Whether Temperance Is a Special Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a special virtue.
For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "it belongs to
temperance to preserve one's integrity and freedom from corruption
for God's sake." But this is common to every virtue. Therefore
temperance is not a special virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 42) that "what we observe
and seek most in temperance is tranquillity of soul." But this is
common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) that "we cannot
separate the beautiful from the virtuous," and that "whatever is just
is beautiful." Now the beautiful is considered as proper to
temperance, according to the same authority (Tully, De Offic. i, 27).
Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 10) reckons it
a special virtue.
_I answer that,_ It is customary in human speech to employ a common
term in a restricted sense in order to designate the principal things
to which that common term is applicable: thus the word "city" is used
antonomastically* to designate Rome. [*Antonomasia is the figure of
speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term;
e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle]. Accordingly the word
"temperance" has a twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its
common signification: and thus temperance is not a special but a
general virtue, because the word "temperance" signifies a certain
temperateness or moderation, which reason appoints to human
operations and passions: and this is common to every moral virtue.
Yet there is a logical difference between temperance and fortitude,
even if we take them both as general virtues: since temperance
withdraws man from things which seduce the appetite from obeying
reason, while fortitude incites him to endure or withstand those
things on account of which he forsakes the good of reason.
On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomastically, as
withholding the appetite from those things which are most seductive
to man, it is a special virtue, for thus it has, like fortitude, a
special matter.
Reply Obj. 1: Man's appetite is corrupted chiefly by those things
which seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and Divine law.
Wherefore integrity, which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can,
like the latter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, and
secondly in a sense of excellence.
Reply Obj. 2: The things about which temperance is concerned have a
most disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason that they are
natural to man, as we shall state further on (AA. 4, 5). Hence
tranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence,
although it is a common property of all the virtues.
Reply Obj. 3: Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it is
ascribed to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons. First,
in respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists in a
certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we
understand by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).
Secondly, because the things from which temperance withholds us, hold
the lowest place in man, and are becoming to him by reason of his
animal nature, as we shall state further on (AA. 4, 5; Q. 142, A. 4),
wherefore it is natural that such things should defile him. In
consequence beauty is a foremost attribute of temperance which above
all hinders man from being defiled. In like manner honesty [*Honesty
must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral
goodness, from the point of view of decorum] is a special attribute
of temperance: for Isidore says (Etym. x): "An honest man is one who
has no defilement, for honesty means an honorable state." This is
most applicable to temperance, which withstands the vices that bring
most dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (Q. 142, A. 4).
_______________________