Whether Humility Has to Do with the Appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that humility concerns, not the appetite
but the judgment of reason. Because humility is opposed to pride. Now
pride concerns things pertaining to knowledge: for Gregory says
(Moral. xxxiv, 22) that "pride, when it extends outwardly to the
body, is first of all shown in the eyes": wherefore it is written
(Ps. 130:1), "Lord, my heart is not exalted, nor are my eyes lofty."
Now eyes are the chief aids to knowledge. Therefore it would seem
that humility is chiefly concerned with knowledge, whereby one thinks
little of oneself.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "almost the
whole of Christian teaching is humility." Consequently nothing
contained in Christian teaching is incompatible with humility. Now
Christian teaching admonishes us to seek the better things, according
to 1 Cor. 12:31, "Be zealous for the better gifts." Therefore it
belongs to humility to restrain not the desire of difficult things
but the estimate thereof.
Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the same virtue both to restrain
excessive movement, and to strengthen the soul against excessive
withdrawal: thus fortitude both curbs daring and fortifies the soul
against fear. Now it is magnanimity that strengthens the soul against
the difficulties that occur in the pursuit of great things. Therefore
if humility were to curb the desire of great things, it would follow
that humility is not a distinct virtue from magnanimity, which is
evidently false. Therefore humility is concerned, not with the desire
but with the estimate of great things.
Obj. 4: Further, Andronicus [*De Affectibus] assigns humility to
outward show; for he says that humility is "the habit of avoiding
excessive expenditure and parade." Therefore it is not concerned with
the movement of the appetite.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]) that
"the humble man is one who chooses to be an abject in the house of
the Lord, rather than to dwell in the tents of sinners." But choice
concerns the appetite. Therefore humility has to do with the appetite
rather than with the estimative power.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it belongs properly to
humility, that a man restrain himself from being borne towards that
which is above him. For this purpose he must know his disproportion
to that which surpasses his capacity. Hence knowledge of one's own
deficiency belongs to humility, as a rule guiding the appetite.
Nevertheless humility is essentially in the appetite itself; and
consequently it must be said that humility, properly speaking,
moderates the movement of the appetite.
Reply Obj. 1: Lofty eyes are a sign of pride, inasmuch as it excludes
respect and fear: for fearing and respectful persons are especially
wont to lower the eyes, as though not daring to compare themselves
with others. But it does not follow from this that humility is
essentially concerned with knowledge.
Reply Obj. 2: It is contrary to humility to aim at greater things
through confiding in one's own powers: but to aim at greater things
through confidence in God's help, is not contrary to humility;
especially since the more one subjects oneself to God, the more is
one exalted in God's sight. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi):
"It is one thing to raise oneself to God, and another to raise
oneself up against God. He that abases himself before Him, him He
raiseth up; he that raises himself up against Him, him He casteth
down."
Reply Obj. 3: In fortitude there is the same reason for restraining
daring and for strengthening the soul against fear: since the reason
in both cases is that man should set the good of reason before
dangers of death. But the reason for restraining presumptuous hope
which pertains to humility is not the same as the reason for
strengthening the soul against despair. Because the reason for
strengthening the soul against despair is the acquisition of one's
proper good lest man, by despair, render himself unworthy of a good
which was competent to him; while the chief reason for suppressing
presumptuous hope is based on divine reverence, which shows that man
ought not to ascribe to himself more than is competent to him
according to the position in which God has placed him. Wherefore
humility would seem to denote in the first place man's subjection to
God; and for this reason Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4)
ascribes humility, which he understands by poverty of spirit, to the
gift of fear whereby man reveres God. Hence it follows that the
relation of fortitude to daring differs from that of humility to
hope. Because fortitude uses daring more than it suppresses it: so
that excess of daring is more like fortitude than lack of daring is.
On the other hand, humility suppresses hope or confidence in self
more than it uses it; wherefore excessive self-confidence is more
opposed to humility than lack of confidence is.
Reply Obj. 4: Excess in outward expenditure and parade is wont to be
done with a view of boasting, which is suppressed by humility.
Accordingly humility has to do, in a secondary way, with externals,
as signs of the inward movement of the appetite.
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