Whether the First Man's Pride Consisted in His Coveting God's Likeness?
Objection 1: It would seem that the first man's pride did not consist
in his coveting the Divine likeness. For no one sins by coveting that
which is competent to him according to his nature. Now God's likeness
is competent to man according to his nature: for it is written (Gen.
1:26): "Let us make man to our image and likeness." Therefore he did
not sin by coveting God's likeness.
Obj. 2: Further, it would seem that man coveted God's likeness in
order that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil: for this was
the serpent's suggestion: "You shall be as Gods knowing good and
evil." Now the desire of knowledge is natural to man, according to
the saying of the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i,
1: "All men naturally desire knowledge." Therefore he did not sin by
coveting God's likeness.
Obj. 3: Further, no wise man chooses the impossible. Now the first
man was endowed with wisdom, according to Ecclus. 17:5, "He filled
them with the knowledge of understanding." Since then every sin
consists in a deliberate act of the appetite, namely choice, it would
seem that the first man did not sin by coveting something impossible.
But it is impossible for man to be like God, according to the saying
of Ex. 15:11, "Who is like to Thee among the strong, O Lord?"
Therefore the first man did not sin by coveting God's likeness.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine commenting on Ps. 68:5 [*Enarr. in Ps.
68], "Then did I restore [Douay: 'pay'] that which I took not away,"
says: "Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they lost
happiness."
_I answer that,_ likeness is twofold. One is a likeness of absolute
equality [*Cf. I, Q. 93, A. 1]: and such a likeness to God our first
parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not
conceivable to the mind, especially of a wise man.
The other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a
creature in reference to God, in so far as the creature participates
somewhat of God's likeness according to its measure. For Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. ix): "The same things are like and unlike to God;
like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated;
unlike, according as an effect falls short of its cause." Now every
good existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first
good.
Wherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spiritual good above
his measure, as stated in the foregoing Article, it follows that he
coveted God's likeness inordinately.
It must, however, be observed that the proper object of the appetite
is a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good, in so far as the
rational creature participates in the Divine likeness, may be
considered in reference to three things. First, as to natural being:
and this likeness was imprinted from the very outset of their
creation, both on man--of whom it is written (Gen. 1:26) that God
made man "to His image and likeness"--and on the angel, of whom it is
written (Ezech. 28:12): "Thou wast the seal of resemblance."
Secondly, as to knowledge: and this likeness was bestowed on the
angel at his creation, wherefore immediately after the words just
quoted, "Thou wast the seal of resemblance," we read: "Full of
wisdom." But the first man, at his creation, had not yet received
this likeness actually but only in potentiality. Thirdly, as to the
power of operation: and neither angel nor man received this likeness
actually at the very outset of his creation, because to each there
remained something to be done whereby to obtain happiness.
Accordingly, while both (namely the devil and the first man) coveted
God's likeness inordinately, neither of them sinned by coveting a
likeness of nature. But the first man sinned chiefly by coveting
God's likeness as regards "knowledge of good and evil," according to
the serpent's instigation, namely that by his own natural power he
might decide what was good, and what was evil for him to do; or again
that he should of himself foreknow what good and what evil would
befall him. Secondarily he sinned by coveting God's likeness as
regards his own power of operation, namely that by his own natural
power he might act so as to obtain happiness. Hence Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the woman's mind was filled with love of
her own power." On the other hand, the devil sinned by coveting God's
likeness, as regards power. Wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig.
13) that "he wished to enjoy his own power rather than God's."
Nevertheless both coveted somewhat to be equal to God, in so far as
each wished to rely on himself in contempt of the order of the Divine
rule.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the likeness of nature: and man
did not sin by coveting this, as stated.
Reply Obj. 2: It is not a sin to covet God's likeness as to
knowledge, absolutely; but to covet this likeness inordinately, that
is, above one's measure, this is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on
Ps. 70:18, "O God, who is like Thee?" says: "He who desires to be of
himself, even as God is of no one, wishes wickedly to be like God.
Thus did the devil, who was unwilling to be subject to Him, and man
who refused to be, as a servant, bound by His command."
Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the likeness of equality.
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