbuilders

in anticipation of the Canal’s opening, and the public naturally cried

out against a measure which seemed to interpose an obstacle to the

reappearance of the American flag on the high seas. But the law was bred

of bitter experience. In bygone days it was discovered that both time

and money could be saved on shipments from California to New York or

other Atlantic seaports by sending them to Panama by water, across the

Isthmus by rail, and then by water from Colon to their destination.

This route grew in favor until the transcontinental railroads intervened

to check its further development. Getting control of the Pacific Mail

line of steamers from San Francisco to Panama, they first put their

rates so low as to drive all competing ships from the route. Of course

they lost money, but the loss was apportioned among the companies

forming the pool, and when the competing concerns had been ruined or

driven out of business, the rates were put up again and the losses that

had been incurred were speedily recouped. Once the complete monopoly on

the Pacific had been secured, every effort was made to discourage

shipments by that route. The ships passed Los Angeles, the greatest

fruit port in the country, without a call, but touched at innumerable

little mud villages in Central America so as to make the time of through

shipments intolerable. They often sailed with half a cargo--refusing to

take freight that lay at their docks on the plea that all their cargo

space was disposed of. It was--to the railroads who afterward gathered

up the rejected freight and shipped it east over their own lines at

prices to suit themselves.

[Illustration: NATIVE GIRL, CHORRERA PROVINCE]

[Illustration: NATIVE BOY, CHORRERA PROVINCE]

Taught wisdom by these tactics--against which they had unavailingly

employed all the expedients of law and of coöperative competition--the

shippers of California appealed to Congress to act wisely lest the

Panama Canal as a waterway for all and a regulator of transcontinental

freight rates be throttled by the railroads. They pointed out that the

roads might in combination maintain one line of ships between New York

and San Francisco which would make rates so low that no other line could

meet them and live. Doubtless such a line would lose money, but the

loss, divided among the conspiring roads, would be but a flea bite to

each, and would be more than recouped by the higher rail rates they

might charge. In response to this appeal Congress enacted the law

denying railroads the right to maintain lines of water carriage on what

would be normally competitive routes. The statute though planned

primarily for the maintenance of the highest usefulness of the Panama

Canal affects other routes, notably Long Island Sound. It is denounced

by the railroads and has doubtless checked to some extent American

shipbuilding, but it is nevertheless the only apparent weapon against a

very real and harmful device in the railroads’ efforts to maintain high

rates.

[Illustration: PARK AT DAVID]

The question of the tolls to be charged for passage through the Canal is

one that has evoked a somewhat acrimonious discussion, the end of which

is not yet. About the amount of the toll there was little dispute. It

was determined by taking the cost of maintenance of the Canal, which is

estimated at about $4,000,000 annually, and the interest on its cost,

about $10,000,000 a year, and comparing the total with the amount of

tonnage which might reasonably be expected to pass through annually.

Prof. Emory R. Johnson, the government expert upon whose figures are

based all estimates concerning canal revenues, fixed the probable

tonnage of the Canal for the first year at 10,500,000 tons, with an

increase at the end of the first decade of operation to 17,000,000, and

at the end of the second decade to 27,000,000 tons. The annual expenses

of the Canal, including interest, approximates $14,000,000, and Congress

has accordingly fixed the tolls at $1.20 a ton for freight and $1.50 per

passenger. It is anticipated that these figures will cause a deficit in

the first two or three years of operation, but that the growth of

commerce through the Canal will speedily make it up.

[Illustration: MAIN STREET, CHORRERA]

[Illustration: A PLACID BACK WATER IN CHIRIQUI]

In legislating upon the question of tolls Congress opened an

international question which has been fiercely debated and which remains

a subject of diplomatic negotiation between our State Department and the

British Foreign Office. This was done by the section of the law which

granted to American-built ships engaged in the coasting trade the right

to use the Canal without the payment of any tolls whatsoever. At the

time of its appearance in Congress this proposition attracted little

attention and evoked no discussion. It seemed to be a perfectly obvious

and entirely justifiable employment of the Canal for the encouragement

of American shipping. The United States had bought the territory through

which the Canal extended and was paying every dollar of the cost of the

great work. What could be more natural than that it should concede to

American shipping owners, who had borne their share of the taxation

which the cost of the Canal necessitated, the right of free passage

through it?

The concession seemed the more obvious and proper because the privilege

of free passage was limited to vessels in the coastwise trade. Under our

navigation laws maritime trade between ports in the United States is

confined to ships built in American shipyards. This regulation is

clearly intended to confer upon the United States a monopoly of the

building of coastwise ships, and the subsequent exemption of coastwise

ships from Panama Canal tolls was a further benefaction to this

monopoly. As a matter of fact, our coastwise trade was at the moment

passing into monopolistic control, and the wisdom of making so

prodigious a gift to a monopolistic combination might have justly been

questioned. But the strictly business features of the Canal have always

been decorated with more or less sentimental declamation about

reëstablishing the American flag on the high seas, and it was to

contribute to the latter desirable end that the tolls were to be

remitted. It seemed to occur to no one that the ships thus favored were

either owned by railroad companies and used largely to stifle

competition or by a somewhat notorious organizer of trusts whose

ambition was to control water transportation from Maine to the Mexico

border, and who was checked in the attainment of his aim by a sentence

to the Federal penitentiary. It is not only in war time that the flag is

waved most enthusiastically by men who only want the bounty that goes

with it.

Nobody, however, at the time of the passage of the act regulating tolls

thought it had any particular international significance. Its signature

by the President was taken as a matter of course and it was not until

some time afterward that the Ambassador of Great Britain presented his

country’s claim that the exemption clause was in violation of the

Hay-Pauncefote treaty. The section of that treaty which it is claimed is

violated reads thus:

“The Canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war

of all nations observing these rules on terms of entire equality, so

that there shall be no discrimination against any such nation, or its

citizens or subjects, in respect of the conditions or changes of

traffic”.

The outcry against the exemption clause soon became very vociferous.

Perhaps the Canadian railroads or some of their officials may have been

instrumental in this, seeing a possible profit in running ships from

Montreal or Quebec to Vancouver or Victoria, touching at various United

States ports en route. Such a voyage would not constitute a “coastwise

passage” under our laws, and foreign vessels might engage in such

traffic. But they saw that the exemption in tolls by which a United

States vessel of 12,000 tons would escape canal tolls amounting to

$15,000 would put them at a serious disadvantage. Hence they appealed to

Great Britain and the protest followed. Whether affected by the vigorous

colonial protest or not, the British government urges that the United

States will very properly adjust its tolls to meet the needs of the

Canal for revenue, and that if the coastwise shipping be exempted there

will be a loss of some millions of dollars in revenue which will compel

the imposition of higher tolls on other shipping. It is urged also on

behalf of the protestants that the word “coastwise” is capable of

various constructions and that a vessel plying between New York and Los

Angeles might be held not to have sacrificed her coastwise register if

she continued her voyage to Yokohama or Hong Kong.

[Illustration: GATUN LAKE. FLOATING ISLANDS MASSED AGAINST TRESTLE]

American public men and the American press are radically divided on the

question. A majority, perhaps, are inclined to thrust it aside with a

mere declaration of our power in the matter. “We built the Canal and

paid for it”, they say, “and our ships have the same rights in it that

they have in the Hudson River or the canal at the Soo. Besides the

British cannot engage in our coasting trade anyway, and what we do to

help our coastwise ships concerns no one but us”. Which seems a pretty

fair and reasonable statement of the case until the opponents of the

exemption clause put in their rejoinder. “Read the treaty”, they say.

“It is perfectly clear in its agreement that the United States should

not do this thing it now proposes to do. Treaties are, by the

Constitution, the supreme law of the land. To violate one is to violate

our national honor. It would be disgraceful to let the word go out to

all the world that the United States entered into sacred obligations by

treaty and repudiated them the moment their fulfilment proved galling.

The protected shipyards, the already subsidized coastwise steamship

companies, are asking for more gratuities at the cost of our national

honor. What is the use of reëstablishing on the high seas a flag which

all peoples may point out as the emblem of a dishonorable state”?

[Illustration: GUIDE WALL AT MIRAFLORES

This picture shows method of lock construction. The space within these

two walls will be filled with dirt and cement. The ground on either side

will be inundated, forming a small lake through which the Canal passes.]

So rests the argument. The advocates of the remission of tolls to the

coastwise ships of the United States have the best of the position,

since their contention is already enacted into law, but the opposing

forces are vigorously urging the repeal of the law. Congress will of

course be the final arbiter, and as the Canal cannot be opened to

commerce before 1915 there is ample time for deliberation and just

judgment. A phase of the problem which I do not recall having seen

discussed arises out of the literal acceptance of the language of the

treaty as bearing upon the use of the Canal in war time. It declares

that the Canal “shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of

war of all nations ... on terms of entire equality”, and while it goes

on to prescribe the rules to be followed in war time it nowhere declares

the right of the United States to debar to the warships of a hostile

nation the privilege of passing through the Canal. Under the strictest

construction of the language of the treaty the refusal of the United

States to permit a German or a Japanese fleet to pass through, even

though that nation was at war with us, would be a violation of the

treaty which would justify English interference to enforce the opening

of the Canal--which of course would be war. No such contingency could

possibly arise, nor any such construction be put upon the language of

the treaty by any reasonable and responsible party. Yet it is scarcely

a more forced construction than the one applied in order to make it

appear that we may not free our own ships in purely domestic trade from

canal tolls.

[Illustration: POLING OVER THE SHALLOWS]

The fundamental principle controlling the amount of the tolls is to fix

them at such a figure as to minimize the competition of Suez. Commerce

proceeds by the cheapest route. Some slight advantage may accrue to the

Panama route if the government can make such contracts with American

mines as to be able to furnish coal at the Isthmus at a price materially

less than is charged at Suez. The estimates, supplied by Prof. Johnson,

of probable commerce have been based on a price for coal at Cristobal or

Colon of $5 a ton and at Balboa of $5.50 a ton. At the time the prices

for coal at Port Said on the Suez Canal were from $6.20 to $6.32 a ton.

This, plus cheaper tolls, will give Panama a great advantage over Suez.

[Illustration: _Photo by American Press Association_

THE SPILLWAY ALMOST COMPLETE.

The scaffolding will be removed and all towers built to height of those

on left]

The first immediate and direct profit accruing to the people of the

United States from the Canal will come from the quick, short and cheap

communication it will afford between the eastern and western coasts of

the United States. People who think of passenger schedules when they

speak of communication between distant cities will doubtless be

surprised to learn that on freight an average of two weeks will be saved

by the Canal route between New York and San Francisco. The saving in

money, even should the railroads materially reduce their present

transcontinental rates, will be even more striking. Even now for many

classes of freights there is a profit in shipping by way of the Straits

of Magellan--a distance of 13,135 miles. By Panama the distance between

New York and San Francisco is but 5262 miles, a saving of 7873 miles or

about the distance across the Atlantic and back. From New Orleans to San

Francisco will be but 4683 miles. Today there is little or no water

communication between the two cities and their tributary territory. At

least one month’s steaming will be saved by 12-knot vessels going

through the Panama Canal over those making the voyage by way of the

Straits of Magellan. A general idea of the saving in distance between

points likely to be affected by the Canal is given by the table prepared

by Hon. John Barrett, Director General of the Pan-American Union and

published on page 384.

[Illustration: SAN BLAS LUGGER IN PORT]

[Illustration: _Photo by Brown Bros._

THE BEGINNING OF A SLIDE

The great crack has opened in the side of a road; note house in the

distance about to go]

The Pacific coasts both of the United States and of South and Central

America will be quickened into new life when the stream of commerce

begins to flow through the new channel at Panama. It may be wise to lay

emphasis at this point upon the fact that so far as industrial and

commercial life on our own Pacific coast is concerned it needs little

quickening, as the march to civic greatness of those communities has

been unparalleled. But even that magnificent advance has been impeded

and harassed by the difficulty of communication with the markets of the

Atlantic coast. The struggles of the Pacific coast planters and

lumbermen to break the bondage imposed upon them by the railroads have

been fairly frantic, and their uniform failure pathetic. Perhaps the

railroad managers have demanded no more than a rightful care for the

interests of their stockholders warranted. This is no place to argue the

railroad rate question. But from the shipper’s point of view the demands

have been so intolerable that every expedient for resisting them has

been tried and failed. Even now there is profit to a corporation--and to

the shippers that patronize it--in carrying goods from San Francisco to

Hawaii, thence to Tehuantepec and across that Isthmus to the Gulf and

thence again to New York in competition with the direct railroad lines.

If freight can be thus handled profitably, with two changes from ship to

car and vice versa, it is easy to see how vastly beneath the charges of

the railroads will be the all-water route between New York and San

Francisco. It is little exaggeration to say that for commercial purposes

all the Pacific seaboard will be brought as near New York and European

markets as Chicago is today. The forward impetus given by this to the

commercial interests of the Pacific baffles computation.

[Illustration: _Photo by Brown Bros._

“MAKING THE DIRT FLY”]

But it is Latin America that has reason to look forward with the utmost

avidity to the results that will follow the opening of the Canal. For

the people of that little developed and still mysterious coast line

reaching from the United States-Mexico boundary, as far south at least

as Valparaiso, the United States has prepared a gift of incalculable

richness. Our share in the benefit will come in increased trade, if our

merchants seize upon the opportunity offered.

[Illustration: THE HAPPY CHILDREN OF THE ZONE]

From Liverpool to Valparaiso today is 8747 miles and from New York 8380.

But when the ships go through the Canal the English vessels will save

little. For them the run will be reduced to 7207 miles, while from New

York the distance will be cut to 4633. With such a handicap in their

favor New York shippers should control the commerce of Pacific South

America north of Valparaiso. Guayaquil, in Ecuador, will be but 2232

miles from New Orleans; it has been 10,631. Callao, with all Peru at its

back, will be 3363 miles from New York, 2784 from New Orleans. In every

instance the saving of distance by the Panama route is more to the

advantage of the United States than of Great Britain. Today the lion’s

share of the commerce of the South American countries goes to England or

to Germany.

DISTANCE SAVED BY THE PANAMA CUTOFF

COMPARATIVE DISTANCES (IN NAUTICAL MILES) IN THE WORLD’S SEA TRAFFIC AND

DIFFERENCE IN DISTANCES VIA PANAMA CANAL AND OTHER PRINCIPAL ROUTES

=From=

/----------------------^---------------------\

=============+==========+=======+=======+=======+=======+=======+=====

| | New | New | Liver-| | |Pana-

-------------+----------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-----

Seattle |{Magellan |13,953 |14,369 |14,320 |14,701 |15,397 | ...

|{Panama | 6,080 | 5,501 | 8,654 | 9,173 |10,447 |4,063

=Distance| saved= |=7,873=|=8,868=|=5,666=|=5,528=|=4,950=| ...

-------------+----------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-----

San Francisco|{Magellan |13,135 |13,551 |13,502 |13,883 |14,579 | ...

|{Panama | 5,262 | 4,683 | 7,836 | 8,355 | 9,629 |3,245

=Distance| saved= |=7,873=|=8,868=|=5,666=|=5,528=|=4,950=| ...

-------------+----------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-----

Honolulu |{Magellan |13,312 |13,728 |13,679 |14,060 |14,756 | ...

|{Panama | 6,702 | 6,123 | 9,276 | 9,795 |11,069 |4,685

=Distance| saved= |=6,610=|=7,605=|=4,403=|=4,265=|=3,687=| ...

-------------+----------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-----

Guayaquil |{Magellan |10,215 |10,631 |10,582 |10,963 |11,659 | ...

|{Panama | 2,810 | 2,231 | 5,384 | 5,903 | 9,192 | 793

=Distance| saved= |=7,405=|=8,400=|=5,198=|=5,060=|=2,467=| ...

-------------+----------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-----

Callao |{Magellan | 9,613 |10,029 | 9,980 |10,361 |11,057 | ...

|{Panama | 3,363 | 2,784 | 5,937 | 6,456 | 7,730 |1,346

=Distance| saved= |=6,250=|=7,245=|=4,043=|=3,905=|=3,327=| ...

-------------+----------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-----

Valparaiso |{Magellan | 8,380 | 8,796 | 8,747 | 9,128 | 9,824 | ...

|{Panama | 4,633 | 4,054 | 7,207 | 7,726 | 9,000 |2,616

=Distance| saved= |=3,747=|=4,742=|=1,540=|=1,402=| =824=| ...

-------------+----------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-----

Wellington |{Magellan |11,344 |11,760 | ... |13,353 | 9,694 | ...

|{Suez | ... | ... |12,989 | ... | ... | ...

|{Panama | 8,857 | 8,272 |11,425 |11,944 | 9,205 |6,834

=Distance| saved= |=2,493=|=3,488=|=1,564=|=1,409=| =489=| ...

-------------+----------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-----

Melbourne |{Cape | | | | | |

|{Good Hope|13,162 |14,095 | ... |11,845 | 8,186 | ...

|{Suez | ... | ... |11,654 | ... | ... | ...

|{Panama |10,392 | 9,813 |12,966 |13,452 |10,713 |8,342

=Distance| saved= |=2,770=|=4,282=|=1,312=|=1,607=|=2,527=| ...

| | | | =[1]= | =[1]= | =[1]= |

-------------+----------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-----

Manila |{Suez |11,589 |12,943 | 9,701 | 9,892 | 6,233 | ...

|{Panama |11,548 |10,969 |14,122 |14,608 |11,869 |9,370

=Distance| saved= | =41=|=1,974=|=4,421=|=4,716=|=5,636=| ...

| | | | =[1]= | =[1]= | =[1]= |

-------------+----------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-----

Hongkong |{Suez |11,673 |13,031 | 9,785 | 9,976 | 6,317 | ...

|{Panama |11,691 |11,112 |13,957 |14,443 |11,704 |9,173

=Distance| saved= | =18=|=1,919=|=4,172=|=4,467=|=5,387=| ...

| | | | =[1]= | =[1]= | =[1]= |

-------------+----------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-----

Yokohama |{Suez |13,566 |14,924 |11,678 |11,869 | 8,210 | ...

|{Panama | 9,798 | 9,219 |12,372 |13,858 |11,119 |7,660

=Distance| saved= |=3,768=|=5,705=| =694=|=1,989=|=2,909=| ...

| | | | =[1]= | =[1]= | =[1]= |

-------------+----------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-----

Panama | | 2,017 | 1,438 | 4,591 | 5,110 | 6,387 | ...

-------------+----------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-----