Whether Daring Is a Sin?
Objection 1: It seems that daring is not a sin. For it is written
(Job 39:21) concerning the horse, by which according to Gregory
(Moral. xxxi) the godly preacher is denoted, that "he goeth forth
boldly to meet armed men [*Vulg.: 'he pranceth boldly, he goeth forth
to meet armed men']." But no vice redounds to a man's praise.
Therefore it is not a sin to be daring.
Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9), "one
should take counsel in thought, and do quickly what has been
counseled." But daring helps this quickness in doing. Therefore
daring is not sinful but praiseworthy.
Obj. 3: Further, daring is a passion caused by hope, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 45, A. 2) when we were treating of the passions. But hope
is accounted not a sin but a virtue. Neither therefore should daring
be accounted a sin.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 8:18): "Go not on the way
with a bold man, lest he burden thee with his evils." Now no man's
fellowship is to be avoided save on account of sin. Therefore daring
is a sin.
_I answer that,_ Daring, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 55),
is a passion. Now a passion is sometimes moderated according to
reason, and sometimes it lacks moderation, either by excess or by
deficiency, and on this account the passion is sinful. Again, the
names of the passions are sometimes employed in the sense of excess,
thus we speak of anger meaning not any but excessive anger, in which
case it is sinful, and in the same way daring as implying excess is
accounted a sin.
Reply Obj. 1: The daring spoken of there is that which is moderated
by reason, for in that sense it belongs to the virtue of fortitude.
Reply Obj. 2: It is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking counsel,
which is an act of reason. But to wish to act quickly before taking
counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful; for this would be to act
rashly, which is a vice contrary to prudence, as stated above (Q. 58,
A. 3). Wherefore daring which leads one to act quickly is so far
praiseworthy as it is directed by reason.
Reply Obj. 3: Some vices are unnamed, and so also are some virtues,
as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 4, 5, 6). Hence the
names of certain passions have to be applied to certain vices and
virtues: and in order to designate vices we employ especially the
names of those passions the object of which is an evil, as in the
case of hatred, fear, anger and daring. But hope and love have a good
for this object, and so we use them rather to designate virtues.
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