Whether Security Belongs to Magnanimity?
Objection 1: It seems that security does not belong to magnanimity.
For security, as stated above (Q. 128, ad 6), denotes freedom from
the disturbance of fear. But fortitude does this most effectively.
Wherefore security is seemingly the same as fortitude. But fortitude
does not belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case.
Neither therefore does security belong to magnanimity.
Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man "is said to be
secure because he is without care." But this seems to be contrary to
virtue, which has a care for honorable things, according to 2 Tim.
2:15, "Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God."
Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity, which does great
things in all the virtues.
Obj. 3: Further, virtue is not its own reward. But security is
accounted the reward of virtue, according to Job 11:14, 18, "If thou
wilt put away from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand . . . being
buried thou shalt sleep secure." Therefore security does not belong
to magnanimity or to any other virtue, as a part thereof.
_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading:
"Magnanimity consists of two things," that "it belongs to magnanimity
to give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to fortune."
But a man's security consists in this. Therefore security belongs to
magnanimity.
_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes a
man take counsel," because, to wit he takes care to avoid what he
fears. Now security takes its name from the removal of this care, of
which fear is the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect freedom
of the mind from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope.
Now, as hope directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly
regards fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately to
magnanimity, so security belongs immediately to fortitude.
It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring, so
is fear the cause of despair, as stated above when we were treating
of the passion (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2). Wherefore as confidence belongs
indirectly to fortitude, in so far as it makes use of daring, so
security belongs indirectly to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes
despair.
Reply Obj. 1: Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because it banishes
fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a firmness of
mind in the matter of the passion. Wherefore security is not the same
as fortitude, but is a condition thereof.
Reply Obj. 2: Not all security is worthy of praise but only when one
puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should not
fear: in this way it is a condition of fortitude and of magnanimity.
Reply Obj. 3: There is in the virtues a certain likeness to, and
participation of, future happiness, as stated above (I-II, Q. 5, AA.
3, 7). Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a
condition of a virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue's
reward.
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