Whether a Vow Consists in a Mere Purpose of the Will?
Objection 1: It would seem that a vow consists in nothing but a
purpose of the will. According to some [*William of Auxerre, Sum.
Aur. III, xxviii, qu. 1; Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38], "a vow is
a conception of a good purpose after a firm deliberation of the mind,
whereby a man binds himself before God to do or not to do a certain
thing." But the conception of a good purpose and so forth, may
consist in a mere movement of the will. Therefore a vow consists in a
mere purpose of the will.
Obj. 2: Further, the very word vow seems to be derived from
_voluntas_ (will), for one is said to do a thing _proprio voto_ (by
one's own vow) when one does it voluntarily. Now to _purpose_ is an
act of the will, while to _promise_ is an act of the reason.
Therefore a vow consists in a mere act of the will.
Obj. 3: Further, our Lord said (Luke 9:62): "No man putting his hand
to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God." Now
from the very fact that a man has a purpose of doing good, he puts
his hand to the plough. Consequently, if he look back by desisting
from his good purpose, he is not fit for the kingdom of God.
Therefore by a mere good purpose a man is bound before God, even
without making a promise; and consequently it would seem that a vow
consists in a mere purpose of the will.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:3): "If thou hast vowed
anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish
promise displeaseth Him." Therefore to vow is to promise, and a vow
is a promise.
_I answer that,_ A vow denotes a binding to do or omit some
particular thing. Now one man binds himself to another by means of a
promise, which is an act of the reason to which faculty it belongs to
direct. For just as a man by commanding or praying, directs, in a
fashion, what others are to do for him, so by promising he directs
what he himself is to do for another. Now a promise between man and
man can only be expressed in words or any other outward signs;
whereas a promise can be made to God by the mere inward thought,
since according to 1 Kings 16:7, "Man seeth those things that appear,
but the Lord beholdeth the heart." Yet we express words outwardly
sometimes, either to arouse ourselves, as was stated above with
regard to prayer (Q. 83, A. 12), or to call others to witness, so
that one may refrain from breaking the vow, not only through fear of
God, but also through respect of men. Now a promise is the outcome
from a purpose of doing something: and a purpose presupposes
deliberation, since it is the act of a deliberate will. Accordingly
three things are essential to a vow: the first is deliberation; the
second is a purpose of the will; and the third is a promise, wherein
is completed the nature of a vow. Sometimes, however, two other
things are added as a sort of confirmation of the vow, namely,
pronouncement by word of mouth, according to Ps. 65:13, "I will pay
Thee my vows which my lips have uttered"; and the witnessing of
others. Hence the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 38) that a vow is "the
witnessing of a spontaneous promise and ought to be made to God and
about things relating to God": although the "witnessing" may strictly
refer to the inward protestation.
Reply Obj. 1: The conceiving of a good purpose is not confirmed by
the deliberation of the mind, unless the deliberation lead to a
promise.
Reply Obj. 2: Man's will moves the reason to promise something
relating to things subject to his will, and a vow takes its name from
the will forasmuch as it proceeds from the will as first mover.
Reply Obj. 3: He that puts his hand to the plough does something
already; while he that merely purposes to do something does nothing
so far. When, however, he promises, he already sets about doing,
although he does not yet fulfil his promise: even so, he that puts
his hand to the plough does not plough yet, nevertheless he stretches
out his hand for the purpose of ploughing.
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