Whether Humility Is a Part of Modesty or Temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a part of modesty or
temperance. For humility regards chiefly the reverence whereby one is
subject to God, as stated above (A. 3). Now it belongs to a
theological virtue to have God for its object. Therefore humility
should be reckoned a theological virtue rather than a part of
temperance or modesty.
Obj. 2: Further, temperance is in the concupiscible, whereas humility
would seem to be in the irascible, just as pride which is opposed to
it, and whose object is something difficult. Therefore apparently
humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.
Obj. 3: Further, humility and magnanimity are about the same object,
as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). But magnanimity is reckoned a part, not
of temperance but of fortitude, as stated above (Q. 129, A. 5).
Therefore it would seem that humility is not a part of temperance or
modesty.
_On the contrary,_ Origen says (Hom. viii super Luc.): "If thou wilt
hear the name of this virtue, and what it was called by the
philosophers, know that humility which God regards is the same as
what they called _metriotes_, i.e. measure or moderation." Now this
evidently pertains to modesty or temperance. Therefore humility is a
part of modesty or temperance.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 137, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 157, A. 3,
ad 2), in assigning parts to a virtue we consider chiefly the
likeness that results from the mode of the virtue. Now the mode of
temperance, whence it chiefly derives its praise, is the restraint or
suppression of the impetuosity of a passion. Hence whatever virtues
restrain or suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity
of the emotions, are reckoned parts of temperance. Now just as
meekness suppresses the movement of anger, so does humility suppress
the movement of hope, which is the movement of a spirit aiming at
great things. Wherefore, like meekness, humility is accounted a part
of temperance. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says
that a man who aims at small things in proportion to his mode is not
magnanimous but "temperate," and such a man we may call humble.
Moreover, for the reason given above (Q. 160, A. 2), among the
various parts of temperance, the one under which humility is
comprised is modesty as understood by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii,
54), inasmuch as humility is nothing else than a moderation of
spirit: wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 3:4): "In the
incorruptibility of a quiet and meek spirit."
Reply Obj. 1: The theological virtues, whose object is our last end,
which is the first principle in matters of appetite, are the causes
of all the other virtues. Hence the fact that humility is caused by
reverence for God does not prevent it from being a part of modesty or
temperance.
Reply Obj. 2: Parts are assigned to a principal virtue by reason of a
sameness, not of subject or matter, but of formal mode, as stated
above (Q. 137, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 157, A. 3, ad 2). Consequently,
although humility is in the irascible as its subject, it is assigned
as a part of modesty or temperance by reason of its mode.
Reply Obj. 3: Although humility and magnanimity agree as to matter,
they differ as to mode, by reason of which magnanimity is reckoned a
part of fortitude, and humility a part of temperance.
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