Whether Temperance Is a Cardinal Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a cardinal virtue.
For the good of moral virtue depends on reason. But temperance is
about those things that are furthest removed from reason, namely
about pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated in
_Ethic._ iii, 10. Therefore temperance, seemingly, is not a principal
virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, the greater the impetus the more difficult is it to
control. Now anger, which is controlled by meekness, seems to be more
impetuous than desire, which is controlled by temperance. For it is
written (Prov. 27:4): "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh
forth; and who can bear the violence (_impetum_) of one provoked?"
Therefore meekness is a principal virtue rather than temperance.
Obj. 3: Further, hope as a movement of the soul takes precedence of
desire and concupiscence, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 4). But
humility controls the presumption of immoderate hope. Therefore,
seemingly, humility is a principal virtue rather than temperance
which controls concupiscence.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory reckons temperance among the principal
virtues (Moral. ii, 49).
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 11; Q. 61, A. 3), a
principal or cardinal virtue is so called because it has a foremost
claim to praise on account of one of those things that are requisite
for the notion of virtue in general. Now moderation, which is
requisite in every virtue, deserves praise principally in pleasures
of touch, with which temperance is concerned, both because these
pleasures are most natural to us, so that it is more difficult to
abstain from them, and to control the desire for them, and because
their objects are more necessary to the present life, as stated above
(A. 4). For this reason temperance is reckoned a principal or
cardinal virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: The longer the range of its operation, the greater is
the agent's power (_virtus_) shown to be: wherefore the very fact
that the reason is able to moderate desires and pleasures that are
furthest removed from it, proves the greatness of reason's power.
This is how temperance comes to be a principal virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: The impetuousness of anger is caused by an accident,
for instance, a painful hurt; wherefore it soon passes, although its
impetus be great. On the other hand, the impetuousness of the desire
for pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause, wherefore it is
more lasting and more general, and consequently its control regards a
more principal virtue.
Reply Obj. 3: The object of hope is higher than the object of desire,
wherefore hope is accounted the principal passion in the irascible.
But the objects of desires and pleasures of touch move the appetite
with greater force, since they are more natural. Therefore
temperance, which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal
virtue.
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