_Madam,_
Two sorts of motions, I find your _Author_[1] doth attribute to
Animals, _viz. Vital and Animal, the Vital motions_, says he, _are
begun in Generation, and continued without Interruption through their
whole life, and those are the Course of the Blood, the Pulse, the
Breathing, Conviction, Nutrition, Excretion, &c. to which motions
there needs no help of Imaginations; But the animal Motions, otherwise
called voluntary Motions, are to go, to speak, to move any of our
limbs, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds: And because
going, speaking, and the like voluntary motions, depend always upon
a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what, it is evident,
that the Imagination is the first Internal beginning of all voluntary
Motion_. Thus far your _Author_. Whereof in short I give you my
opinion, first concerning Vital Motions, that it appears improbable if
not impossible to me, that Generation should be the cause and beginning
of Life, because Life must of necessity be the cause of Generation,
life being the Generator of all things, for without life motion could
not be, and without motion not any thing could be begun, increased,
perfected, or dissolved. Next, that Imagination is not necessary to
Vital Motions, it is probable it may not, but yet there is required
Knowledg, which I name Reason; for if there were not Knowledg in all
Generations or Productions, there could not any distinct Creature be
made or produced, for then all Generations would be confusedly mixt,
neither would there be any distinct kinds or sorts of Creatures, nor
no different Faculties, Proprieties, and the like. Thirdly, concerning
_Animal Motions_, which your _Author_ names _Voluntary Motions, as to
go, to speak, to move any of our limbs, in such manner as is first
fancied in our minds, and that they depend upon a precedent thought
of whither, which way, and what, and that Imagination is the first
Internal beginning of them_; I think, by your _Authors_ leave, it doth
imply a contradiction, to call them Voluntary Motions, and yet to say
they are caused and depend upon our Imagination; for if the Imagination
draws them this way, or that way, how can they be voluntary motions,
being in a manner forced and necessitated to move according to Fancy
or Imagination? But when he goes on in the same place and treats of
Endeavour, Appetite, Desire, Hunger, Thirst, Aversion, Love, Hate, and
the like, he derives one from the other, and treats well as a Moral
Philosopher; but whether it be according to the truth or probability of
Natural Philosophy, I will leave to others to judge, for in my opinion
Passions and Appetites are very different, Appetites being made by
the motions of the sensitive Life, and Passions, as also Imagination,
Memory, &c. by the motions of the rational Life, which is the cause
that Appetites belong more to the actions of the Body then the Mind:
'Tis true, the Sensitive and Rational self-moving matter doth so much
resemble each other in their actions, as it is difficult to distinguish
them. But having treated hereof at large in my other Philosophical
Work, to cut off repetitions, I will refer you to that, and desire
you to compare our opinions together: But certainly there is so much
variety in one and the same sort of Passions, and so of Appetites, as
it cannot be easily express'd. To conclude, I do not perceive that your
_Author_ tells or expresses what the cause is of such or such actions,
onely he mentions their dependance, which is, as if a man should
converse with a Nobleman's Friend or Servant, and not know the Lord
himself. But leaving him for this time, it is sufficient to me, that I
know your Ladyship, and your Ladyship knows me, that I am,
Madam,
_Your faithful Friend, and humble Servant._
[1] _Leviathan, part._ 1. _c._ 6.