Whether Observance Is a Special Virtue, Distinct from Other Virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that observance is not a special virtue,
distinct from other virtues. For virtues are distinguished by their
objects. But the object of observance is not distinct from the object
of piety: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by
observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some
kind of dignity." But worship and honor are paid also by piety to our
parents, who excel in dignity. Therefore observance is not a distinct
virtue from piety.
Obj. 2: Further, just as honor and worship are due to those that are
in a position of dignity, so also are they due to those who excel in
science and virtue. But there is no special virtue whereby we pay
honor and worship to those who excel in science and virtue. Therefore
observance, whereby we pay worship and honor to those who excel in
dignity, is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues.
Obj. 3: Further, we have many duties towards those who are in a
position of dignity, the fulfilment of which is required by law,
according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their dues: tribute
to whom tribute is due," etc. Now the fulfilment of the requirements
of the law belongs to legal justice, or even to special justice.
Therefore observance is not by itself a special virtue distinct from
other virtues.
_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons observance
along with the other parts of justice, which are special virtues.
_I answer that,_ As explained above (Q. 101, AA. 1, 3; Q. 80),
according to the various excellences of those persons to whom
something is due, there must needs be a corresponding distinction of
virtues in a descending order. Now just as a carnal father partakes
of the character of principle in a particular way, which character is
found in God in a universal way, so too a person who, in some way,
exercises providence in one respect, partakes of the character of
father in a particular way, since a father is the principle of
generation, of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the
perfection of human life: while a person who is in a position of
dignity is as a principle of government with regard to certain
things: for instance, the governor of a state in civil matters, the
commander of an army in matters of warfare, a professor in matters of
learning, and so forth. Hence it is that all such persons are
designated as "fathers," on account of their being charged with like
cares: thus the servants of Naaman said to him (4 Kings 5:13):
"Father, if the prophet had bid thee do some great thing," etc.
Therefore, just as, in a manner, beneath religion, whereby worship is
given to God, we find piety, whereby we worship our parents; so under
piety we find observance, whereby worship and honor are paid to
persons in positions of dignity.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 101, A. 3, ad 2), religion goes by
the name of piety by way of supereminence, although piety properly so
called is distinct from religion; and in the same way piety can be
called observance by way of excellence, although observance properly
speaking is distinct from piety.
Reply Obj. 2: By the very fact of being in a position of dignity a
man not only excels as regards his position, but also has a certain
power of governing subjects, wherefore it is fitting that he should
be considered as a principle inasmuch as he is the governor of
others. On the other hand, the fact that a man has perfection of
science and virtue does not give him the character of a principle in
relation to others, but merely a certain excellence in himself.
Wherefore a special virtue is appointed for the payment of worship
and honor to persons in positions of dignity. Yet, forasmuch as
science, virtue and all like things render a man fit for positions of
dignity, the respect which is paid to anyone on account of any
excellence whatever belongs to the same virtue.
Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to special justice, properly speaking, to
pay the equivalent to those to whom we owe anything. Now this cannot
be done to the virtuous, and to those who make good use of their
position of dignity, as neither can it be done to God, nor to our
parents. Consequently these matters belong to an annexed virtue, and
not to special justice, which is a principal virtue.
Legal justice extends to the acts of all the virtues, as stated above
(Q. 58, A. 6).
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