Whether the Honest Differs from the Useful and the Pleasant?
Objection 1: It would seem that the honest does not differ from the
useful and the pleasant. For the honest is "what is desirable for its
own sake" [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. Now pleasure is desired
for its own sake, for "it seems ridiculous to ask a man why he wishes
to be pleased," as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore
the honest does not differ from the pleasant.
Obj. 2: Further, riches are comprised under the head of useful good:
for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52): "There is a thing that
attracts the desire not by any force of its own, nor by its very
nature, but on account of its fruitfulness and utility": and "that is
money." Now riches come under the head of honesty, for it is written
(Ecclus. 11:14): "Poverty and riches (_honestas_) are from God," and
(Ecclus. 13:2): "He shall take a burden upon him that hath fellowship
with one more honorable," i.e. richer, "than himself." Therefore the
honest differs not from the useful.
Obj. 3: Further, Tully proves (De Offic. ii, 3) that nothing can be
useful unless it be honest: and Ambrose makes the same statement (De
Offic. ii, 6). Therefore the useful differs not from the honest.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Q. 83, qu. 30): "The honest is
that which is desirable for its own sake: the useful implies
reference to something else."
_I answer that,_ The honest concurs in the same subject with the
useful and the pleasant, but it differs from them in aspect. For, as
stated above (A. 2), a thing is said to be honest, in so far as it
has a certain beauty through being regulated by reason. Now whatever
is regulated in accordance with reason is naturally becoming to man.
Again, it is natural for a thing to take pleasure in that which is
becoming to it. Wherefore an honest thing is naturally pleasing to
man: and the Philosopher proves this with regard to acts of virtue
(Ethic. i, 8). Yet not all that is pleasing is honest, since a thing
may be becoming according to the senses, but not according to reason.
A pleasing thing of this kind is beside man's reason which perfects
his nature. Even virtue itself, which is essentially honest, is
referred to something else as its end namely happiness. Accordingly
the honest the useful, and the pleasant concur in the one subject.
Nevertheless they differ in aspect. For a thing is said to be honest
as having a certain excellence deserving of honor on account of its
spiritual beauty: while it is said to be pleasing, as bringing rest
to desire, and useful, as referred to something else. The pleasant,
however, extends to more things than the useful and the honest: since
whatever is useful and honest is pleasing in some respect, whereas
the converse does not hold (Ethic. ii, 3).
Reply Obj. 1: A thing is said to be honest, if it is desired for its
own sake by the rational appetite, which tends to that which is in
accordance with reason: while a thing is said to be pleasant if it is
desired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite.
Reply Obj. 2: Riches are denominated honesty according of the opinion
of the many who honor wealth: or because they are intended to be the
instruments of virtuous deeds, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2).
Reply Obj. 3: Tully and Ambrose mean to say that nothing incompatible
with honesty can be simply and truly useful, since it follows that it
is contrary to man's last end, which is a good in accordance with
reason; although it may perhaps be useful in some respect, with
regard to a particular end. But they do not mean to say that every
useful thing as such may be classed among those that are honest.
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