Whether This Kind of Friendship Is a Part of Justice?
Objection 1: It seems that this kind of friendship is not a part of
justice. For justice consists in giving another man his due. But this
virtue does not consist in doing that, but in behaving agreeably
towards those among whom we live. Therefore this virtue is not a part
of justice.
Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this
virtue is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those who dwell in
fellowship. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate the greatest
pleasures, as stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 5; Q. 61, A. 3).
Therefore this virtue is a part of temperance rather than of justice.
Obj. 3: Further, to give equal things to those who are unequal is
contrary to justice, as stated above (Q. 59, AA. 1, 2). Now,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue "treats in
like manner known and unknown, companions and strangers." Therefore
this virtue rather than being a part of justice is opposed thereto.
_On the contrary,_ Macrobius (De Somno Scip. i) accounts friendship a
part of justice.
_I answer that,_ This virtue is a part of justice, being annexed to
it as to a principal virtue. Because in common with justice it is
directed to another person, even as justice is: yet it falls short of
the notion of justice, because it lacks the full aspect of debt,
whereby one man is bound to another, either by legal debt, which the
law binds him to pay, or by some debt arising out of a favor
received. For it regards merely a certain debt of equity, namely,
that we behave pleasantly to those among whom we dwell, unless at
times, for some reason, it be necessary to displease them for some
good purpose.
Reply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 109, A. 3, ad 1), because man
is a social animal he owes his fellow-man, in equity, the
manifestation of truth without which human society could not last.
Now as man could not live in society without truth, so likewise, not
without joy, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii), no one
could abide a day with the sad nor with the joyless. Therefore, a
certain natural equity obliges a man to live agreeably with his
fellow-men; unless some reason should oblige him to sadden them for
their good.
Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to temperance to curb pleasures of the
senses. But this virtue regards the pleasures of fellowship, which
have their origin in the reason, in so far as one man behaves
becomingly towards another. Such pleasures need not to be curbed as
though they were noisome.
Reply Obj. 3: This saying of the Philosopher does not mean that one
ought to converse and behave in the same way with acquaintances and
strangers, since, as he says (Ethic. iv, 6), "it is not fitting to
please and displease intimate friends and strangers in the same way."
This likeness consists in this, that we ought to behave towards all
in a fitting manner.
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