THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 110, Art. 3]

Whether Every Lie Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that not every lie is a sin. For it is evident

that the evangelists did not sin in the writing of the Gospel. Yet

they seem to have told something false: since their accounts of the

words of Christ and of others often differ from one another:

wherefore seemingly one of them must have given an untrue account.

Therefore not every lie is a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, no one is rewarded by God for sin. But the midwives

of Egypt were rewarded by God for a lie, for it is stated that "God

built them houses" (Ex. 1:21). Therefore a lie is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, the deeds of holy men are related in Sacred Writ

that they may be a model of human life. But we read of certain very

holy men that they lied. Thus (Gen. 12 and 20) we are told that

Abraham said of his wife that she was his sister. Jacob also lied

when he said that he was Esau, and yet he received a blessing (Gen.

27:27-29). Again, Judith is commended (Judith 15:10, 11) although she

lied to Holofernes. Therefore not every lie is a sin.

Obj. 4: Further, one ought to choose the lesser evil in order to

avoid the greater: even so a physician cuts off a limb, lest the

whole body perish. Yet less harm is done by raising a false opinion

in a person's mind, than by someone slaying or being slain. Therefore

a man may lawfully lie, to save another from committing murder, or

another from being killed.

Obj. 5: Further, it is a lie not to fulfill what one has promised.

Yet one is not bound to keep all one's promises: for Isidore says

(Synonym. ii): "Break your faith when you have promised ill."

Therefore not every lie is a sin.

Obj. 6: Further, apparently a lie is a sin because thereby we deceive

our neighbor: wherefore Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xxi): "Whoever

thinks that there is any kind of lie that is not a sin deceives

himself shamefully, since he deems himself an honest man when he

deceives others." Yet not every lie is a cause of deception, since no

one is deceived by a jocose lie; seeing that lies of this kind are

told, not with the intention of being believed, but merely for the

sake of giving pleasure. Hence again we find hyperbolical expressions

in Holy Writ. Therefore not every lie is a sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 7:14): "Be not willing to

make any manner of lie."

_I answer that,_ An action that is naturally evil in respect of its

genus can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an

action to be good it must be right in every respect: because good

results from a complete cause, while evil results from any single

defect, as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now a lie is evil in

respect of its genus, since it is an action bearing on undue matter.

For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is

unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words something that is

not in his mind. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that

"lying is in itself evil and to be shunned, while truthfulness is

good and worthy of praise." Therefore every lie is a sin, as also

Augustine declares (Contra Mend. i).

Reply Obj. 1: It is unlawful to hold that any false assertion is

contained either in the Gospel or in any canonical Scripture, or that

the writers thereof have told untruths, because faith would be

deprived of its certitude which is based on the authority of Holy

Writ. That the words of certain people are variously reported in the

Gospel and other sacred writings does not constitute a lie. Hence

Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. ii): "He that has the wit to

understand that in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at

the sense, will conclude that he must not be the least troubled, no

matter by what words that sense is expressed." Hence it is evident,

as he adds (De Consens. Evang. ii), that "we must not judge that

someone is lying, if several persons fail to describe in the same way

and in the same words a thing which they remember to have seen or

heard."

Reply Obj. 2: The midwives were rewarded, not for their lie, but for

their fear of God, and for their good-will, which latter led them to

tell a lie. Hence it is expressly stated (Ex. 2:21): "And because the

midwives feared God, He built them houses." But the subsequent lie

was not meritorious.

Reply Obj. 3: In Holy Writ, as Augustine observes (Lib. De Mend. v),

the deeds of certain persons are related as examples of perfect

virtue: and we must not believe that such persons were liars. If,

however, any of their statements appear to be untruthful, we must

understand such statements to have been figurative and prophetic.

Hence Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v): "We must believe that

whatever is related of those who, in prophetical times, are mentioned

as being worthy of credit, was done and said by them prophetically."

As to Abraham "when he said that Sara was his sister, he wished to

hide the truth, not to tell a lie, for she is called his sister since

she was the daughter of his father," Augustine says (QQ. Super. Gen.

xxvi; Contra Mend. x; Contra Faust. xxii). Wherefore Abraham himself

said (Gen. 20:12): "She is truly my sister, the daughter of my

father, and not the daughter of my mother," being related to him on

his father's side. Jacob's assertion that he was Esau, Isaac's

first-born, was spoken in a mystical sense, because, to wit, the

latter's birthright was due to him by right: and he made use of this

mode of speech being moved by the spirit of prophecy, in order to

signify a mystery, namely, that the younger people, i.e. the

Gentiles, should supplant the first-born, i.e. the Jews.

Some, however, are commended in the Scriptures, not on account of

perfect virtue, but for a certain virtuous disposition, seeing that

it was owing to some praiseworthy sentiment that they were moved to

do certain undue things. It is thus that Judith is praised, not for

lying to Holofernes, but for her desire to save the people, to which

end she exposed herself to danger. And yet one might also say that

her words contain truth in some mystical sense.

Reply Obj. 4: A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's

neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above

in this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything

inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as

neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except

perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore

it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any

danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth

prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x).

Reply Obj. 5: A man does not lie, so long as he has a mind to do what

he promises, because he does not speak contrary to what he has in

mind: but if he does not keep his promise, he seems to act without

faith in changing his mind. He may, however, be excused for two

reasons. First, if he has promised something evidently unlawful,

because he sinned in promise, and did well to change his mind.

Secondly, if circumstances have changed with regard to persons and

the business in hand. For, as Seneca states (De Benef. iv), for a man

to be bound to keep a promise, it is necessary for everything to

remain unchanged: otherwise neither did he lie in promising--since he

promised what he had in his mind, due circumstances being taken for

granted--nor was he faithless in not keeping his promise, because

circumstances are no longer the same. Hence the Apostle, though he

did not go to Corinth, whither he had promised to go (2 Cor. 1), did

not lie, because obstacles had arisen which prevented him.

Reply Obj. 6: An action may be considered in two ways. First, in

itself, secondly, with regard to the agent. Accordingly a jocose lie,

from the very genus of the action, is of a nature to deceive;

although in the intention of the speaker it is not told to deceive,

nor does it deceive by the way it is told. Nor is there any

similarity in the hyperbolical or any kind of figurative expressions,

with which we meet in Holy Writ: because, as Augustine says (Lib. De

Mend. v), "it is not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively: because

every statement must be referred to the thing stated: and when a

thing is done or said figuratively, it states what those to whom it

is tendered understand it to signify."

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 704 / 1128 题