SOME STRATEGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Soundly considered, any great strategical problem is a matter of:
1. Naval and military strength; rarely exercised separately but usually
in combination.
2. Disposition of fortified stations and of bases of supplies.
3. The economic and political conditions of countries concerned.
Such phrases as the "Blue-water School of Strategy" are either
misleading, inasmuch as they give an incorrect impression of the ideas
of the people described as belonging to such a school, wrongly
representing them as considering naval strength, and naval strength
alone, in a problem of attack and defence; or else they rightly describe
an altogether incorrect conception of strategy. It will be found on
examination of any great typical struggle between nations that all three
matters I have mentioned have usually entered into the final
determination of the issue; that superior military or naval force has
often been countered by superior disposition of fortresses, fitting
stations, and supply bases: that sometimes clear superiority both in
armaments and disposition of armaments has been countered by greater
financial and industrial resources and more resolute national character.
On all questions of strategy the Napoleonic wars will provide leading
cases, for Napoleon brought to his campaigns the full range of
weapons--military, naval, political, economic; and his early victories
were won as much by the audaciously new reading he gave to the politics
of war as to his skill in military strategy and in tactics. It would be
a fascinating task to imagine a Napoleon setting his mind to a
consideration of the strategy of the Pacific with all its vast problems.
But since to give to "strategy" its properly wide definition would be to
deal again in this chapter with many matters already fully discussed, I
propose to touch upon it here in a much narrower sense, and suggest
certain of the more immediate strategical problems, particularly in
regard to the disposition of fortified stations and bases of supplies.
A glance at the map will show that the British Empire has at the present
moment an enormous strategical superiority over any other Power in the
Pacific. That Empire is established on both flanks, in positions with
strong and safe harbours for fleets, and with great tracts of fertile
country for recruiting local military forces and providing garrisons.
(For the time being I put aside political limitations and consider only
military and naval possibilities unhampered by any restrictions.) On
the eastern flank of the Pacific Ocean is the Columbian province of
Canada provided with several fine harbours and allowing of the
construction of an ideal naval base behind the shelter of Vancouver
Island. The coastal waters and the coastal rivers alike make possible
great fisheries, and consequently are good nurseries for seamen. The
coastal territory has supplies of coal, of timber, of oil. The
hinterland is rich pastoral, agricultural, and mineral country capable
of carrying an enormous population and, therefore, of providing a great
army.
Considered in relation to its neighbours in the Pacific, Canada is
strategically quite safe except as regards attack from one quarter--the
United States. A Russian attack upon Canada, for instance, would be
strategically hopeless (I presume some equality of force), since a
Russian Fleet would have to cross the Pacific and meet the Canadian
Fleet where the Canadians chose, or else batter a fortified coast with
the Canadian Fleet sheltering in some port on a flank waiting a chance
to attack. The same remark applies to an attack from Japan, from China,
or from a South American nation. As regards an attack from the United
States, the position, of course, is different. But even in that case the
strategical position of Canada would be at least not inferior to that of
the enemy (apart from superiority of numbers), since that enemy would be
liable to diverting attacks from Great Britain in the Atlantic and from
Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific (whose forces would, however,
have to subdue the Philippines and the Hawaiian Islands before they
could safely approach the North American coast). An attack by the United
States on Canada is, however, not within the bounds of present
probability, and need not be discussed.
The very great importance of Canada to the British position in the
Pacific cannot, however, be too strongly impressed. Canada holds the
right flank of the Pacific Ocean, and that flank rests upon the main
British strength concentrated in the Atlantic. With the loss of Canada
British mastery in the Pacific would be impossible. To make the
strategical position of Western Canada (naturally very strong) secure
there is needed--
(a) A British Pacific Fleet strong enough to meet any enemy in the
ocean, and so stationed as to be capable of concentrating quickly either
at a base near Vancouver on the outbreak of hostilities, or in the rear
of any Fleet attacking the coast.
(b) A greater population in Western Canada with an army (not necessarily
of Regulars) capable of defending Canadian territory against a landing
party.
On the west flank of the Pacific Great Britain is established at
Wei-hai-wei, Hong Kong, the Straits Settlements, Borneo, New Guinea,
Australia, New Zealand, and various small islands. There are here
possibilities of enormous strength and several points of grave danger.
At the outset let us consider the continental position of the British
Empire on the west flank of the Pacific. The occupation of India gives
to the British Power at once a great position and a great
responsibility. Occupation of India, presuming the loyalty of the
majority of the native inhabitants--a presumption which seems to become
more and more reasonable with the passage of time--gives great material
resources and command of a vast population of good fighting men. It is
admitted, however, that these native troops require a certain
"stiffening" of White troops before taking the field. To provide that
stiffening is the greatest single task of the British Regular army.
Strategically, the transfer from Great Britain to India of a large
number of soldiers to leaven the native forces is not an ideal system.
The distance between the source of supply and the field of operations is
so great that in peace it is necessary to have a larger force than would
be necessary if that distance were reduced, and in war the repairing of
wastage would be a matter of some difficulty. Further, the British
soldier, coming from a very different climate, suffers a great deal from
sickness in India. A more economical and effective system, if that were
found to be politically possible, would be to strengthen the White
garrison of India in part from Australia and New Zealand and South
Africa in case of war.
The defence of India has to be considered in the light of--
(a) An attack from Japan or China based on a Pan-Asiatic movement.
(b) Internal sedition.
(c) An attack from Russia through Persia.
(d) An attack from Germany allied with Turkey by way of the Persian
Gulf.
The two former are the more immediate dangers. But on the whole, India
is a far greater source of strength than of weakness. She makes the
British Empire a great military power on the mainland of Asia, and she
can contribute materially to the strength of the Pacific naval forces.
Passing from India we find the British Empire in possession of several
very important strategical positions on or near the coast of Asia,
Wei-hai-wei and Hong Kong being the advance stations in the north, and
Singapore (the favoured meeting-place of the Pacific squadron of the
British Navy) being a well-situated central point. A British Pacific
Fleet making Singapore its chief base would be in the best position to
dominate the western littoral of the ocean. South of Singapore the large
settlements (Australia and New Zealand) are friendly. From the north any
possible enemy would be best watched, best met, from a Singapore base.
That base would be central for aid from India and South Africa; and it
would also be the best point of departure for a Pacific Fleet finding it
necessary to rendezvous on the American flank of the ocean.
This is a convenient point at which to call attention to one grave
strategical weakness of the British Empire position in the Pacific--the
lack of a fortified coaling station near to the centre of the ocean.
Between Hong Kong and Vancouver there is no fortified coaling station.
There are rumours, as I write, of the want being met by the
fortification of Fanning Island, at present the landing-place of the
Pacific cable between Vancouver and Norfolk Island. Fanning Island is
not an ideal station either by position or natural advantages. But it
would be better than nothing.
The strategical position of Australia and New Zealand comes next for
consideration. Looking to the future, these British Dominions, which can
be grouped under the one title, Australasia, will probably form the most
important national element in the South Pacific. Considered at present,
Australia must be a source of the gravest anxiety strategically, for it
has within its vast, and everywhere insufficiently populated, area one
great tract, the Northern Territory, which is practically empty, and
which contains to-day twice as many Asiatics as Whites. Embracing
335,000,000 acres, the Northern Territory possesses several splendid
rivers, in the inland portion a great artesian water supply, and a wide
diversity of land and of climate. On the uplands is a warm, dry,
exhilarating area, not very rich in soil, but suitable for pastoral
occupation, and giving great promise of mineral wealth. On the lowlands,
with a climate which is sub-tropical to tropical, but, on account of the
wide spread of the gum tree, is practically nowhere dangerously
malarial, every agricultural industry is possible, from dairy-farming
and maize-growing to the cultivation of coffee, sugar, sago, hemp, and
spices. Almost every expert who has explored the Territory has been
struck with its possibilities. Mr Dashwood, the former Government
resident, considered the "area of land suitable for tropical agriculture
enormous." Mr Sydney Kidman, the great cattle breeder, reported on the
land about Herbert River as "ideal cattle country." A dozen other
authorities acclaim the pastoral possibilities of the uplands. The
probability of vast tin, copper and gold deposits is certified to by
every geological explorer.
The Northern Territory thus offers a tempting prize for an Asiatic Power
seeking new outlets for its population. Yet, with all its advantages the
Territory remains empty. It is known that the Government of Great
Britain is profoundly anxious for its settlement. It is an open gate
through which an Asiatic invader may occupy Australia. It is an empty
land which we do not "effectively occupy," and therefore is, according
to the theories of international law, open to colonisation by some other
Power.
Further, the Northern Territory is specially vulnerable, because an
enemy landing there could find horses, oxen, pasturage, timber, some
metals, a good soil, plenty of water, any number of easily defensible
harbours--in short, all the raw material of war. And to prevent a
landing there is nothing. The local White population is nil,
practically; the fortifications are nil; the chances of an Australian
force ever getting there to dislodge an enemy, nil.
An ingenious Australian romance (_The Commonwealth Crisis_, by C. H.
Kirness), recently published, imagines a "colonising invasion" of
Australia by Japan. A certain Thomas Burt and his friend, while on a
hunting trip in the Northern Territory, observe the landing of bodies of
Japanese troops at Junction Bay. They ride to the south-west to bring
the news to Port Darwin, the small White settlement in the Territory.
For some years preceding Japan had contemplated a secret "peaceful
invasion" of the Northern Territory. The project was planned with great
care. First a huge military colony was organised at Formosa, and the men
trained in agriculture. Later, the men were supplied with wives. Three
months were allowed to elapse, and the men were transported secretly to
the Northern Territory. Quite 6000 "colonists" had been thus landed
before "White Australia" was able to take any action. Japan, when
concealment is no longer possible, officially states through its
Ambassador in London that, quite without authority from the Mikado, a
private colonising organisation had settled a body of Japanese in the
Northern Territory. The Mikado regretted this, and was willing that
these subjects should disavow their Japanese citizenship and swear
devotion to the British Flag. A deputation from the Japanese colony in
the Northern Territory then arrives at Port Darwin to offer its
allegiance, and to ask that schools should be established in the new
settlement.
From that point the story develops to the downfall of "White Australia"
so far as all the north of the Continent is concerned. That romance was,
though in some of its details fantastic, in its main idea possible. It
was one of many efforts in warning. Such warnings seem to be taking
effect now, for the Commonwealth Government is moving at last to
colonise the Northern Territory, and to build a railway which will bring
it into touch with the more populous portions of the Continent. A
scientific expedition was sent recently to investigate the conditions of
the Territory as regards productiveness and health. The preliminary
report of that expedition (presented to the Australian Parliament
October 1911) was generally favourable. It enlarged on the great
capacity of the Territory for production, and was optimistic about the
climatic conditions:
"Bearing in mind that the country was visited at the time of year when
the climate was most suitable for Europeans, the general health was
remarkably good. The families of the second generation examined showed
no signs of physical deterioration. There are none of the tropical
diseases, such as malaria and dysentery, endemic in the settlements;
and, as long as the necessary hygienic precautions are observed, there
is no reason to anticipate their appearance.
"There are, at present, men who have spent from three to four decades in
the Territory, and every one of them compares favourably, both as
regards physique and energy, with men of similar ages elsewhere.
"The healthiest and strongest are those, both men and women, who take
regular open-air exercises both in the relatively cool and in the hot
season.
"Life in the back country, provided the ordinary precautions necessary
in tropical parts are taken, is decidedly healthy. The summer months are
undoubtedly trying, but the winter months, when at night-time the
temperature falls below 40 degrees F., afford recuperation from the
excessive damp heat of the summer. In addition, the open-air life is in
itself a great safeguard against enervation and physical deterioration."
That bears out the views of those who are in the best position to know
the Northern Territory of Australia. Clearly, there are no obstacles to
its White settlement except such as arise from the apathy and
carelessness of the governments concerned. But with the strategical
question of populating the Northern Territory is bound up the other idea
of populating Australia itself. In 1904, the Government of New South
Wales, one of the Australian states, alarmed by the fall of the
birth-rate, appointed a Royal Commission to inquire into the cause. One
thing made clear by the investigations of the Commission was "that a
very large section of the population keeps down the birth-rate so far
as it can, and that the limit of birth-suppression is defined by the
limit of knowledge on the subject." That was practically the main
conclusion in the Commissioners' report. It probably did not need a
Commission of Inquiry to tell the social observer of Australia so much.
That the decreasing birth-rate in the Commonwealth was not primarily due
to any physical degeneracy of the people, had long been the conviction
of all who had had the opportunity and the desire to make the most
cursory inquiry into the subject. Not lack of capacity, but lack of
willingness to undertake parental responsibility, was the cause of the
Australian movement towards sterility. Coming to a conclusion as to
"why" was thus an easy task in investigating the dwindling birth-rate.
It was quite clear that the Australian cradle did not fill, mainly
because the Australian parent preferred to have a very small family.
The evil--it is an evil, for there could be no better, no more welcome
immigrants to any country than those coming on the wings of the
stork--does not affect Australia alone, but is observable in almost
every civilised country. It has successfully defied one of the strongest
of natural sentiments. Every sane adult is by instinct desirous of being
a parent. But instinct seems to weaken with civilisation and its
accompanying artificiality of life. If, on an essentially vital point,
it is to become so weak as to be ineffective, and is to be replaced by
no ethical or other motive working towards the same end, then
civilisation will involve extinction. That is the melancholy conclusion
which some pessimists even now come to, pointing to the fact that the
White races of the earth, as a whole, despite the still prolific Slav
and German, show a tendency to dwindle.
Alarm at such a conclusion may yet prove in itself a remedy. Already
there is a general agreement that for the community's good it is well
that there should be a higher birth-rate, but, so far, the general
agreement lacks particular application. With a further recognition of
the fate to which artificially-secured sterility points, there may be an
acuter alarm, which will convert the individual not only to good belief,
but to good practice. What is wanted is a generally accepted conviction
that childlessness is either unfortunate or disgraceful, and that
anything but a moderately large family is a condition calling for
apology. In Australia that is particularly wanted. There are there--in a
new country with plenty of room for many millions yet--none of the
excuses which can be held to justify "small families" in more thickly
populated lands. It is satisfactory to note that since the Birth-rate
Commission aroused the public mind on the subject in Australia, there
has been a distinct betterment of the birth-rate; and there has been an
end to the old objection to immigration. "Empty Australia" is filling up
somewhat more rapidly now; but the process is still far too slow, from
the point of view of strategical safety.
With Australia, including the Northern Territory, populated and
defended, the strategical position of the British Empire on the Asiatic
flank of the Pacific Ocean could be organised on a sound basis. An
Imperial Fleet, contributed to by the Mother Country, by Australia, New
Zealand, South Africa, India, and the Crown Colonies, having a rallying
point at Singapore, could hold the Indian Ocean (which is to the Pacific
what the Mediterranean is to the Atlantic) as a "British lake," and this
powerful naval force would straddle the centre of the western littoral
of the ocean, keeping secure the British communities in the south from
the Asiatic communities in the north, and ready to respond to a call
from Canada. On the western, as on the eastern flank, there is present
all the "raw material" for Fleets and armies--great supplies of coal,
oil, timber, metals, fecund fishing grounds, and enormous areas of
agricultural and pastoral territory.
When the strategical position of the United States in the Pacific comes
to be examined, it is found to be for the moment one full of anxiety.
The Power which may, five years hence, have undisputed hegemony of the
ocean, holds a difficult position there to-day. The map will show that
if the United States had had no expansion ideas at all, in the Pacific
or elsewhere, national safety demanded that she should stretch out her
arm to take in the Hawaiian Islands. This group, if held by an enemy,
would be as a sword pointed to the heart of the Pacific States of the
Republic: but held by the United States it is a buckler against any
enemy from south or west. A foe approaching the United States Pacific
coast would inevitably seek to occupy first the Hawaiian Islands and use
them as a base: and just as surely would not dare to pass those islands
leaving there an American Fleet. With Honolulu Harbour strongly
fortified and sheltering a Fleet of any real fighting strength, the
Pacific coast of the United States is safe from invasion by sea
(invasion by land from Canada hardly needs to be considered; nor from
Mexico). At the present time Honolulu is in the process of being
fortified rather than is fortified: and a powerful American Fleet awaits
the completion of the Panama Canal before it can enter the Pacific
without leaving the Atlantic coast of the Republic unduly exposed.
The Philippine Islands, too, are a source of anxiety rather than of
strength at present. When the Panama Canal has been completed and
Honolulu fortified, and the Philippines mark the terminal point of an
American Fleet patrol, their strategical weight will count in the other
scale, for they will then give the American Power a strong vedette post
in the waters of a possible enemy. Any attack from the Pacific on the
United States would in prudence have to be preceded by the reduction of
the Philippines, or at least their close investment. Yet the temporary
loss of the group would inflict no great disadvantage on the American
plan of campaign. Thus the enemy could not afford to leave the
Philippines alone, and yet would gain no decisive advantage from the
sacrifices necessary to secure them. In the case of a war in which the
United States was acting on the offensive against an Asiatic Power, the
Philippines would be of great value as an advanced base.
The ultimate strategical position of the United States in the Pacific
cannot be forecasted until there is a clearer indication of how far she
proposes to carry a policy of overseas expansion. But in the near future
it can be seen that she will keep on the high seas one great Fleet, its
central rallying point being probably Cuba, with the Galapagos Islands,
San Francisco, Honolulu and Manila as the Pacific bases. At present the
Galapagos belong to Ecuador, and Ecuador does not seem disposed to
"lease" them to the United States. But that difficulty will probably be
overcome, since the United States must have an advance guard to protect
the Panama Canal on the Pacific as well as on the Atlantic side. Viewed
from a purely defensive standpoint, such a strategical position is sound
and courageous. If offensive action is contemplated, on the Asiatic
mainland for example, a military force far greater than that existing
to-day in the United States must be created.
Japan has consolidated a sound strategical position by the annexation of
Corea, Russian naval power having ceased to exist in the Pacific. Japan
now holds the Sea of Japan as her own Narrow Water. The possibility of a
hostile China making a sea attack can be viewed without dread, for
naturally and artificially the Japanese naval position is very strong.
Holding the Sea of Japan as securely as she does, Japan may also
consider that her land frontier on the mainland is more accessible to
her bases than to the bases of any possible enemy.
Russia has been harshly criticised for the conception of naval strategy
which gave her one Fleet in the Baltic, another in the Black Sea, and a
third in the Pacific. But she was forced by her geographical position
into a "straggle" policy. It is extremely unlikely that she will now
adopt the policy, recommended to her in some quarters, of concentrating
naval strength in the Pacific: though, should the _Entente_ with Great
Britain develop into an actual triple alliance between Great Britain,
France and Russia, that concentration is just possible. It would have an
important effect on the strategical position in the Pacific: but is too
unlikely a contingency to call for any discussion. The same may be said
in regard to any possibility of a great development of power in the
Pacific by Germany or France.
The interest of the strategical position in the Pacific thus centres in
the rivalry, or friendly emulation, between the United States and the
British Empire. Without any very clear indications of a conscious
purpose, the British Empire has blundered into a strategical position
which is rich in possibilities of strength and has but two glaring
weaknesses, the absence of a Mid-Pacific fortress and the emptiness of
the Northern Territory of Australia. With a very clear idea of what she
is about, the United States has prepared for a thoroughly scientific
siege of the Pacific, but she has not the same wealth of natural
material as has the British Empire.