Whether All the Actions of the Moral Virtues Pertain to the Active
Life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the moral virtues do not
all pertain to the active life. For seemingly the active life regards
only our relations with other persons: hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv
in Ezech.) that "the active life is to give bread to the hungry," and
after mentioning many things that regard our relations with other
people he adds finally, "and to give to each and every one whatever
he needs." Now we are directed in our relations to others, not by all
the acts of moral virtues, but only by those of justice and its
parts, as stated above (Q. 58, AA. 2, 8; I-II, Q. 60, AA. 2, 3).
Therefore the acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the
active life.
Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that Lia who was
blear-eyed but fruitful signifies the active life: which "being
occupied with work, sees less, and yet since it urges one's neighbor
both by word and example to its imitation it begets a numerous
offspring of good deeds." Now this would seem to belong to charity,
whereby we love our neighbor, rather than to the moral virtues.
Therefore seemingly the acts of moral virtue do not pertain to the
active life.
Obj. 3: Further, as stated above (Q. 180, A. 2), the moral virtues
dispose one to the contemplative life. Now disposition and perfection
belong to the same thing. Therefore it would seem that the moral
virtues do not pertain to the active life.
_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 15): "In the
active life all vices must first of all be extirpated by the practice
of good works, in order that in the contemplative life the mind's eye
being purified one may advance to the contemplation of the Divine
light." Now all vices are not extirpated save by acts of the moral
virtues. Therefore the acts of the moral virtues pertain to the
active life.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 179, A. 1) the active and the
contemplative life differ according to the different occupations of
men intent on different ends: one of which occupations is the
consideration of the truth; and this is the end of the contemplative
life, while the other is external work to which the active life is
directed.
Now it is evident that the moral virtues are directed chiefly, not
to the contemplation of truth but to operation. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that "for virtue knowledge is of
little or no avail." Hence it is clear that the moral virtues belong
essentially to the active life; for which reason the Philosopher
(Ethic. x, 8) subordinates the moral virtues to active happiness.
Reply Obj. 1: The chief of the moral virtues is justice by which one
man is directed in his relations towards another, as the Philosopher
proves (Ethic. v, 1). Hence the active life is described with
reference to our relations with other people, because it consists in
these things, not exclusively, but principally.
Reply Obj. 2: It is possible, by the acts of all the moral virtues,
for one to direct one's neighbor to good by example: and this is what
Gregory here ascribes to the active life.
Reply Obj. 3: Even as the virtue that is directed to the end of
another virtue passes, as it were, into the species of the latter
virtue, so again when a man makes use of things pertaining to the
active life, merely as dispositions to contemplation, such things are
comprised under the contemplative life. On the other hand, when we
practice the works of the moral virtues, as being good in themselves,
and not as dispositions to the contemplative life, the moral virtues
belong to the active life.
It may also be replied, however, that the active life is a
disposition to the contemplative life.
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