Whether Quarreling Is a More Grievous Sin Than Flattery?
Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is a less grievous sin than the
contrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For the more harm a sin
does the more grievous it seems to be. Now flattery does more harm
than quarreling, for it is written (Isa. 3:12): "O My people, they
that call thee blessed, the same deceive thee, and destroy the way of
thy steps." Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarreling.
Obj. 2: Further, there appears to be a certain amount of deceit in
flattery, since the flatterer says one thing, and thinks another:
whereas the quarrelsome man is without deceit, for he contradicts
openly. Now he that sins deceitfully is a viler man, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore flattery is a more grievous
sin than quarreling.
Obj. 3: Further, shame is fear of what is vile, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9). But a man is more ashamed to be a
flatterer than a quarreler. Therefore quarreling is a less grievous
sin than flattery.
_On the contrary,_ The more a sin is inconsistent with the spiritual
state, the more it appears to be grievous. Now quarreling seems to be
more inconsistent with the spiritual state: for it is written (1 Tim.
3:2, 3) that it "behooveth a bishop to be . . . not quarrelsome"; and
(2 Tim. 3:24): "The servant of the Lord must not wrangle." Therefore
quarreling seems to be a more grievous sin than flattery.
_I answer that,_ We can speak of each of these sins in two ways. In
one way we may consider the species of either sin, and thus the more
a vice is at variance with the opposite virtue the more grievous it
is. Now the virtue of friendship has a greater tendency to please
than to displease: and so the quarrelsome man, who exceeds in giving
displeasure sins more grievously than the adulator or flatterer, who
exceeds in giving pleasure. In another way we may consider them as
regards certain external motives, and thus flattery is sometimes more
grievous, for instance when one intends by deception to acquire undue
honor or gain: while sometimes quarreling is more grievous; for
instance, when one intends either to deny the truth, or to hold up
the speaker to contempt.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as the flatterer may do harm by deceiving
secretly, so the quarreler may do harm sometimes by assailing openly.
Now, other things being equal, it is more grievous to harm a person
openly, by violence as it were, than secretly. Wherefore robbery is a
more grievous sin than theft, as stated above (Q. 66, A. 9).
Reply Obj. 2: In human acts, the more grievous is not always the more
vile. For the comeliness of a man has its source in his reason:
wherefore the sins of the flesh, whereby the flesh enslaves the
reason, are viler, although spiritual sins are more grievous, since
they proceed from greater contempt. In like manner, sins that are
committed through deceit are viler, in so far as they seem to arise
from a certain weakness, and from a certain falseness of the reason,
although sins that are committed openly proceed sometimes from a
greater contempt. Hence flattery, through being accompanied by
deceit, seems to be a viler sin; while quarreling, through proceeding
from greater contempt, is apparently more grievous.
Reply Obj. 3: As stated in the objection, shame regards the vileness
of a sin; wherefore a man is not always more ashamed of a more
grievous sin, but of a viler sin. Hence it is that a man is more
ashamed of flattery than of quarreling, although quarreling is more
grievous.
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