Whether Curiosity Can Be About Intellective Knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that curiosity cannot be about
intellective knowledge. Because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
ii, 6), there can be no mean and extremes in things which are
essentially good. Now intellective knowledge is essentially good:
because man's perfection would seem to consist in his intellect being
reduced from potentiality to act, and this is done by the knowledge
of truth. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the good of the
human soul is to be in accordance with reason," whose perfection
consists in knowing the truth. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot
be about intellective knowledge.
Obj. 2: Further, that which makes man like to God, and which he
receives from God, cannot be an evil. Now all abundance of knowledge
is from God, according to Ecclus. 1:1, "All wisdom is from the Lord
God," and Wis. 7:17, "He hath given me the true knowledge of things
that are, to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues
of the elements," etc. Again, by knowing the truth man is likened to
God, since "all things are naked and open to His eyes" (Heb. 4:13),
and "the Lord is a God of all knowledge" (1 Kings 2:3). Therefore
however abundant knowledge of truth may be, it is not evil but good.
Now the desire of good is not sinful. Therefore the vice of curiosity
cannot be about the intellective knowledge of truth.
Obj. 3: Further, if the vice of curiosity can be about any kind of
intellective knowledge, it would be chiefly about the philosophical
sciences. But, seemingly, there is no sin in being intent on them:
for Jerome says (Super Daniel 1:8): "Those who refused to partake of
the king's meat and wine, lest they should be defiled, if they had
considered the wisdom and teaching of the Babylonians to be sinful,
would never have consented to learn that which was unlawful": and
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 40) that "if the philosophers
made any true statements, we must claim them for our own use, as from
unjust possessors." Therefore curiosity about intellective knowledge
cannot be sinful.
_On the contrary,_ Jerome [*Comment. in Ep. ad Ephes. iv, 17] says:
"Is it not evident that a man who day and night wrestles with the
dialectic art, the student of natural science whose gaze pierces the
heavens, walks in vanity of understanding and darkness of mind?" Now
vanity of understanding and darkness of mind are sinful. Therefore
curiosity about intellective sciences may be sinful.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 166, A. 2, ad 2) studiousness is
directly, not about knowledge itself, but about the desire and study
in the pursuit of knowledge. Now we must judge differently of the
knowledge itself of truth, and of the desire and study in the pursuit
of the knowledge of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly
speaking, is good, but it may be evil accidentally, by reason of some
result, either because one takes pride in knowing the truth,
according to 1 Cor. 8:1, "Knowledge puffeth up," or because one uses
the knowledge of truth in order to sin.
On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the knowledge of
truth may be right or wrong. First, when one tends by his study to
the knowledge of truth as having evil accidentally annexed to it, for
instance those who study to know the truth that they may take pride
in their knowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): "Some
there are who forsaking virtue, and ignorant of what God is, and of
the majesty of that nature which ever remains the same, imagine they
are doing something great, if with surpassing curiosity and keenness
they explore the whole mass of this body which we call the world. So
great a pride is thus begotten, that one would think they dwelt in
the very heavens about which they argue." In like manner, those who
study to learn something in order to sin are engaged in a sinful
study, according to the saying of Jer. 9:5, "They have taught their
tongue to speak lies, they have labored to commit iniquity."
Secondly, there may be sin by reason of the appetite or study
directed to the learning of truth being itself inordinate; and this
in four ways. First, when a man is withdrawn by a less profitable
study from a study that is an obligation incumbent on him; hence
Jerome says [*Epist. xxi ad Damas]: "We see priests forsaking the
gospels and the prophets, reading stage-plays, and singing the love
songs of pastoral idylls." Secondly, when a man studies to learn of
one, by whom it is unlawful to be taught, as in the case of those who
seek to know the future through the demons. This is superstitious
curiosity, of which Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 4): "Maybe, the
philosophers were debarred from the faith by their sinful curiosity
in seeking knowledge from the demons."
Thirdly, when a man desires to know the truth about creatures,
without referring his knowledge to its due end, namely, the knowledge
of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29) that "in studying
creatures, we must not be moved by empty and perishable curiosity;
but we should ever mount towards immortal and abiding things."
Fourthly, when a man studies to know the truth above the capacity of
his own intelligence, since by so doing men easily fall into error:
wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:22): "Seek not the things that are
too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability . . .
and in many of His works be not curious," and further on (Ecclus.
3:26), "For . . . the suspicion of them hath deceived many, and hath
detained their minds in vanity."
Reply Obj. 1: Man's good consists in the knowledge of truth; yet
man's sovereign good consists, not in the knowledge of any truth, but
in the perfect knowledge of the sovereign truth, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. x, 7, 8). Hence there may be sin in the knowledge of
certain truths, in so far as the desire of such knowledge is not
directed in due manner to the knowledge of the sovereign truth,
wherein supreme happiness consists.
Reply Obj. 2: Although this argument shows that the knowledge of
truth is good in itself, this does not prevent a man from misusing
the knowledge of truth for an evil purpose, or from desiring the
knowledge of truth inordinately, since even the desire for good
should be regulated in due manner.
Reply Obj. 3: The study of philosophy is in itself lawful and
commendable, on account of the truth which the philosophers acquired
through God revealing it to them, as stated in Rom. 1:19. Since,
however, certain philosophers misuse the truth in order to assail the
faith, the Apostle says (Col. 2:8): "Beware lest any man cheat you by
philosophy and vain deceit, according to the tradition of men . . .
and not according to Christ": and Dionysius says (Ep. vii ad
Polycarp.) of certain philosophers that "they make an unholy use of
divine things against that which is divine, and by divine wisdom
strive to destroy the worship of God."
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