Whether Covetousness Is a Capital Vice?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a capital vice. For
covetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean, and to prodigality
as extreme. But neither is liberality a principal virtue, nor
prodigality a capital vice. Therefore covetousness also should not be
reckoned a capital vice.
Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), those vices
are called capital which have principal ends, to which the ends of
other vices are directed. But this does not apply to covetousness:
since riches have the aspect, not of an end, but rather of something
directed to an end, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 5. Therefore
covetousness is not a capital vice.
Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xv), that "covetousness arises
sometimes from pride, sometimes from fear. For there are those who,
when they think that they lack the needful for their expenses, allow
the mind to give way to covetousness. And there are others who,
wishing to be thought more of, are incited to greed for other
people's property." Therefore covetousness arises from other vices
instead of being a capital vice in respect of other vices.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) reckons covetousness among
the capital vices.
_I answer that,_ As stated in the Second Objection, a capital vice is
one which under the aspect of end gives rise to other vices: because
when an end is very desirable, the result is that through desire
thereof man sets about doing many things either good or evil. Now the
most desirable end is happiness or felicity, which is the last end of
human life, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, AA. 4, 7, 8): wherefore the
more a thing is furnished with the conditions of happiness, the more
desirable it is. Also one of the conditions of happiness is that it
be self-sufficing, else it would not set man's appetite at rest, as
the last end does. Now riches give great promise of self-sufficiency,
as Boethius says (De Consol. iii): the reason of which, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), is that we "use money in token of
taking possession of something," and again it is written (Eccles.
10:19): "All things obey money." Therefore covetousness, which is
desire for money, is a capital vice.
Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is perfected in accordance with reason, but vice
is perfected in accordance with the inclination of the sensitive
appetite. Now reason and sensitive appetite do not belong chiefly to
the same genus, and consequently it does not follow that principal
vice is opposed to principal virtue. Wherefore, although liberality
is not a principal virtue, since it does not regard the principal
good of the reason, yet covetousness is a principal vice, because it
regards money, which occupies a principal place among sensible goods,
for the reason given in the Article.
On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end that is
desirable principally, indeed it seems rather to result from a lack
of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "a prodigal
man is a fool rather than a knave."
Reply Obj. 2: It is true that money is directed to something else as
its end: yet in so far as it is useful for obtaining all sensible
things, it contains, in a way, all things virtually. Hence it has a
certain likeness to happiness, as stated in the Article.
Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents a capital vice from arising
sometimes out of other vices, as stated above (Q. 36, A. 4, ad 1;
I-II, Q. 84, A. 4), provided that itself be frequently the source
of others.
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