_MADAM,_
There are various opinions concerning the seat of Common Sense, as
your _Author_ rehearseth them in his Treatise of the Immortality of
the Soul;[1] But my opinion is, That common sense hath also a common
place; for as there is not any part of the body that hath not sense
and reason, so sense and reason is in all parts of the body, as it is
observable by this, that every part is subject to pain and pleasure,
and all parts are moveable, moving and moved; also appetites are in
every part of the body: As for example, if any part itches, it hath
an appetite to be scratched, and every part can pattern out several
objects, and so several touches; and though the rational part of matter
is mixt in all parts of the body, yet it hath more liberty to make
variety of Motions in the head, heart, liver, spleen, stomack, bowels,
and the like, then in the other parts of the body; nevertheless, it is
in every part, together with the sensitive: but they do not move in
every part alike, but differ in each part more or less, as it may be
observed; and although every part hath some difference of knowledg, yet
all have life and knowledg, sense and reason, some more, some less, and
the whole body moves according to each part, and so do all the bodily
Faculties and Proprieties, and not according to one single part; the
rational Soul being in all parts of the body: for if one part of the
body should have a dead Palsie, it is not, that the Soul is gone from
that part, but that the sensitive and rational matter has altered its
motion and figure from animal to some other kind; for certainly, the
rational Soul, and so life, is in every part, as well in the Pores of
the skin, as in the ventricles of the brain, and as well in the heel
as in the head; and every part of the body knows its own office, what
it ought to do, from whence follows an agreement of all the parts: And
since there is difference of knowledg in every part of one body, well
may there be difference between several kinds and sorts, and yet there
is knowledg in all; for difference of knowledg is no argument to prove
they have no knowledg at all. Wherefore I am not of the opinion, that
that which moves the whole body, is as a Point, or some such thing in
a little kernel or _Glandula_ of the Brain, as an Ostrich-egge is hung
up to the roof of a Chamber; or that it is in the stomack like a single
penny in a great Purse; neither is it in the midst of the heart, like a
Lady in a Lobster; nor in the blood, like as a Menow, or Sprat in the
Sea; nor in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain, as a lousie Souldier
in a Watch-tower. But you may say, it is like a farthing Candle in a
great Church: I answer, That Light will not enlighten the by Chappels
of the Church, nor the Quest-house, nor the Belfrey; neither doth the
Light move the Church, though it enlightens it: Wherefore the Soul
after this manner doth not move the corporeal body, no more then the
Candle moves the Church, or the Lady moves the Lobster, or the Sprat
the Sea as to make it ebb and flow. But this I desire you to observe,
_Madam_, that though all the body of man or any other Creature, hath
sense and reason, which is life and knowledg, in all parts, yet these
parts being all corporeal, and having their certain proportions, can
have no more then what is belonging or proportionable to each figure:
As for example; if a Man should feed, and not evacuate some ways or
other, he could not live; and if he should evacuate and not feed, he
could not subsist: wherefore in all Natures parts there is ingress and
egress, although not always perceived by one creature, as Man; but all
exterior objects do not enter into Man, or any other Creature, but are
figured by the rational, and some by the sensitive parts or motions
in the body; wherefore it is not rational to believe, that exterior
objects take up any more room, then if there were none presented to
the sensitive organs: Nor is there any thing which can better prove
the mind to be corporeal, then that there may be several Figures in
several parts of the body made at one time, as Sight, Hearing, Tasting,
Smelling, and Touching, and all these in each several organ, as well at
one, as at several times, either by patterns, or not; which figuring
without Pattern, may be done as well by the sensitive motions in the
organs, as by the rational in the mind, and is called remembrance. As
for example: a Man may hear or see without an object; which is, that
the sensitive and rational matter repeat such figurative actions, or
make others in the sensitive organs, or in the mind: and Thoughts,
Memory, Imagination, as also Passion, are no less corporeal actions
then the motion of the hand or heel; neither hath the rational matter,
being naturally wise, occasion to jumble and knock her parts together,
by reason every part knows naturally their office what they ought to
do, or what they may do. But I conclude, repeating onely what I have
said oft before, that all Perceptions, Thoughts, and the like, are the
Effects, and Life and Knowledg, the Nature and Essence of self-moving
Matter. And so I rest,
Madam,
_Your Faithful Friend_
_and Servant._
[1] _Lib._ 2. _c._ 4.