Whether the Vice of Curiosity Is About Sensitive Knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that the vice of curiosity is not about
sensitive knowledge. For just as some things are known by the sense
of sight, so too are some things known by the senses of touch and
taste. Now the vice concerned about objects of touch and taste is not
curiosity but lust or gluttony. Therefore seemingly neither is the
vice of curiosity about things known by the sight.
Obj. 2: Further, curiosity would seem to refer to watching games;
wherefore Augustine says (Confess. vi, 8) that when "a fall occurred
in the fight, a mighty cry of the whole people struck him strongly,
and overcome by curiosity Alypius opened his eyes." But it does not
seem to be sinful to watch games, because it gives pleasure on
account of the representation, wherein man takes a natural delight,
as the Philosopher states (Poet. vi). Therefore the vice of curiosity
is not about the knowledge of sensible objects.
Obj. 3: Further, it would seem to pertain to curiosity to inquire
into our neighbor's actions, as Bede observes [*Comment. in 1 John
2:16]. Now, seemingly, it is not a sin to inquire into the actions of
others, because according to Ecclus. 17:12, God "gave to every one of
them commandment concerning his neighbor." Therefore the vice of
curiosity does not regard the knowledge of such like particular
sensible objects.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 38) that
"concupiscence of the eyes makes men curious." Now according to Bede
(Comment. in 1 John 2:16) "concupiscence of the eyes refers not only
to the learning of magic arts, but also to sight-seeing, and to the
discovery and dispraise of our neighbor's faults," and all these are
particular objects of sense. Therefore since concupiscence of the
eves is a sin, even as concupiscence of the flesh and pride of life,
which are members of the same division (1 John 2:16), it seems that
the vice of curiosity is about the knowledge of sensible things.
_I answer that,_ The knowledge of sensible things is directed to two
things. For in the first place, both in man and in other animals, it
is directed to the upkeep of the body, because by knowledge of this
kind, man and other animals avoid what is harmful to them, and seek
those things that are necessary for the body's sustenance. In the
second place, it is directed in a manner special to man, to
intellective knowledge, whether speculative or practical. Accordingly
to employ study for the purpose of knowing sensible things may be
sinful in two ways. First, when the sensitive knowledge is not
directed to something useful, but turns man away from some useful
consideration. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 35), "I go no more
to see a dog coursing a hare in the circus; but in the open country,
if I happen to be passing, that coursing haply will distract me from
some weighty thought, and draw me after it . . . and unless Thou,
having made me see my weakness, didst speedily admonish me, I become
foolishly dull." Secondly, when the knowledge of sensible things is
directed to something harmful, as looking on a woman is directed to
lust: even so the busy inquiry into other people's actions is
directed to detraction. On the other hand, if one be ordinately
intent on the knowledge of sensible things by reason of the necessity
of sustaining nature, or for the sake of the study of intelligible
truth, this studiousness about the knowledge of sensible things is
virtuous.
Reply Obj. 1: Lust and gluttony are about pleasures arising from the
use of objects of touch, whereas curiosity is about pleasures arising
from the knowledge acquired through all the senses. According to
Augustine (Confess. x, 35) "it is called concupiscence of the eyes"
because "the sight is the sense chiefly used for obtaining knowledge,
so that all sensible things are said to be seen," and as he says
further on: "By this it may more evidently be discerned wherein
pleasure and wherein curiosity is the object of the senses; for
pleasure seeketh objects beautiful, melodious, fragrant, savory,
soft; but curiosity, for trial's sake, seeketh even the contraries of
these, not for the sake of suffering annoyance, but out of the lust
of experiment and knowledge."
Reply Obj. 2: Sight-seeing becomes sinful, when it renders a man
prone to the vices of lust and cruelty on account of things he sees
represented. Hence Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in Matth.] that such
sights make men adulterers and shameless.
Reply Obj. 3: One may watch other people's actions or inquire into
them, with a good intent, either for one's own good--that is in order
to be encouraged to better deeds by the deeds of our neighbor--or for
our neighbor's good--that is in order to correct him, if he do
anything wrong, according to the rule of charity and the duty of
one's position. This is praiseworthy, according to Heb. 10:24,
"Consider one another to provoke unto charity and to good works." But
to observe our neighbor's faults with the intention of looking down
upon them, or of detracting them, or even with no further purpose
than that of disturbing them, is sinful: hence it is written (Prov.
24:15), "Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of
the just, nor spoil his rest."
_______________________