Whether _Epikeia_ Is a Part of Justice?
Objection 1: It seems that _epikeia_ is not a part of justice. For,
as stated above (Q. 58, A. 7), justice is twofold, particular and
legal. Now _epikeia_ is not a part of particular justice, since it
extends to all virtues, even as legal justice does. In like manner,
neither is it a part of legal justice, since its operation is beside
that which is established by law. Therefore it seems that _epikeia_
is not a part of justice.
Obj. 2: Further, a more principal virtue is not assigned as the part
of a less principal virtue: for it is to the cardinal virtue, as
being principal, that secondary virtues are assigned as parts. Now
_epikeia_ seems to be a more principal virtue than justice, as
implied by its name: for it is derived from _epi_, i.e. "above," and
_dikaion_, i.e. "just." Therefore _epikeia_ is not a part of justice.
Obj. 3: Further, it seems that _epikeia_ is the same as modesty. For
where the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5), "Let your modesty be known to all
men," the Greek has _epieikeia_ [*_to epieikes_]. Now, according to
Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), modesty is a part of temperance.
Therefore _epikeia_ is not a part of justice.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 10) that "_epikeia_
is a kind of justice."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 48), a virtue has three kinds of
parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A subjective part is one
of which the whole is predicated essentially, and it is less than the
whole. This may happen in two ways. For sometimes one thing is
predicated of many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox:
and sometimes one thing is predicated of many according to priority
and posteriority, as _being_ of substance and accident.
Accordingly, _epikeia_ is a part of justice taken in a general sense,
for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v,
10). Wherefore it is evident that _epikeia_ is a subjective part of
justice; and justice is predicated of it with priority to being
predicated of legal justice, since legal justice is subject to the
direction of _epikeia._ Hence _epikeia_ is by way of being a higher
rule of human actions.
Reply Obj. 1: _Epikeia_ corresponds properly to legal justice, and in
one way is contained under it, and in another way exceeds it. For if
legal justice denotes that which complies with the law, whether as
regards the letter of the law, or as regards the intention of the
lawgiver, which is of more account, then _epikeia_ is the more
important part of legal justice. But if legal justice denote merely
that which complies with the law with regard to the letter, then
_epikeia_ is a part not of legal justice but of justice in its
general acceptation, and is condivided with legal justice, as
exceeding it.
Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10), "_epikeia_ is
better than a certain," namely, legal, "justice," which observes the
letter of the law: yet since it is itself a kind of justice, it is
not better than all justice.
Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to _epikeia_ to moderate something, namely,
the observance of the letter of the law. But modesty, which is
reckoned a part of temperance, moderates man's outward life--for
instance, in his deportment, dress or the like. Possibly also the
term _epieikeia_ is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds of
moderation.
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