SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 127, Art. 2]

Whether Daring Is Opposed to Fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that daring is not opposed to fortitude. For

excess of daring seems to result from presumption of mind. But

presumption pertains to pride which is opposed to humility. Therefore

daring is opposed to humility rather than to fortitude.

Obj. 2: Further, daring does not seem to call for blame, except in so

far as it results in harm either to the daring person who puts

himself in danger inordinately, or to others whom he attacks with

daring, or exposes to danger. But this seemingly pertains to

injustice. Therefore daring, as designating a sin, is opposed, not to

fortitude but to justice.

Obj. 3: Further, fortitude is concerned about fear and daring, as

stated above (Q. 123, A. 3). Now since timidity is opposed to

fortitude in respect of an excess of fear, there is another vice

opposed to timidity in respect of a lack of fear. If then, daring is

opposed to fortitude, in the point of excessive daring, there will

likewise be a vice opposed to it in the point of deficient daring.

But there is no such vice. Therefore neither should daring be

accounted a vice in opposition to fortitude.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher in both the Second and Third Books

of Ethics accounts daring to be opposed to fortitude.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 126, A. 2), it belongs to a

moral virtue to observe the rational mean in the matter about which

it is concerned. Wherefore every vice that denotes lack of moderation

in the matter of a moral virtue is opposed to that virtue, as

immoderate to moderate. Now daring, in so far as it denotes a vice,

implies excess of passion, and this excess goes by the name of

daring. Wherefore it is evident that it is opposed to the virtue of

fortitude which is concerned about fear and daring, as stated above

(Q. 122, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 1: Opposition between vice and virtue does not depend

chiefly on the cause of the vice but on the vice's very species.

Wherefore it is not necessary that daring be opposed to the same

virtue as presumption which is its cause.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as the direct opposition of a vice does not depend

on its cause, so neither does it depend on its effect. Now the harm

done by daring is its effect. Wherefore neither does the opposition

of daring depend on this.

Reply Obj. 3: The movement of daring consists in a man taking the

offensive against that which is in opposition to him: and nature

inclines him to do this except in so far as such inclination is

hindered by the fear of receiving harm from that source. Hence the

vice which exceeds in daring has no contrary deficiency, save only

timidity. Yet daring does not always accompany so great a lack of

timidity, for as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), "the daring

are precipitate and eager to meet danger, yet fail when the danger is

present," namely through fear.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 788 / 1128 题