Whether Any Virtue Regards the Outward Movements of the Body?
Objection 1: It would seem that no virtue regards the outward
movements of the body. For every virtue pertains to the spiritual
beauty of the soul, according to Ps. 44:14, "All the glory of the
king's daughter is within," and a gloss adds, "namely, in the
conscience." Now the movements of the body are not within, but
without. Therefore there can be no virtue about them.
Obj. 2: Further, "Virtues are not in us by nature," as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1). But outward bodily movements are
in man by nature, since it is by nature that some are quick, and some
slow of movement, and the same applies to other differences of
outward movements. Therefore there is no virtue about movements of
this kind.
Obj. 3: Further, every moral virtue is either about actions directed
to another person, as justice, or about passions, as temperance and
fortitude. Now outward bodily movements are not directed to another
person, nor are they passions. Therefore no virtue is connected with
them.
Obj. 4: Further, study should be applied to all works of virtue, as
stated above (Q. 166, A. 1, Obj. 1; A. 2, ad 1). Now it is censurable
to apply study to the ordering of one's outward movements: for
Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "A becoming gait is one that reflects
the carriage of authority, has the tread of gravity, and the
foot-print of tranquillity: yet so that there be neither study nor
affectation, but natural and artless movement." Therefore seemingly
there is no virtue about the style of outward movements.
_On the contrary,_ The beauty of honesty [*Cf. Q. 145, A. 1] pertains
to virtue. Now the style of outward movements pertains to the beauty
of honesty. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "The sound of the
voice and the gesture of the body are distasteful to me, whether they
be unduly soft and nerveless, or coarse and boorish. Let nature be
our model; her reflection is gracefulness of conduct and beauty of
honesty." Therefore there is a virtue about the style of outward
movement.
_I answer that,_ Moral virtue consists in the things pertaining to
man being directed by his reason. Now it is manifest that the outward
movements of man are dirigible by reason, since the outward members
are set in motion at the command of reason. Hence it is evident that
there is a moral virtue concerned with the direction of these
movements.
Now the direction of these movements may be considered from a twofold
standpoint. First, in respect of fittingness to the person; secondly,
in respect of fittingness to externals, whether persons, business, or
place. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Beauty of conduct
consists in becoming behavior towards others, according to their sex
and person," and this regards the first. As to the second, he adds:
"This is the best way to order our behavior, this is the polish
becoming to every action."
Hence Andronicus [*De Affectibus] ascribes two things to these
outward movements: namely "taste" (_ornatus_) which regards what is
becoming to the person, wherefore he says that it is the knowledge of
what is becoming in movement and behavior; and "methodicalness"
(_bona ordinatio_) which regards what is becoming to the business in
hand, and to one's surroundings, wherefore he calls it "the practical
knowledge of separation," i.e. of the distinction of "acts."
Reply Obj. 1: Outward movements are signs of the inward disposition,
according to Ecclus. 19:27, "The attire of the body, and the laughter
of the teeth, and the gait of the man, show what he is"; and Ambrose
says (De Offic. i, 18) that "the habit of mind is seen in the gesture
of the body," and that "the body's movement is an index of the soul."
Reply Obj. 2: Although it is from natural disposition that a man is
inclined to this or that style of outward movement, nevertheless what
is lacking to nature can be supplied by the efforts of reason. Hence
Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Let nature guide the movement: and
if nature fail in any respect, surely effort will supply the defect."
Reply Obj. 3: As stated (ad 1) outward movements are indications of
the inward disposition, and this regards chiefly the passions of the
soul. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18) that "from these
things," i.e. the outward movements, "the man that lies hidden in our
hearts is esteemed to be either frivolous, or boastful, or impure, or
on the other hand sedate, steady, pure, and free from blemish." It is
moreover from our outward movements that other men form their
judgment about us, according to Ecclus. 19:26, "A man is known by his
look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, is known by his
countenance." Hence moderation of outward movements is directed
somewhat to other persons, according to the saying of Augustine in
his Rule (Ep. ccxi), "In all your movements, let nothing be done to
offend the eye of another, but only that which is becoming to the
holiness of your state." Wherefore the moderation of outward
movements may be reduced to two virtues, which the Philosopher
mentions in _Ethic._ iv, 6, 7. For, in so far as by outward movements
we are directed to other persons, the moderation of our outward
movements belongs to "friendliness or affability" [*Cf. Q. 114, A.
1]. This regards pleasure or pain which may arise from words or deeds
in reference to others with whom a man comes in contact. And, in so
far as outward movements are signs of our inward disposition, their
moderation belongs to the virtue of truthfulness [*Cf. Q. 9], whereby
a man, by word and deed, shows himself to be such as he is inwardly.
Reply Obj. 4: It is censurable to study the style of one's outward
movements, by having recourse to pretense in them, so that they do
not agree with one's inward disposition. Nevertheless it behooves one
to study them, so that if they be in any way inordinate, this may be
corrected. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Let them be without
artifice, but not without correction."
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