Whether Life Is Fittingly Divided into Active and Contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that life is not fittingly divided into
active and contemplative. For the soul is the principle of life by
its essence: since the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "in
living things to live is to be." Now the soul is the principle of
action and contemplation by its powers. Therefore it would seem that
life is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative.
Obj. 2: Further, the division of that which comes afterwards is
unfittingly applied to that which comes first. Now active and
contemplative, or "speculative" and "practical," are differences of
the intellect (De Anima iii, 10); while "to live" comes before "to
understand," since "to live" comes first to living things through the
vegetative soul, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 4).
Therefore life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
Obj. 3: Further, the word "life" implies movement, according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. vi): whereas contemplation consists rather in
rest, according to Wis. 8:16: "When I enter into my house, I shall
repose myself with her." Therefore it would seem that life is
unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv super Ezech.): "There is a
twofold life wherein Almighty God instructs us by His holy word, the
active life and the contemplative."
_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, those things are said to live
whose movement or operation is from within themselves. Now that which
is proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined is that which
is most becoming to it from itself; wherefore every living thing
gives proof of its life by that operation which is most proper to it,
and to which it is most inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to
consist in nourishment and generation; the life of animals in
sensation and movement; and the life of men in their understanding
and acting according to reason. Wherefore also in men the life of
every man would seem to be that wherein he delights most, and on
which he is most intent; thus especially does he wish "to associate
with his friends" (Ethic. ix, 12).
Accordingly since certain men are especially intent on the
contemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on
external actions, it follows that man's life is fittingly divided
into active and contemplative.
Reply Obj. 1: Each thing's proper form that makes it actually _to be_
is properly that thing's principle of operation. Hence _to live_ is,
in living things, _to be,_ because living things through having
_being_ from their form, act in such and such a way.
Reply Obj. 2: Life in general is not divided into active and
contemplative, but the life of man, who derives his species from
having an intellect, wherefore the same division applies to intellect
and human life.
Reply Obj. 3: It is true that contemplation enjoys rest from external
movements. Nevertheless to contemplate is itself a movement of the
intellect, in so far as every operation is described as a movement;
in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that sensation
and understanding are movements of a kind, in so far as movement is
defined "the act of a perfect thing." In this way Dionysius (Div.
Nom. iv) ascribes three movements to the soul in contemplation,
namely, "straight," "circular," and "oblique" [*Cf. Q. 180, A. 6].
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