Whether There Can Be a Virtue About Games?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be a virtue about games.
For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 23): "Our Lord said: 'Woe to you who
laugh, for you shall weep.' Wherefore I consider that all, and not
only excessive, games should be avoided." Now that which can be done
virtuously is not to be avoided altogether. Therefore there cannot be
a virtue about games.
Obj. 2: Further, "Virtue is that which God forms in us, without us,"
as stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). Now Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in
Matth.]: "It is not God, but the devil, that is the author of fun.
Listen to what happened to those who played: 'The people sat down to
eat and drink, and they rose up to play.'" Therefore there can be no
virtue about games.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 6) that "playful
actions are not directed to something else." But it is a requisite of
virtue that the agent in choosing should "direct his action to
something else," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4). Therefore
there can be no virtue about games.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Music. ii, 15): "I pray thee,
spare thyself at times: for it becomes a wise man sometimes to relax
the high pressure of his attention to work." Now this relaxation of
the mind from work consists in playful words or deeds. Therefore it
becomes a wise and virtuous man to have recourse to such things at
times. Moreover the Philosopher [*Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8] assigns to
games the virtue of _eutrapelia_, which we may call "pleasantness."
_I answer that,_ Just as man needs bodily rest for the body's
refreshment, because he cannot always be at work, since his power is
finite and equal to a certain fixed amount of labor, so too is it
with his soul, whose power is also finite and equal to a fixed amount
of work. Consequently when he goes beyond his measure in a certain
work, he is oppressed and becomes weary, and all the more since when
the soul works, the body is at work likewise, in so far as the
intellective soul employs forces that operate through bodily organs.
Now sensible goods are connatural to man, and therefore, when the
soul arises above sensibles, through being intent on the operations
of reason, there results in consequence a certain weariness of soul,
whether the operations with which it is occupied be those of the
practical or of the speculative reason. Yet this weariness is greater
if the soul be occupied with the work of contemplation, since thereby
it is raised higher above sensible things; although perhaps certain
outward works of the practical reason entail a greater bodily labor.
In either case, however, one man is more soul-wearied than another,
according as he is more intensely occupied with works of reason. Now
just as weariness of the body is dispelled by resting the body, so
weariness of the soul must needs be remedied by resting the soul: and
the soul's rest is pleasure, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 2;
I-II, Q. 31, A. 1, ad 2). Consequently, the remedy for weariness of
soul must needs consist in the application of some pleasure, by
slackening the tension of the reason's study. Thus in the
_Conferences of the Fathers_ (xxiv, 21), it is related of Blessed
John the Evangelist, that when some people were scandalized on
finding him playing together with his disciples, he is said to have
told one of them who carried a bow to shoot an arrow. And when the
latter had done this several times, he asked him whether he could do
it indefinitely, and the man answered that if he continued doing it,
the bow would break. Whence the Blessed John drew the inference that
in like manner man's mind would break if its tension were never
relaxed.
Now such like words or deeds wherein nothing further is sought than
the soul's delight, are called playful or humorous. Hence it is
necessary at times to make use of them, in order to give rest, as it
were, to the soul. This is in agreement with the statement of the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 8) that "in the intercourse of this life
there is a kind of rest that is associated with games": and
consequently it is sometimes necessary to make use of such things.
Nevertheless it would seem that in this matter there are three points
which require especial caution. The first and chief is that the
pleasure in question should not be sought in indecent or injurious
deeds or words. Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 29) that "one kind
of joke is discourteous, insolent, scandalous, obscene." Another
thing to be observed is that one lose not the balance of one's mind
altogether. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 20): "We should beware
lest, when we seek relaxation of mind, we destroy all that harmony
which is the concord of good works": and Tully says (De Offic. i,
29), that, "just as we do not allow children to enjoy absolute
freedom in their games, but only that which is consistent with good
behavior, so our very fun should reflect something of an upright
mind." Thirdly, we must be careful, as in all other human actions, to
conform ourselves to persons, time, and place, and take due account
of other circumstances, so that our fun "befit the hour and the man,"
as Tully says (De Offic. i, 29).
Now these things are directed according to the rule of reason: and a
habit that operates according to reason is virtue. Therefore there
can be a virtue about games. The Philosopher gives it the name of
wittiness (_eutrapelia_), and a man is said to be pleasant through
having a happy turn* of mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a
cheerful turn: and inasmuch as this virtue restrains a man from
immoderate fun, it is comprised under modesty. [*_Eutrapelia_ is
derived from _trepein_ = "to turn"].
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, fun should fit with business and
persons; wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. i, 17) that "when the
audience is weary, it will be useful for the speaker to try something
novel or amusing, provided that joking be not incompatible with the
gravity of the subject." Now the sacred doctrine is concerned with
things of the greatest moment, according to Prov. 8:6, "Hear, for I
will speak of great things." Wherefore Ambrose does not altogether
exclude fun from human speech, but from the sacred doctrine; hence he
begins by saying: "Although jokes are at times fitting and pleasant,
nevertheless they are incompatible with the ecclesiastical rule;
since how can we have recourse to things which are not to be found in
Holy Writ?"
Reply Obj. 2: This saying of Chrysostom refers to the inordinate use
of fun, especially by those who make the pleasure of games their end;
of whom it is written (Wis. 15:12): "They have accounted our life a
pastime." Against these Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "We are so
begotten by nature that we appear to be made not for play and fun,
but rather for hardships, and for occupations of greater gravity and
moment."
Reply Obj. 3: Playful actions themselves considered in their species
are not directed to an end: but the pleasure derived from such
actions is directed to the recreation and rest of the soul, and
accordingly if this be done with moderation, it is lawful to make use
of fun. Hence Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "It is indeed lawful to
make use of play and fun, but in the same way as we have recourse to
sleep and other kinds of rest, then only when we have done our duty
by grave and serious matters."
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