Whether It Is Possible to Be Dispensed from a Solemn Vow of
Continency?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is possible to be dispensed from a
solemn vow of continency. As stated above, one reason for granting a
dispensation from a vow is if it be an obstacle to a greater good.
But a vow of continency, even though it be solemn, may be an obstacle
to a greater good, since the common good is more God-like than the
good of an individual. Now one man's continency may be an obstacle to
the good of the whole community, for instance, in the case where, if
certain persons who have vowed continency were to marry, the peace of
their country might be procured. Therefore it seems that it is
possible to be dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency.
Obj. 2: Further, religion is a more excellent virtue than chastity.
Now if a man vows an act of religion, e.g. to offer sacrifice to God
he can be dispensed from that vow. Much more, therefore, can he be
dispensed from the vow of continency which is about an act of
chastity.
Obj. 3: Further, just as the observance of a vow of abstinence may be
a source of danger to the person, so too may be the observance of a
vow of continency. Now one who takes a vow of abstinence can be
dispensed from that vow if it prove a source of danger to his body.
Therefore for the same reason one may be dispensed from a vow of
continency.
Obj. 4: Further, just as the vow of continency is part of the
religious profession, whereby the vow is solemnized, so also are the
vows of poverty and obedience. But it is possible to be dispensed
from the vows of poverty and obedience, as in the case of those who
are appointed bishops after making profession. Therefore it seems
that it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 26:20): "No price is worthy
of a continent soul."
Further, (Extra, De Statu Monach.) at the end of the Decretal, _Cum
ad Monasterium,_ it is stated that the "renouncing of property, like
the keeping of chastity, is so bound up with the monastic rule, that
not even the Sovereign Pontiff can disperse from its observance."
_I answer that,_ Three things may be considered in a solemn vow of
continency: first, the matter of the vow, namely, continency;
secondly, the perpetuity of the vow, namely, when a person binds
himself by vow to the perpetual observance of chastity: thirdly, the
solemnity of the vow. Accordingly, some [*William of Auxerre, Sum.
Aur. III. vii. 1, qu. 5] say that the solemn vow cannot be a matter
of dispensation, on account of the continency itself for which no
worthy price can be found, as is stated by the authority quoted
above. The reason for this is assigned by some to the fact that by
continency man overcomes a foe within himself, or to the fact that by
continency man is perfectly conformed to Christ in respect of purity
of both body and soul. But this reason does not seem to be cogent
since the goods of the soul, such as contemplation and prayer, far
surpass the goods of the body and still more conform us to God, and
yet one may be dispensed from a vow of prayer or contemplation.
Therefore, continency itself absolutely considered seems no reason
why the solemn vow thereof cannot be a matter of dispensation;
especially seeing that the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:34) exhorts us to be
continent on account of contemplation, when he says that the
unmarried woman . . . "thinketh on the things of God [Vulg.: 'the
Lord']," and since the end is of more account than the means.
Consequently others [*Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38] find the
reason for this in the perpetuity and universality of this vow. For
they assert that the vow of continency cannot be canceled, save by
something altogether contrary thereto, which is never lawful in any
vow. But this is evidently false, because just as the practice of
carnal intercourse is contrary to continency, so is eating flesh or
drinking wine contrary to abstinence from such things, and yet these
latter vows may be a matter for dispensation.
For this reason others [*Innocent IV, on the above decretal] maintain
that one may be dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency, for
the sake of some common good or common need, as in the case of the
example given above (Obj. 1), of a country being restored to peace
through a certain marriage to be contracted. Yet since the Decretal
quoted says explicitly that "not even the Sovereign Pontiff can
dispense a monk from keeping chastity," it follows seemingly, that we
must maintain that, as stated above (A. 10, ad 1; cf. Lev. 27:9, 10,
28), whatsoever has once been sanctified to the Lord cannot be put to
any other use. For no ecclesiastical prelate can make that which is
sanctified to lose its consecration, not even though it be something
inanimate, for instance a consecrated chalice to be not consecrated,
so long as it remains entire. Much less, therefore, can a prelate
make a man that is consecrated to God cease to be consecrated, so
long as he lives. Now the solemnity of a vow consists in a kind of
consecration or blessing of the person who takes the vow, as stated
above (A. 7). Hence no prelate of the Church can make a man, who has
pronounced a solemn vow, to be quit of that to which he was
consecrated, e.g. one who is a priest, to be a priest no more,
although a prelate may, for some particular reason, inhibit him from
exercising his order. In like manner the Pope cannot make a man who
has made his religious profession cease to be a religious, although
certain jurists have ignorantly held the contrary.
We must therefore consider whether continency is essentially bound up
with the purpose for which the vow is solemnized. Because if not, the
solemnity of the consecration can remain without the obligation of
continency, but not if continency is essentially bound up with that
for which the vow is solemnized. Now the obligation of observing
continency is connected with Holy Orders, not essentially but by the
institution of the Church; wherefore it seems that the Church can
grant a dispensation from the vow of continency solemnized by the
reception of Holy Orders. On the other hand the obligation of
observing continency is an essential condition of the religious
state, whereby a man renounces the world and binds himself wholly to
God's service, for this is incompatible with matrimony, in which
state a man is under the obligation of taking to himself a wife, of
begetting children, of looking after his household, and of procuring
whatever is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore the Apostle says
(1 Cor. 7:33) that "he that is with a wife, is solicitous for the
things of the world, how he may please his wife; and he is divided."
Hence the "monk" takes his name from "unity" [*The Greek _monos_] in
contrast with this division. For this reason the Church cannot
dispense from a vow solemnized by the religious profession; and the
reason assigned by the Decretal is because "chastity is bound up with
the monastic rule."
Reply Obj. 1: Perils occasioned by human affairs should be obviated
by human means, not by turning divine things to a human use. Now a
professed religious is dead to the world and lives to God, and so he
must not be called back to the human life on the pretext of any human
contingency.
Reply Obj. 2: A vow of temporal continency can be a matter of
dispensation, as also a vow of temporal prayer or of temporal
abstinence. But the fact that no dispensation can be granted from a
vow of continency solemnized by profession is due, not to its being
an act of chastity, but because through the religious profession it
is already an act of religion.
Reply Obj. 3: Food is directly ordered to the upkeep of the person,
therefore abstinence from food may be a direct source of danger to
the person: and so on this count a vow of abstinence is a matter of
dispensation. On the other hand sexual intercourse is directly
ordered to the upkeep not of the person but of the species, wherefore
to abstain from such intercourse by continency does not endanger the
person. And if indeed accidentally it prove a source of danger to the
person, this danger may be obviated by some other means, for instance
by abstinence, or other corporal remedies.
Reply Obj. 4: A religious who is made a bishop is no more absolved
from his vow of poverty than from his vow of continency, since he
must have nothing of his own and must hold himself as being the
dispenser of the common goods of the Church. In like manner neither
is he dispensed from his vow of obedience; it is an accident that he
is not bound to obey if he have no superior; just as the abbot of a
monastery, who nevertheless is not dispensed from his vow of
obedience.
The passage of Ecclesiasticus, which is put forward in the contrary
sense, should be taken as meaning that neither fruitfulness of the of
the flesh nor any bodily good is to be compared with continency,
which is reckoned one of the goods of the soul, as Augustine declares
(De Sanct. Virg. viii). Wherefore it is said pointedly "of a
continent soul," not "of a continent body."
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