Whether Chastity Is a Distinct Virtue from Abstinence?
Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is not a distinct virtue
from abstinence. Because where the matter is generically the same,
one virtue suffices. Now it would seem that things pertaining to the
same sense are of one genus. Therefore, since pleasures of the palate
which are the matter of abstinence, and venereal pleasures which are
the matter of chastity, pertain to the touch, it seems that chastity
is not a distinct virtue from abstinence.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12) likens all vices of
intemperance to childish sins, which need chastising. Now "chastity"
takes its name from "chastisement" of the contrary vices. Since then
certain vices are bridled by abstinence, it seems that abstinence is
chastity.
Obj. 3: Further, the pleasures of the other senses are the concern of
temperance in so far as they refer to pleasures of touch; which are
the matter of temperance. Now pleasures of the palate, which are the
matter of abstinence, are directed to venereal pleasures, which are
the matter of chastity: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. cxlvii ad Amand.
Cf. Gratian, Dist. xliv.], commenting on Titus 1:7, "Not given to
wine, no striker," etc.: "The belly and the organs of generation are
neighbors, that the neighborhood of the organs may indicate their
complicity in vice." Therefore abstinence and chastity are not
distinct virtues.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle (2 Cor. 6:5, 6) reckons "chastity"
together with "fastings" which pertain to abstinence.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 141, A. 4), temperance is
properly about the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch: so that
where there are different kinds of pleasure, there are different
virtues comprised under temperance. Now pleasures are proportionate
to the actions whose perfections they are, as stated in _Ethic._ ix,
4, 5: and it is evident that actions connected with the use of food
whereby the nature of the individual is maintained differ generically
from actions connected with the use of matters venereal, whereby the
nature of the species is preserved. Therefore chastity, which is
about venereal pleasures, is a distinct virtue from abstinence, which
is about pleasures of the palate.
Reply Obj. 1: Temperance is chiefly about pleasures of touch, not as
regards the sense's judgment concerning the objects of touch, which
judgment is of uniform character concerning all such objects, but as
regards the use itself of those objects, as stated in _Ethic._ iii,
10. Now the uses of meats, drinks, and venereal matters differ in
character. Wherefore there must needs be different virtues, though
they regard the one sense.
Reply Obj. 2: Venereal pleasures are more impetuous, and are more
oppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate: and
therefore they are in greater need of chastisement and restraint,
since if one consent to them this increases the force of
concupiscence and weakens the strength of the mind. Hence Augustine
says (Soliloq. i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the
manly mind from its heights as the fondling of women, and those
bodily contacts which belong to the married state."
Reply Obj. 3: The pleasures of the other senses do not pertain to the
maintenance of man's nature, except in so far as they are directed to
pleasures of touch. Wherefore in the matter of such pleasures there
is no other virtue comprised under temperance. But the pleasures of
the palate, though directed somewhat to venereal pleasures, are
essentially directed to the preservation of man's life: wherefore by
their very nature they have a special virtue, although this virtue
which is called abstinence directs its act to chastity as its end.
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