Whether the Authority of a Prelate Is Required for the Commutation or
the Dispensation of a Vow?
Objection 1: It would seem that the authority of a prelate is not
required for the commutation or dispensation of a vow. A person may
enter religion without the authority of a superior prelate. Now by
entering religion one is absolved from the vows he made in the world,
even from the vow of making a pilgrimage to the Holy Land [*Cap.
Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.]. Therefore the commutation or
dispensation of a vow is possible without the authority of a superior
prelate.
Obj. 2: Further, to dispense anyone from a vow seems to consist in
deciding in what circumstances he need not keep that vow. But if the
prelate is at fault in his decision, the person who took the vow does
not seem to be absolved from his vow, since no prelate can grant a
dispensation contrary to the divine precept about keeping one's vows,
as stated above (A. 10, ad 2; A. 11). Likewise, when anyone rightly
determines of his own authority that in his case a vow is not to be
kept, he would seem not to be bound; since a vow need not be kept if
it have an evil result (A. 2, ad 2). Therefore the Authority of a
prelate is not required that one may be dispensed from a vow.
Obj. 3: Further, if it belongs to a prelate's power to grant
dispensations from vows, on the same count it is competent to all
prelates, but it does not belong to all to dispense from every vow.
Therefore it does not belong to the power of a prelate to dispense
from vows.
_On the contrary,_ A vow binds one to do something, even as a law
does. Now the superior's authority is requisite for a dispensation
from a precept of the law, as stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 6; Q. 97,
A. 4). Therefore it is likewise required in a dispensation from a vow.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), a vow is a promise made
to God about something acceptable to Him. Now if you promise
something to anyone it depends on his decision whether he accept what
you promise. Again in the Church a prelate stands in God's place.
Therefore a commutation or dispensation of vows requires the
authority of a prelate who in God's stead declares what is acceptable
to God, according to 2 Cor. 2:10: "For [I] . . . have pardoned . . .
for your sakes . . . in the person of Christ." And he says
significantly "for your sakes," since whenever we ask a prelate for a
dispensation we should do so to honor Christ in Whose person he
dispenses, or to promote the interests of the Church which is His
Body.
Reply Obj. 1: All other vows are about some particular works, whereas
by the religious life a man consecrates his whole life to God's
service. Now the particular is included in the universal, wherefore a
Decretal [*Cap. Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.] says that "a
man is not deemed a vow-breaker if he exchange a temporal service for
the perpetual service of religion." And yet a man who enters religion
is not bound to fulfil the vows, whether of fasting or of praying or
the like, which he made when in the world, because by entering
religion he dies to his former life, and it is unsuitable to the
religious life that each one should have his own observances, and
because the burden of religion is onerous enough without requiring
the addition of other burdens.
Reply Obj. 2: Some have held that prelates can dispense from vows at
their will, for the reason that every vow supposes as a condition
that the superior prelate be willing; thus it was stated above (A. 8)
that the vow of a subject, e.g. of a slave or a son, supposes this
condition, if "the father or master consent," or "does not dissent."
And thus a subject might break his vow without any remorse of
conscience, whenever his superior tells him to.
But this opinion is based on a false supposition: because a spiritual
prelate being, not a master, but a dispenser, his power is given
"unto edification, not for destruction" (2 Cor. 10:8), and
consequently, just as he cannot command that which is in itself
displeasing to God, namely, sin, so neither can he forbid what is in
itself pleasing to God, namely, works of virtue. Therefore absolutely
speaking man can vow them. But it does belong to a prelate to decide
what is the more virtuous and the more acceptable to God.
Consequently in matters presenting no difficulty, the prelate's
dispensation would not excuse one from sin: for instance, if a
prelate were to dispense a person from a vow to enter the religious
life, without any apparent cause to prevent him from fulfilling his
vow. But if some cause were to appear, giving rise, at least, to
doubt, he could hold to the prelate's decision whether of commutation
or of dispensation. He could not, however, follow his own judgment in
the matter, because he does not stand in the place of God; except
perhaps in the case when the thing he has vowed is clearly unlawful,
and he is unable to have recourse to the prelate.
Reply Obj. 3: Since the Sovereign Pontiff holds the place of Christ
throughout the whole Church, he exercises absolute power of
dispensing from all vows that admit of dispensation. To other and
inferior prelates is the power committed of dispensing from those
vows that are commonly made and frequently require dispensation, in
order that men may easily have recourse to someone; such are the vows
of pilgrimage (Cap. de Peregin., de Voto et Voti redempt.), fasting
and the like, and of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, are reserved to the
Sovereign Pontiff [*Cap. Ex multa].
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