Whether Lies Are Sufficiently Divided into Officious, Jocose, and
Mischievous Lies?
Objection 1: It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided into
"officious," "jocose" and "mischievous" lies. For a division should
be made according to that which pertains to a thing by reason of its
nature, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vii, text. 43; De Part.
Animal i, 3). But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting
from a moral act is something beside and accidental to the species of
that act, so that an indefinite number of effects can result from one
act. Now this division is made according to the intention of the
effect: for a "jocose" lie is told in order to make fun, an
"officious" lie for some useful purpose, and a "mischievous" lie in
order to injure someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly divided in
this way.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac. xiv) gives eight kinds of
lies. The first is "in religious doctrine"; the second is "a lie that
profits no one and injures someone"; the third "profits one party so
as to injure another"; the fourth is "told out of mere lust of lying
and deceiving"; the fifth is "told out of the desire to please"; the
sixth "injures no one, and profits someone in saving his money"; the
seventh "injures no one and profits someone in saving him from
death"; the eighth "injures no one, and profits someone in saving him
from defilement of the body." Therefore it seems that the first
division of lies is insufficient.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) divides lying into
"boasting," which exceeds the truth in speech, and "irony," which
falls short of the truth by saying something less: and these two are
not contained under any one of the kinds mentioned above. Therefore
it seems that the aforesaid division of lies is inadequate.
_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy all that
speak a lie," says "that there are three kinds of lies; for some are
told for the wellbeing and convenience of someone; and there is
another kind of lie that is told in fun; but the third kind of lie is
told out of malice." The first of these is called an officious lie,
the second a jocose lie, the third a mischievous lie. Therefore lies
are divided into these three kinds.
_I answer that,_ Lies may be divided in three ways. First, with
respect to their nature as lies: and this is the proper and essential
division of lying. In this way, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
iv, 7), lies are of two kinds, namely, the lie which goes beyond the
truth, and this belongs to "boasting," and the lie which stops short
of the truth, and this belongs to "irony." This division is an
essential division of lying itself, because lying as such is opposed
to truth, as stated in the preceding Article: and truth is a kind of
equality, to which more and less are in essential opposition.
Secondly, lies may be divided with respect to their nature as sins,
and with regard to those things that aggravate or diminish the sin of
lying, on the part of the end intended. Now the sin of lying is
aggravated, if by lying a person intends to injure another, and this
is called a "mischievous" lie, while the sin of lying is diminished
if it be directed to some good--either of pleasure and then it is a
"jocose" lie, or of usefulness, and then we have the "officious" lie,
whereby it is intended to help another person, or to save him from
being injured. In this way lies are divided into the three kinds
aforesaid.
Thirdly, lies are divided in a more general way, with respect to
their relation to some end, whether or not this increase or diminish
their gravity: and in this way the division comprises eight kinds, as
stated in the Second Objection. Here the first three kinds are
contained under "mischievous" lies, which are either against God, and
then we have the lie "in religious doctrine," or against man, and
this either with the sole intention of injuring him, and then it is
the second kind of lie, which "profits no one, and injures someone";
or with the intention of injuring one and at the same time profiting
another, and this is the third kind of lie, "which profits one, and
injures another." Of these the first is the most grievous, because
sins against God are always more grievous, as stated above (I-II, Q.
73, A. 3): and the second is more grievous than the third, since the
latter's gravity is diminished by the intention of profiting another.
After these three, which aggravate the sin of lying, we have a
fourth, which has its own measure of gravity without addition or
diminution; and this is the lie which is told "out of mere lust of
lying and deceiving." This proceeds from a habit, wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "the liar, when he lies from
habit, delights in lying."
The four kinds that follow lessen the gravity of the sin of lying.
For the fifth kind is the jocose lie, which is told "with a desire to
please": and the remaining three are comprised under the officious
lie, wherein something useful to another person is intended. This
usefulness regards either external things, and then we have the sixth
kind of lie, which "profits someone in saving his money"; or his
body, and this is the seventh kind, which "saves a man from death";
or the morality of his virtue, and this is the eighth kind, which
"saves him from unlawful defilement of his body."
Now it is evident that the greater the good intended, the more is the
sin of lying diminished in gravity. Wherefore a careful consideration
of the matter will show that these various kinds of lies are
enumerated in their order of gravity: since the useful good is better
than the pleasurable good, and life of the body than money, and
virtue than the life of the body.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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