Whether No Venereal Act Can Be Without Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that no venereal act can be without sin.
For nothing but sin would seem to hinder virtue. Now every venereal
act is a great hindrance to virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq. i,
10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its
height as the fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts."
Therefore, seemingly, no venereal act is without sin.
Obj. 2: Further, any excess that makes one forsake the good of reason
is sinful, because virtue is corrupted by "excess" and "deficiency"
as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there is
excess of pleasure, since it so absorbs the mind, that "it is
incompatible with the act of understanding," as the Philosopher
observes (Ethic. vii, 11); and as Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num.;
Cf. Jerome, Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.] states, rendered the hearts of
the prophets, for the moment, insensible to the spirit of prophecy.
Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.
Obj. 3: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. Now
original sin is transmitted to children by concupiscence, without
which no venereal act is possible, as Augustine declares (De Nup. et
Concup. i, 24). Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxv): "This is a
sufficient answer to heretics, if only they will understand that no
sin is committed in that which is against neither nature, nor morals,
nor a commandment": and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse
between the patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not
every venereal act is a sin.
_I answer that,_ A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the
order of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering
everything to its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no sin if
one, by the dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a
fitting manner and order for the end to which they are adapted,
provided this end be something truly good. Now just as the
preservation of the bodily nature of one individual is a true good,
so, too, is the preservation of the nature of the human species a
very great good. And just as the use of food is directed to the
preservation of life in the individual, so is the use of venereal
acts directed to the preservation of the whole human race. Hence
Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): "What food is to a man's well
being, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the whole human
race." Wherefore just as the use of food can be without sin, if it be
taken in due manner and order, as required for the welfare of the
body, so also the use of venereal acts can be without sin, provided
they be performed in due manner and order, in keeping with the end of
human procreation.
Reply Obj. 1: A thing may be a hindrance to virtue in two ways.
First, as regards the ordinary degree of virtue, and as to this
nothing but sin is an obstacle to virtue. Secondly, as regards the
perfect degree of virtue, and as to this virtue may be hindered by
that which is not a sin, but a lesser good. In this way sexual
intercourse casts down the mind not from virtue, but from the height,
i.e. the perfection of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug.
viii): "Just as that was good which Martha did when busy about
serving holy men, yet better still that which Mary did in hearing the
word of God: so, too, we praise the good of Susanna's conjugal
chastity, yet we prefer the good of the widow Anna, and much more
that of the Virgin Mary."
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 152, A. 2, ad 2; I-II, Q. 64, A.
2), the mean of virtue depends not on quantity but on conformity with
right reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure attaching to a
venereal act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the mean
of virtue. Moreover, virtue is not concerned with the amount of
pleasure experienced by the external sense, as this depends on the
disposition of the body; what matters is how much the interior
appetite is affected by that pleasure. Nor does it follow that the
act in question is contrary to virtue, from the fact that the free
act of reason in considering spiritual things is incompatible with
the aforesaid pleasure. For it is not contrary to virtue, if the act
of reason be sometimes interrupted for something that is done in
accordance with reason, else it would be against virtue for a person
to set himself to sleep. That venereal concupiscence and pleasure are
not subject to the command and moderation of reason, is due to the
punishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the reason, for rebelling
against God, deserved that its body should rebel against it, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13).
Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13), "the child,
shackled with original sin, is born of fleshly concupiscence (which
is not imputed as sin to the regenerate) as of a daughter of sin."
Hence it does not follow that the act in question is a sin, but that
it contains something penal resulting from the first sin.
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