III.

_MADAM,_

You thought verily, I had mistaken my self in my last, concerning the

Rational Souls of every particular Creature, because I said, all

Creatures had numerous Souls; and not onely so, but every particular

Creature had numerous Souls. Truly, _Madam_, I did not mistake my self,

for I am of the same opinion still; for though there is but one Soul

in infinite Nature, yet that soul being dividable into parts, every

part is a soul in every single creature, were the parts no bigger

in quantity then an atome. But you ask whether Nature hath Infinite

souls? I answer: That Infinite Nature is but one Infinite body, divided

into Infinite parts, which we call Creatures; and therefore it may

as well be said, That Nature is composed of Infinite Creatures or

Parts, as she is divided into Infinite Creatures or Parts; for Nature

being Material, is dividable, and composable. The same may be said

of Nature's Soul, which is the Rational part of the onely infinite

Matter, as also of Nature's Life, which is the sensitive part of the

onely Infinite self-moving Matter; and of the Inanimate part of the

onely Infinite Matter, which I call the body for distinction sake,

as having no self-motion in its own nature, for Infinite Material

Nature hath an Infinite Material Soul, Life, and Body. But, _Madam_,

I desire you to observe what I said already, _viz._ that the parts

of Nature are as apt to divide, as to unite; for the chief actions

of Nature are to divide, and to unite; which division is the cause,

that it may well be said, every particular Creature hath numerous

souls; for every part of rational Matter is a particular Soul, and

every part of the sensitive Matter is a particular Life; all which,

mixed with the Inanimate Matter, though they be Infinite in parts, yet

they make but one Infinite whole, which is Infinite Nature; and thus

the Infinite division into Infinite parts is the cause, that every

particular Creature hath numerous Souls, and the transmigration of

parts from, and to parts, is the reason, that not any Creature can

challenge a single soul, or souls to it self; the same for life. But

most men are unwilling to believe, that Rational Souls are material,

and that this rational Matter is dividable in Nature; when as humane

sense and reason may well perceive, that Nature is active, and

full of variety; and action, and variety cannot be without motion,

division, and composition: but the reason that variety, division, and

composition, runs not into confusion, is, that first there is but

one kind of Matter; next, that the division and composition of parts

doth ballance each other into a union in the whole. But, to conclude,

those Creatures which have their rational parts most united, are the

wisest; and those that have their rational parts most divided, are the

wittiest; and those that have much of this rational matter, are much

knowing; and those which have less of this rational matter, are less

knowing; and there is no Creature that hath not some; for like as all

the parts of a humane body are indued with life, and soul; so are all

the parts of Infinite Nature; and though some parts of Matter are not

animate in themselves, yet there is no part that is not mixt with the

animate matter; so that all parts of Nature are moving, and moved.

And thus, hoping I have cleared my self in this point, to your better

understanding, I take my leave, and rest,

Madam,

_Your faithful Friend_

_and Servant._

Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy · 第 138 / 169 题