Whether Desires for Pleasures of Touch Are the Matter of Continence?
Objection 1: It would seem that desires for pleasures of touch are
not the matter of continence. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 46):
"General decorum by its consistent form and the perfection of what is
virtuous is restrained* in its every action." [*"Continentem"
according to St. Thomas' reading; St. Ambrose wrote "concinentem =
harmonious"].
Obj. 2: Further, continence takes its name from a man standing for
the good of right reason, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Now other
passions lead men astray from right reason with greater vehemence
than the desire for pleasures of touch: for instance, the fear of
mortal dangers, which stupefies a man, and anger which makes him
behave like a madman, as Seneca remarks [*De Ira i, 1]. Therefore
continence does not properly regard the desires for pleasures of
touch.
Obj. 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54): "It is
continence that restrains cupidity with the guiding hand of counsel."
Now cupidity is generally used to denote the desire for riches rather
than the desire for pleasures of touch, according to 1 Tim. 6:10,
"Cupidity [Douay: 'The desire of money'] (_philargyria_), is the root
of all evils." Therefore continence is not properly about the desires
for pleasures of touch.
Obj. 4: Further, there are pleasures of touch not only in venereal
matters but also in eating. But continence is wont to be applied only
to the use of venereal matters. Therefore the desire for pleasures of
touch is not its proper matter.
Obj. 5: Further, among pleasures of touch some are not human but
bestial, both as regards food--for instance, the pleasure of eating
human flesh; and as regards venereal matters--for instance the abuse
of animals or boys. But continence is not about such like things, as
stated in _Ethic._ vii, 5. Therefore desires for pleasures of touch
are not the proper matter of continence.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that
"continence and incontinence are about the same things as temperance
and intemperance." Now temperance and intemperance are about the
desires for pleasures of touch, as stated above (Q. 141, A. 4).
Therefore continence and incontinence are also about that same matter.
_I answer that,_ Continence denotes, by its very name, a certain
curbing, in so far as a man contains himself from following his
passions. Hence continence is properly said in reference to those
passions which urge a man towards the pursuit of something, wherein
it is praiseworthy that reason should withhold man from pursuing:
whereas it is not properly about those passions, such as fear and the
like, which denote some kind of withdrawal: since in these it is
praiseworthy to remain firm in pursuing what reason dictates, as
stated above (Q. 123, AA. 3, 4). Now it is to be observed that
natural inclinations are the principles of all supervening
inclinations, as stated above (I, Q. 60, A. 2). Wherefore the more
they follow the inclination of nature, the more strongly do the
passions urge to the pursuance of an object. Now nature inclines
chiefly to those things that are necessary to it, whether for the
maintenance of the individual, such as food, or for the maintenance
of the species, such as venereal acts, the pleasures of which pertain
to the touch. Therefore continence and incontinence refer properly to
desires for pleasures of touch.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as temperance may be used in a general sense in
connection with any matter; but is properly applied to that matter
wherein it is best for man to be curbed: so, too, continence properly
speaking regards that matter wherein it is best and most difficult to
contain oneself, namely desires for pleasures of touch, and yet in a
general sense and relatively may be applied to any other matter: and
in this sense Ambrose speaks of continence.
Reply Obj. 2: Properly speaking we do not speak of continence in
relation to fear, but rather of firmness of mind which fortitude
implies. As to anger, it is true that it begets an impulse to the
pursuit of something, but this impulse follows an apprehension of the
soul--in so far as a man apprehends that someone has injured
him--rather than an inclination of nature. Wherefore a man may be
said to be continent of anger, relatively but not simply.
Reply Obj. 3: External goods, such as honors, riches and the like, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4), seem to be objects of choice in
themselves indeed, but not as being necessary for the maintenance of
nature. Wherefore in reference to such things we speak of a person as
being continent or incontinent, not simply, but relatively, by adding
that they are continent or incontinent in regard to wealth, or honor
and so forth. Hence Tully either understood continence in a general
sense, as including relative continence, or understood cupidity in a
restricted sense as denoting desire for pleasures of touch.
Reply Obj. 4: Venereal pleasures are more vehement than pleasures of
the palate: wherefore we are wont to speak of continence and
incontinence in reference to venereal matters rather than in
reference to food; although according to the Philosopher they are
applicable to both.
Reply Obj. 5: Continence is a good of the human reason: wherefore it
regards those passions which can be connatural to man. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that "if a man were to lay hold of a
child with desire of eating him or of satisfying an unnatural passion
whether he follow up his desire or not, he is said to be continent
[*See A. 4], not absolutely, but relatively."
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