Whether Temperance Is the Greatest of the Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is the greatest of the
virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "what we observe and
seek most in temperance is the safeguarding of what is honorable, and
the regard for what is beautiful." Now virtue deserves praise for
being honorable and beautiful. Therefore temperance is the greatest
of the virtues.
Obj. 2: Further, the more difficult the deed the greater the virtue.
Now it is more difficult to control desires and pleasures of touch
than to regulate external actions, the former pertaining to
temperance and the latter to justice. Therefore temperance is a
greater virtue than justice.
Obj. 3: Further, seemingly the more general a thing is, the more
necessary and the better it is. Now fortitude is about dangers of
death which occur less frequently than pleasures of touch, for these
occur every day; so that temperance is in more general use than
fortitude. Therefore temperance is a more excellent virtue than
fortitude.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that the
"greatest virtues are those which are most profitable to others, for
which reason we give the greatest honor to the brave and the just."
_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 2) "the good
of the many is more of the godlike than the good of the individual,"
wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better
it is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the many more
than temperance does, since justice regards the relations between one
man and another, while fortitude regards dangers of battle which are
endured for the common weal: whereas temperance moderates only the
desires and pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident
that justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than
temperance: while prudence and the theological virtues are more
excellent still.
Reply Obj. 1: Honor and beauty are especially ascribed to temperance,
not on account of the excellence of the good proper to temperance,
but on account of the disgrace of the contrary evil from which it
withdraws us, by moderating the pleasures common to us and the lower
animals.
Reply Obj. 2: Since virtue is about the difficult and the good, the
excellence of a virtue is considered more under the aspect of good,
wherein justice excels, than under the aspect of difficult, wherein
temperance excels.
Reply Obj. 3: That which is general because it regards the many
conduces more to the excellence of goodness than that which is
general because it occurs frequently: fortitude excels in the former
way, temperance in the latter. Hence fortitude is greater simply,
although in some respects temperance may be described as greater not
only than fortitude but also than justice.
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