X.

_MADAM,_

_Understanding_ says your Author,[1] _is nothing else but Conception

caused by speech, and therefore, if speech be peculiar to man, (as, for

ought I know, it is) then is understanding peculiar to him also._ Where

he confineth Understanding onely to speech and to Mankind; But, by his

leave, _Madam_, I surely believe, that there is more understanding in

Nature, then that, which is in speech, for if there were not, I cannot

conceive, how all the exact forms in Generations could be produced,

or how there could be such distinct degrees of several sorts and

kinds of Creatures, or distinctions of times and seasons, and so many

exact motions and figures in Nature: Considering all this, my reason

perswadeth me, that all Understanding, which is a part of Knowledg, is

not caused by speech, for all the motions of the Celestial Orbs are not

made by speech, neither is the knowledg or understanding which a man

hath, when sick, as to know or understand he is sick, made by speech,

nor by outward objects, especially in a disease he never heard, nor

saw, nor smelt, nor tasted, nor touched; Wherefore all Perception,

Sensation, Memory, Imagination, Appetite, Understanding, and the like,

are not made nor caused by outward objects, nor by speech. And as for

names of things, they are but different postures of the figures in

our mind or thoughts, made by the Rational matter; But Reasoning is

a comparing of the several figures with their several postures and

actions in the Mind, which joyned with the several words, made by the

sensitive motions, inform another distinct and separate part, as an

other man, of their minds conceptions, understanding, opinions, and the

like.

Concerning Addition and Subtraction, wherein your _Author_ sayes

Reasoning consists, I grant, that it is an act of Reasoning, yet it

doth not make Sense or Reason, which is Life and Knowledge, but Sense

and Reason which is self-motion, makes addition and subtraction of

several Parts of matter; for had matter not self-motion, it could not

divide nor compose, nor make such varieties, without great and lingring

retardments, if not confusion. Wherefore all, what is made in Nature,

is made by self-moving matter, which self-moving matter doth not at all

times move regularly, but often irregularly, which causes false Logick,

false Arithmetick, and the like; and if there be not a certainty in

these self-motions or actions of Nature, much less in Art, which is

but a secundary action; and therefore, neither speech, words, nor

exterior objects cause Understanding or Reason. And although many parts

of the Rational and Sensitive Matter joyned into one, may be stronger

by their association, and over-power other parts that are not so well

knit and united, yet these are not the less pure; onely these Parts and

Motions being not equal in several Creatures, make their Knowledge and

Reason more or less: For, when a man hath more Rational Matter well

regulated, and so more Wisdom then an other, that same man may chance

to over-power the other, whose Rational Matter is more irregular, but

yet not so much by strength of the united Parts, as by their subtilty;

for the Rational Matter moving regularly, is more strong with subtilty,

then the sensitive with force; so that Wisdom is stronger then

Life, being more pure, and so more active; for in my opinion, there

is a degree of difference between Life and Knowledge, as my Book of

_Philosophical Opinions_ will inform you.

Again, your _Author_ sayes, _That Man doth excel all other Animals in

this faculty, that when he conceives any thing whatsoever, he is apt

to enquire the Consequences of it, and what effects he can do with

it: Besides this_ (sayes he) _Man hath an other degree of Excellence,

that he can by Words reduce the Consequences he finds to General Rules

called Theoremes or Aphorisms, that is, he can reason or reckon not

onely in Number, but in all other things, whereof one may be added

unto, or substracted from an other._ To which I answer, That according

to my Reason I cannot perceive, but that all Creatures may do as much;

but by reason they do it not after the same manner or way as Man, Man

denies, they can do it at all; which is very hard; for what man knows,

whether Fish do not Know more of the nature of Water, and ebbing and

flowing, and the saltness of the Sea? or whether Birds do not know

more of the nature and degrees of Air, or the cause of Tempests? or

whether Worms do not know more of the nature of Earth, and how Plants

are produced? or Bees of the several sorts of juices of Flowers, then

Men? And whether they do not make there Aphorismes and Theoremes by

their manner of Intelligence? For, though they have not the speech of

Man, yet thence doth not follow, that they have no Intelligence at

all. But the Ignorance of Men concerning other Creatures is the cause

of despising other Creatures, imagining themselves as petty Gods in

Nature, when as _Nature_ is not capable to make one God, much less so

many as Mankind; and were it not for Mans supernatural Soul, Man would

not be more Supreme, then other Creatures in Nature, _But_ (says your

_Author_) _this Priviledge in Man is allay'd by another, which is, No

living Creature is subject to absurdity, but onely Man._ Certainly,

_Madam_, I believe the contrary, to wit, that all other Creatures do

as often commit mistakes and absurdities as Man, and if it were not to

avoid tediousness, I could present sufficient proofs to you: Wherefore

I think, not onely Man but also other Creatures may be Philosophers and

subject to absurdities as aptly as Men; for Man doth, nor cannot truly

know the Faculties, and Abilities or Actions of all other Creatures,

no not of his own Kind as Man-Kind, for if he do measure all men by

himself he will be very much mistaken, for what he conceives to be

true or wise, an other may conceive to be false and foolish. But Man

may have one way of Knowledge in Philosophy and other Arts, and other

Creatures another way, and yet other Creatures manner or way may be

as Intelligible and Instructive to each other as Man's, I mean, in

those things which are Natural. Wherefore I cannot consent to what

your _Author_ says, _That Children are not endued with Reason at all,

till they have attained to the use of Speech_; for Reason is in those

Creatures which have not Speech, witness Horses, especially those which

are taught in the manage, and many other Animals. And as for the weak

understanding in Children, I have discoursed thereof in my Book of

Philosophy; The rest of this discourse, lest I tire you too much at

once, I shall reserve for the next, resting in the mean time,

Madam,

_Your faithful Friend,_

_and Servant._

[1] _Leviathan, part._ 1. _c._ 4.

Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy · 第 18 / 169 题