Whether a Vow Should Always Be About a Better Good?
Objection 1: It would seem that a vow need not be always about a
better good. A greater good is one that pertains to supererogation.
But vows are not only about matters of supererogation, but also about
matters of salvation: thus in Baptism men vow to renounce the devil
and his pomps, and to keep the faith, as a gloss observes on Ps.
75:12, "Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God"; and Jacob vowed (Gen.
28:21) that the Lord should be his God. Now this above all is
necessary for salvation. Therefore vows are not only about a better
good.
Obj. 2: Further, Jephte is included among the saints (Heb. 11:32).
Yet he killed his innocent daughter on account of his vow (Judges
11). Since, then, the slaying of an innocent person is not a better
good, but is in itself unlawful, it seems that a vow may be made not
only about a better good, but also about something unlawful.
Obj. 3: Further, things that tend to be harmful to the person, or
that are quite useless, do not come under the head of a better good.
Yet sometimes vows are made about immoderate vigils or fasts which
tend to injure the person: and sometimes vows are about indifferent
matters and such as are useful to no purpose. Therefore a vow is not
always about a better good.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 23:22): "If thou wilt not
promise thou shalt be without sin."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to
God. Now a promise is about something that one does voluntarily for
someone else: since it would be not a promise but a threat to say
that one would do something against someone. In like manner it would
be futile to promise anyone something unacceptable to him. Wherefore,
as every sin is against God, and since no work is acceptable to God
unless it be virtuous, it follows that nothing unlawful or
indifferent, but only some act of virtue, should be the matter of a
vow. But as a vow denotes a voluntary promise, while necessity
excludes voluntariness, whatever is absolutely necessary, whether to
be or not to be, can nowise be the matter of a vow. For it would be
foolish to vow that one would die or that one would not fly.
On the other hand, if a thing be necessary, not absolutely but on the
supposition of an end--for instance if salvation be unattainable
without it--it may be the matter of a vow in so far as it is done
voluntarily, but not in so far as there is a necessity for doing it.
But that which is not necessary, neither absolutely, nor on the
supposition of an end, is altogether voluntary, and therefore is most
properly the matter of a vow. And this is said to be a greater good
in comparison with that which is universally necessary for salvation.
Therefore, properly speaking, a vow is said to be about a better good.
Reply Obj. 1: Renouncing the devil's pomps and keeping the faith of
Christ are the matter of baptismal vows, in so far as these things
are done voluntarily, although they are necessary for salvation. The
same answer applies to Jacob's vow: although it may also be explained
that Jacob vowed that he would have the Lord for his God, by giving
Him a special form of worship to which he was not bound, for instance
by offering tithes and so forth as mentioned further on in the same
passage.
Reply Obj. 2: Certain things are good, whatever be their result; such
are acts of virtue, and these can be, absolutely speaking, the matter
of a vow: some are evil, whatever their result may be; as those
things which are sins in themselves, and these can nowise be the
matter of a vow: while some, considered in themselves, are good, and
as such may be the matter of a vow, yet they may have an evil result,
in which case the vow must not be kept. It was thus with the vow of
Jephte, who as related in Judges 11:30, 31, "made a vow to the Lord,
saying: If Thou wilt deliver the children of Ammon into my hands,
whosoever shall first come forth out of the doors of my house, and
shall meet me when I return in peace . . . the same will I offer a
holocaust to the Lord." For this could have an evil result if, as
indeed happened, he were to be met by some animal which it would be
unlawful to sacrifice, such as an ass or a human being. Hence Jerome
says [*Implicitly 1 Contra Jovin.: Comment. in Micheam vi, viii:
Comment. in Jerem. vii. The quotation is from Peter Comestor, Hist.
Scholast.]: "In vowing he was foolish, through lack of discretion,
and in keeping his vow he was wicked." Yet it is premised (Judges
11:29) that "the Spirit of the Lord came upon him," because his faith
and devotion, which moved him to make that vow, were from the Holy
Ghost; and for this reason he is reckoned among the saints, as also
by reason of the victory which he obtained, and because it is
probable that he repented of his sinful deed, which nevertheless
foreshadowed something good.
Reply Obj. 3: The mortification of one's own body, for instance by
vigils and fasting, is not acceptable to God except in so far as it
is an act of virtue; and this depends on its being done with due
discretion, namely, that concupiscence be curbed without
overburdening nature. On this condition such things may be the matter
of a vow. Hence the Apostle after saying (Rom. 12:1), "Present your
bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God," adds, "your
reasonable service." Since, however, man is easily mistaken in
judging of matters concerning himself, such vows as these are more
fittingly kept or disregarded according to the judgment of a
superior, yet so that, should a man find that without doubt he is
seriously burdened by keeping such a vow, and should he be unable to
appeal to his superior, he ought not to keep it. As to vows about
vain and useless things they should be ridiculed rather than kept.
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