_MADAM,_
I am not able to conceive how the Mind of Man can be compared to a
Table-book, in which nothing is writ;[1] nor how to a Musician, who
being asleep, doth not so much as dream of any Musick, but being
jogg'd and awakend by another, who tells him two or three words of
a Song, and desires him to sing it, presently recovers himself, and
sings upon so slight an Intimation: For such intimations are nothing
else but outward objects, which the interior sense consents to, and
obeys; for interior sense and reason doth often obey outward objects:
and in my opinion there is no rest in Nature, and so neither in the
Mind or natural Soul of Man, which is in a perpetual motion, and needs
therefore no jogging to put it into any actual motion; for it hath
actual motion and knowledg in it self, because it is a self-moving
substance, actually knowing, and Material or Corporeal, not Immaterial,
as your _Author_ thinks: and this material or corporeal Mind is nothing
else but what I call the rational matter, and the corporeal life is
the sensitive matter. But this is to be observed, that the motions of
the corporeal Mind do often imitate the motions of the sensitive Life,
and these again the motions of the mind: I say oftentimes; for they do
it not always, but each one can move without taking any pattern from
the other. And all this I understand of the Natural Soul of Man; not
of the Divine Soul, and her powers and faculties, for I leave that to
Divines to inform us of; onely this I say, that men not conceiving the
distinction between this natural and divine Soul, make such a confusion
betwixt those two Souls and their actions, which causes so many
disputes and opinions. But if Nature hath power from God to produce
all kinds of Vegetables, Minerals, Elements, Animals, and other sorts
of Creatures, Why not also Man? Truly if all Creatures are natural
Creatures, Man must be so too; and if Man is a natural Creature, he
must needs have natural sense and reason, as well as other Creatures,
being composed of the same matter they are of. Neither is it requisite,
that all Creatures, being of the same matter, must have the same manner
of sensitive and rational knowledg; which if so, it is not necessary
for Corn to have Ears to hear the whistling or chirping of Birds, nor
for Stones to have such a touch of feeling as animals have, and to
suffer pain, as they do, when Carts go over them; as your _Author_ is
pleased to argue out of _Æsopes_ Tales; or for the Heliotrope to have
eyes to see the Sun: for what necessity is there that they should have
humane sense and reason? which is, that the rational and sensitive
matter should act and move in them as she doth in man or animals:
Certainly if there must be any variety in nature, it is requisite she
should not; wherefore all Vegetables, Minerals, Elements, and Animals,
have their proper motions different from each others, not onely in
their kinds and sorts, but also in their particulars. And though Stones
have no progressive motion to withdraw themselves from the Carts going
over them, which your _Author_ thinks they would do, if they had
sense, to avoid pain: nevertheless they have motion, and consequently
sense and reason, according to the nature and propriety of their
figure, as well as man has according to his. But this is also to be
observed, that not any humane Creature, which is accounted to have the
perfectest sense and reason, is able always to avoid what is hurtful or
painful, for it is subject to it by Nature: Nay, the Immaterial Soul
it self, according to your _Author_,[2] cannot by her self-contracting
faculty withdraw her self from pain. Wherefore there is no manner of
consequence to conclude from the sense of Animals to the sense of
Minerals, they being as much different as their Figures are; And saying
this, I have said enough to express the opinion and mind of,
Madam,
_Your faithful Friend_
_and Servant._
[1] _Antid. Book_ 1. _c._ 5.
[2] _Append. to the Antid. ch._ 3.