Whether the Sin of Fear Is Contrary to Fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that the sin of fear is not contrary to
fortitude: because fortitude is about dangers of death, as stated
above (Q. 123, AA. 4, 5). But the sin of fear is not always connected
with dangers of death, for a gloss on Ps. 127:1, "Blessed are all
they that fear the Lord," says that "it is human fear whereby we
dread to suffer carnal dangers, or to lose worldly goods." Again a
gloss on Matt. 27:44, "He prayed the third time, saying the selfsame
word," says that "evil fear is threefold, fear of death, fear of
pain, and fear of contempt." Therefore the sin of fear is not
contrary to fortitude.
Obj. 2: Further, the chief reason why a man is commended for
fortitude is that he exposes himself to the danger of death. Now
sometimes a man exposes himself to death through fear of slavery or
shame. Thus Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei i) that Cato, in order not
to be Caesar's slave, gave himself up to death. Therefore the sin of
fear bears a certain likeness to fortitude instead of being opposed
thereto.
Obj. 3: Further, all despair arises from fear. But despair is opposed
not to fortitude but to hope, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 1; I-II, Q.
40, A. 4). Neither therefore is the sin of fear opposed to fortitude.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 7) states that
timidity is opposed to fortitude.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 19, A. 3; I-II, Q. 43, A. 1),
all fear arises from love; since no one fears save what is contrary
to something he loves. Now love is not confined to any particular
kind of virtue or vice: but ordinate love is included in every
virtue, since every virtuous man loves the good proper to his virtue;
while inordinate love is included in every sin, because inordinate
love gives use to inordinate desire. Hence in like manner inordinate
fear is included in every sin; thus the covetous man fears the loss
of money, the intemperate man the loss of pleasure, and so on. But
the greatest fear of all is that which has the danger of death for
its object, as we find proved in _Ethic._ iii, 6. Wherefore the
inordinateness of this fear is opposed to fortitude which regards
dangers of death. For this reason timidity is said to be
antonomastically* opposed to fortitude. [*Antonomasia is the figure
of speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term;
e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle: and so timidity, which is
inordinate fear of any evil, is employed to denote inordinate fear of
the danger of death.]
Reply Obj. 1: The passages quoted refer to inordinate fear in its
generic acceptation, which can be opposed to various virtues.
Reply Obj. 2: Human acts are estimated chiefly with reference to the
end, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6): and it belongs
to a brave man to expose himself to danger of death for the sake of a
good. But a man who exposes himself to danger of death in order to
escape from slavery or hardships is overcome by fear, which is
contrary to fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7),
that "to die in order to escape poverty, lust, or something
disagreeable is an act not of fortitude but of cowardice: for to shun
hardships is a mark of effeminacy."
Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2), fear is the
beginning of despair even as hope is the beginning of daring.
Wherefore, just as fortitude which employs daring in moderation
presupposes hope, so on the other hand despair proceeds from some
kind of fear. It does not follow, however, that any kind of despair
results from any kind of fear, but that only from fear of the same
kind. Now the despair that is opposed to hope is referred to another
kind, namely to Divine things; whereas the fear that is opposed to
fortitude regards dangers of death. Hence the argument does not prove.
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