Whether the Moral Virtues Pertain to the Contemplative Life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the
contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the
contemplative life is to cling to the love of God and our neighbor
with the whole mind." Now all the moral virtues, since their acts are
prescribed by the precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of
God and of our neighbor, for "love . . . is the fulfilling of the
Law" (Rom. 13:10). Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues
belong to the contemplative life.
Obj. 2: Further, the contemplative life is chiefly directed to the
contemplation of God; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the
mind tramples on all cares and longs to gaze on the face of its
Creator." Now no one can accomplish this without cleanness of heart,
which is a result of moral virtue [*Cf. Q. 8, A. 7]. For it is
written (Matt. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall
see God": and (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness,
without which no man shall see God." Therefore it would seem that the
moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life.
Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the
contemplative life gives beauty to the soul," wherefore it is
signified by Rachel, of whom it is said (Gen. 29:17) that she was "of
a beautiful countenance." Now the beauty of the soul consists in the
moral virtues, especially temperance, as Ambrose says (De Offic. i,
43, 45, 46). Therefore it seems that the moral virtues pertain to the
contemplative life.
_On the contrary,_ The moral virtues are directed to external
actions. Now Gregory says (Moral. vi [*Hom. xiv in Ezech.; Cf. A. 1,
Obj. 3]) that it belongs to the contemplative life "to rest from
external action." Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the
contemplative life.
_I answer that,_ A thing may belong to the contemplative life in two
ways, essentially or dispositively. The moral virtues do not belong
to the contemplative life essentially, because the end of the
contemplative life is the consideration of truth: and as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4), "knowledge," which pertains to the
consideration of truth, "has little influence on the moral virtues":
wherefore he declares (Ethic. x, 8) that the moral virtues pertain to
active but not to contemplative happiness.
On the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life
dispositively. For the act of contemplation, wherein the
contemplative life essentially consists, is hindered both by the
impetuosity of the passions which withdraw the soul's intention from
intelligible to sensible things, and by outward disturbances. Now the
moral virtues curb the impetuosity of the passions, and quell the
disturbance of outward occupations. Hence moral virtues belong
dispositively to the contemplative life.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1), the contemplative life has its
motive cause on the part of the affections, and in this respect the
love of God and our neighbor is requisite to the contemplative life.
Now motive causes do not enter into the essence of a thing, but
dispose and perfect it. Wherefore it does not follow that the moral
virtues belong essentially to the contemplative life.
Reply Obj. 2: Holiness or cleanness of heart is caused by the virtues
that are concerned with the passions which hinder the purity of the
reason; and peace is caused by justice which is about operations,
according to Isa. 32:17, "The work of justice shall be peace": since
he who refrains from wronging others lessens the occasions of
quarrels and disturbances. Hence the moral virtues dispose one to the
contemplative life by causing peace and cleanness of heart.
Reply Obj. 3: Beauty, as stated above (Q. 145, A. 2), consists in a
certain clarity and due proportion. Now each of these is found
radically in the reason; because both the light that makes beauty
seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to
reason. Hence since the contemplative life consists in an act of the
reason, there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence;
wherefore it is written (Wis. 8:2) of the contemplation of wisdom: "I
became a lover of her beauty."
On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation,
in so far as they participate in the order of reason; and especially
is it in temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which
especially darken the light of reason. Hence it is that the virtue of
chastity most of all makes man apt for contemplation, since venereal
pleasures most of all weigh the mind down to sensible objects, as
Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10).
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