FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 133, Art. 1]

Whether Pusillanimity Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that pusillanimity is not a sin. For every sin

makes a man evil, just as every virtue makes a man good. But a

fainthearted man is not evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3).

Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a

fainthearted man is especially one who is worthy of great goods, yet

does not deem himself worthy of them." Now no one is worthy of great

goods except the virtuous, since as the Philosopher again says

(Ethic. iv, 3), "none but the virtuous are truly worthy of honor."

Therefore the fainthearted are virtuous: and consequently

pusillanimity is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, "Pride is the beginning of all sin" (Ecclus. 10:15).

But pusillanimity does not proceed from pride, since the proud man

sets himself above what he is, while the fainthearted man withdraws

from the things he is worthy of. Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.

Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he who

deems himself less worthy than he is, is said to be fainthearted."

Now sometimes holy men deem themselves less worthy than they are; for

instance, Moses and Jeremias, who were worthy of the office God chose

them for, which they both humbly declined (Ex. 3:11; Jer. 1:6).

Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ Nothing in human conduct is to be avoided save

sin. Now pusillanimity is to be avoided: for it is written (Col.

3:21): "Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they

be discouraged." Therefore pusillanimity is a sin.

_I answer that,_ Whatever is contrary to a natural inclination is a

sin, because it is contrary to a law of nature. Now everything has a

natural inclination to accomplish an action that is commensurate with

its power: as is evident in all natural things, whether animate or

inanimate. Now just as presumption makes a man exceed what is

proportionate to his power, by striving to do more than he can, so

pusillanimity makes a man fall short of what is proportionate to his

power, by refusing to tend to that which is commensurate thereto.

Wherefore as presumption is a sin, so is pusillanimity. Hence it is

that the servant who buried in the earth the money he had received

from his master, and did not trade with it through fainthearted fear,

was punished by his master (Matt. 25; Luke 19).

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher calls those evil who injure their

neighbor: and accordingly the fainthearted is said not to be evil,

because he injures no one, save accidentally, by omitting to do what

might be profitable to others. For Gregory says (Pastoral. i) that if

"they who demur to do good to their neighbor in preaching be judged

strictly, without doubt their guilt is proportionate to the good they

might have done had they been less retiring."

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders a person who has a virtuous habit from

sinning venially and without losing the habit, or mortally and with

loss of the habit of gratuitous virtue. Hence it is possible for a

man, by reason of the virtue which he has, to be worthy of doing

certain great things that are worthy of great honor, and yet through

not trying to make use of his virtue, he sins sometimes venially,

sometimes mortally.

Again it may be replied that the fainthearted is worthy of great

things in proportion to his ability for virtue, ability which he

derives either from a good natural disposition, or from science, or

from external fortune, and if he fails to use those things for

virtue, he becomes guilty of pusillanimity.

Reply Obj. 3: Even pusillanimity may in some way be the result of

pride: when, to wit, a man clings too much to his own opinion,

whereby he thinks himself incompetent for those things for which he

is competent. Hence it is written (Prov. 26:16): "The sluggard is

wiser in his own conceit than seven men that speak sentences." For

nothing hinders him from depreciating himself in some things, and

having a high opinion of himself in others. Wherefore Gregory says

(Pastoral. i) of Moses that "perchance he would have been proud, had

he undertaken the leadership of a numerous people without misgiving:

and again he would have been proud, had he refused to obey the

command of his Creator."

Reply Obj. 4: Moses and Jeremias were worthy of the office to which

they were appointed by God, but their worthiness was of Divine grace:

yet they, considering the insufficiency of their own weakness,

demurred; though not obstinately lest they should fall into pride.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 814 / 1128 题