_MADAM,_
In the Works of that most famous Philosopher and Mathematician of our
age _Gal._ which you thought worth my reading, I find, he discourses
much of upwards and downwards, backwards and forwards; but to tell
you really, I do not understand what he means by those words, for, in
my opinion, there is properly no such thing as upwards, downwards,
backwards, or forwards in Nature, for all this is nothing else but
natural corporeal motions, to which in respect of some particulars we
do attribute such or such names; for if we conceive a Circle, I pray
where is upwards and downwards, backwards and forwards? Certainly, it
is, in my opinion, just like that, they name Rest, Place, Space, Time,
&c. when as Nature her self knows of no such things, but all these are
onely the several and various motions of the onely Matter. You will
say, How can Rest be a motion? I answer: Rest is a word which expresses
rather mans ignorance then his knowledg; for when he sees, that a
particular Creature has not any external local motion perceptible by
his sight, he says it resteth, and this rest he calls a cessation from
motion, when as yet there is no such thing as cessation from motion
in Nature; for motion is the action of natural Matter, and its Nature
is to move perpetually; so that it is more probable for motion to be
annihilated, then to cease. But you may say, It is a cessation from
some particular motion. I answer: You may rather call it an alteration
of a particular motion, then a cessation; for though a particular
motion doth not move in that same manner as it did before, nevertheless
it is still there, and not onely there, but still moving; onely it is
not moving after the same manner as it did move heretofore, but has
changed from such a kind of motion to another kind of motion, and being
still moving it cannot be said to cease: Wherefore what is commonly
called cessation from motion, is onely a change of some particular
motion, and is a mistake of change for rest. Next, I find in the same
_Author_ a long discourse of circular and strait motions; to wit, _That
they are simple motions, and that all others are composed out of them,
and are mixt motions; Also, That the Circular Motion is perfect, and
the Right imperfect; and that all the parts of the world, if moveable
of their own nature, it is impossible, that their motions should be
Right, or any other then Circular: That a Circular motion is never to
be gotten naturally, without a preceding right motion: That a Right
motion cannot naturally be perpetual: That a Right motion is impossible
in the World well ordered:_ and the like. First, I cannot conceive why
natural Matter should use the Circle-figure more then any other in
the motions of her Creatures; for Nature, which is Infinite Matter,
is not bound to one particular motion, or to move in a Circle more
then any other figure, but she moves more variously then any one part
of hers can conceive; Wherefore it is not requisite that the natural
motions of natural bodies should be onely Circular. Next, I do not
understand, why a Circular Motion cannot be gotten naturally without
a precedent right motion; for, in my opinion, corporeal motions may
be round or circular, without being or moving straight before; and if
a straight line doth make a circle, then an imperfect figure makes
a perfect; but, in my opinion, a circle may as well make a straight
line, as a strait line a circle; except it be like a Gordian knot,
that it cannot be dissolved, or that Nature may make some corporeal
motions as constant as she makes others inconstant, for her motions
are not alike in continuance and alteration. And as for right motion,
that naturally it cannot be perpetual; my opinion is, that it cannot
be, if Nature be finite; but if Nature be infinite, it may be: But the
circular motion is more proper for a finite, then an infinite, because
a circle-figure is perfect and circumscribed, and a straight line is
infinite, or at least producible in infinite; and there may be other
worlds in infinite Nature, besides these round Globes perceptible by
our sight, which may have other figures; for though it be proper for
Globes or Spherical bodies to move round, yet that doth not prove, that
Infinite Matter moves round, or that all worlds must be of a Globous
figure; for there may be as different Worlds, as other Creatures. He
says, That a Right motion is impossible in the World well ordered; But
I cannot conceive a Right motion to be less orderly then a Circular
in Nature, except it be in some Particulars; but oftentimes that,
which is well ordered in some cases, seems to some mens understandings
and perceptions ill ordered in other cases; for man, as a part, most
commonly considers but the Particulars, not the Generals, like as every
one in a Commonwealth considers more himself and his Family, then the
Publick. Lastly, Concerning the simplicity of Motions, as that onely
circular and straight motions are simple motions, because they are made
by simple Lines; I know not what they mean by simple Lines; for the
same Lines which make straight and circular figures, may make as well
other figures as those; but, in my opinion, all motions may be called
simple, in regard of their own nature; for they are nothing else but
the sensitive and rational part of Matter, which in its own nature is
pure, and simple, and moves according to the Nature of each Figure,
either swiftly or slowly, or in this or that sort of motion; but the
most simple, purest and subtillest part is the rational part of matter,
which though it be mixed with the sensitive and inanimate in one body,
yet it can and doth move figuratively in its own matter, without the
help or assistance of any other. But I desire you to remember, _Madam_,
that in the compositions and divisions of the parts of Nature, there
is as much unity and agreement as there is discord and disagreement;
for in Infinite, there is no such thing, as most, and least; neither is
there any such thing as more perfect, or less perfect in Matter. And
as for Irregularities, properly there is none in Nature, for Nature is
Regular; but that, which Man (who is but a small part of Nature, and
therefore but partly knowing) names Irregularities, or Imperfections,
is onely a change and alteration of motions; for a part can know the
variety of motions in Nature no more, then Finite can know Infinite, or
the bare exterior shape and figure of a mans body can know the whole
body, or the head can know the mind; for Infinite natural knowledg is
incorporeal; and being corporeal, it is dividable; and being dividable,
it cannot be confined to one part onely; for there is no such thing as
an absolute determination or subsistence in parts without relation or
dependance upon one another. And since Matter is Infinite, and acts
wisely, and all for the best, it may be as well for the best of Nature,
when parts are divided antipathetically, as when they are united
sympathetically: Also Matter being Infinite, it cannot be perfect,
neither can a part be called perfect, as being a part. But mistake me
not, _Madam;_ for when I say, there is no perfection in Nature, as I do
in my _Philosophical Opinions_,[1] I mean by Perfection, a finiteness,
absoluteness, or compleatness of figure; and in this sense I say Nature
has no perfection by reason it is Infinite; but yet I do not deny, but
that there is a perfection in the nature or essence of Infinite Matter;
for Matter is perfect Matter; that is, pure and simple in its own
substance or nature, as meer Matter, without any mixture or addition of
some thing that is not Matter, or that is between Matter and no Matter;
and material motions are perfect motions although Infinite: just as
a line may be called a perfect line, although it be endless, and
Gold, or other Mettal, may be called perfect Gold, or perfect Metal,
although it be but apart, And thus it may be said of Infinite Nature,
or Infinite Matter, without any contradiction, that it is both perfect,
and not perfect; perfect in its nature or substance, not perfect in its
exterior figure. But you may say, If Infinite Matter be not perfect,
it is imperfect, and what is imperfect, wants something. I answer,
That doth not follow: for we cannot say, that what is not perfect, must
of necessity be imperfect, because there is something else, which it
may be, to wit, Infinite; for as imperfection is beneath perfection,
so perfection is beneath Infinite; and though Infinite Matter be not
perfect in its figure, yet it is not imperfect, but Infinite; for
Perfection and Imperfection belongs onely to Particulars, and not to
Infinite. And thus much for the present. I conclude, and rest,
Madam,
_Your Ladiships_
_most obliged Friend_
_and humble Servant._
[1] _Part._ 1. _c._ 14.