Whether Temperance Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that temperance is not a virtue. For no virtue
goes against the inclination of nature, since "there is in us a
natural aptitude for virtue," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 1. Now
temperance withdraws us from pleasures to which nature inclines,
according to _Ethic._ ii, 3, 8. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). But some people have temperance without
having the other virtues: for we find many who are temperate, and yet
covetous or timid. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, to every virtue there is a corresponding gift, as
appears from what we have said above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 4). But
seemingly no gift corresponds to temperance, since all the gifts have
been already ascribed to the other virtues (QQ. 8, 9, 19, 45, 52, 71,
139). Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Music. vi, 15): "Temperance is the
name of a virtue."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 3), it is essential
to virtue to incline man to good. Now the good of man is to be in
accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence
human virtue is that which inclines man to something in accordance
with reason. Now temperance evidently inclines man to this, since its
very name implies moderation or temperateness, which reason causes.
Therefore temperance is a virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: Nature inclines everything to whatever is becoming to
it. Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are becoming to
him. Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it follows that
those pleasures are becoming to man which are in accordance with
reason. From such pleasures temperance does not withdraw him, but
from those which are contrary to reason. Wherefore it is clear that
temperance is not contrary to the inclination of human nature, but is
in accord with it. It is, however, contrary to the inclination of the
animal nature that is not subject to reason.
Reply Obj. 2: The temperance which fulfils the conditions of perfect
virtue is not without prudence, while this is lacking to all who are
in sin. Hence those who lack other virtues, through being subject to
the opposite vices, have not the temperance which is a virtue, though
they do acts of temperance from a certain natural disposition, in so
far as certain imperfect virtues are either natural to man, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 63, A. 1), or acquired by habituation, which virtues,
through lack of prudence, are not perfected by reason, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1).
Reply Obj. 3: Temperance also has a corresponding gift, namely, fear,
whereby man is withheld from the pleasures of the flesh, according to
Ps. 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear." The gift of fear
has for its principal object God, Whom it avoids offending, and in
this respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as stated above
(Q. 19, A. 9, ad 1). But it may have for its secondary object
whatever a man shuns in order to avoid offending God. Now man stands
in the greatest need of the fear of God in order to shun those things
which are most seductive, and these are the matter of temperance:
wherefore the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also.
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